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outcomes of Federal civilianization of the military have focused predominantly on 
economic outcomes and have failed to confirm or refute its effectiveness as a 
management strategy.  In this study I argue that social-psychological outcomes must be 
considered in evaluating the effects of military civilianization.  Data gathered from case 
studies of the Navy and Army are path analyzed to determine the direct and indirect 
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1Chapter 1.  Introduction: Civilianization of the Military
There has been a massive push in the past decade to transfer jobs formerly 
performed by military personnel to civilian Department of Defense employees or civilian 
contractors.  This trend has accelerated with the U.S. military’s global efforts to combat 
terrorism, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The impact of integrating military and 
civilian personnel at all levels of the military organization is not well understood.  This 
study addresses the impact that structural change brought on by civilianizing the military 
has on the attitudes and behavioral intentions of military and civilian personnel.  Two 
military units, one Navy and one Army, are used as case studies to examine this question.  
This study uses level of contact, and social comparisons, between civilian and military 
personnel as two civilianization-related variables predicted to impact retention intentions 
directly, and indirectly through job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
The Civilian-Military Distinction
Military actions, and the individuals who carry out those actions, are often viewed 
as separate from the everyday, mundane procession of individuals’ lives in the general 
populace.  The culture that surrounds the military is distinct from that of its host (civilian) 
society.  Military culture places a high priority on public service to the extent that 
normative pressures are placed on both service members and their spouses (generally 
wives) to engage in community activities (Harrel 2001).  The military is intentionally and 
overtly formal and hierarchical, and uses uniforms, insignia, decorations, and prescribed 
language to express these highly valued aspects of their culture publicly.  The military 
also has a separate legal and judicial system from civilian society: the Uniform Code of 
2Military Justice (UCMJ).  The norms, rituals, rules, and expectations of life in the 
military are intentional social constructs that allow those in the military to plan for and 
execute actions that are directly antagonistic in many ways to those adhered to in its 
ambient society (Huntington 1957).  
The balance between inclusion and differentiation between the military and its 
host society has been debated in the literature since the 1960s.  Janowitz (1960) argued 
that the military should be tightly integrated into the fabric of its host society.  For him, 
service members should not be separated from broader society.   In the other camp, 
Huntington (1957) claimed that the progressively liberal society was weakening the 
traditional values and principles of the military that are necessary for its proper 
functioning.  He argued for more clear and complete separation of military personnel 
from civilian society in an attempt to shield its members from the growing dysfunction of 
society.
The debate over the nature, extent, and import of the civil-military gap witnessed 
renewed vigor in the 1990s (Ricks 1997).  In terms similar to those used by Janowitz and 
Huntington, this debate centers on whether and to what extent a gap exists between those 
in military service and the rest of society on issues such as morals, religiosity, 
nationalism/patriotism, political ideology, and attitudes on a broad range of socio-
political issues (Feaver et al. 2001 ; Ricks 1997).  At the core of these debates is the issue 
of differentiation between military personnel and civilians.  A fundamental concern of 
those engaged with these debates is the tension between the two groups.  While those in 
the Huntington (1957) camp argue that it is best for the military to be separate and 
distinct, others argue that separateness and distinctiveness between groups is unhealthy –
even dangerous (Janowitz 1960; Ricks 1997).
3What it Means to be Military
In the broadest sense, the military is the institutionalization of the state’s 
monopoly on violence (see Weber 1958).  Militariness may be measured by the 
probability of being injured or killed for the common good (i.e., one’s country, or even 
abstract principles such as liberty or sovereignty) (Biderman 1967).  If this is taken as the 
appropriate measure, then our current military is much less military than in prior eras.  
Technology is a primary reason for the reduced chances among service members of being 
killed or injured for the common good.  Technology has affected this outcome in three 
ways.  First, technology has improved the survivability of American service members 
through inventions such as Kevlar body armor, improved intelligence capabilities that can 
detect and monitor dangerous people and weapons, and advances in medical technology 
to treat injuries sustained by military personnel.  Second, the U.S. military’s technological 
sophistication has made deterrence a viable option in most instances, preventing service 
members from having to engage in conflicts that might otherwise erupt.   Third, when 
conflict is inevitable, the technological sophistication that the U.S. military is able to 
bring to bear is unparalleled, and when combined with decisive battle tactics (Hanson
1989) it reduces the likelihood of injury and death for U.S. personnel by limiting the 
duration of conventional threats that are the most taxin g in terms of the quantity of 
injuries and deaths among service members.
On the opposite side of the issue, the types of duties performed by civilians in 
support of military operations and the changed nature of warfare that effectively 
eliminates the distinction between front lines and rear positions (Avant 2004), civilians 
appear to be gaining in militariness.  Civilians are being integrated with the U.S. military 
4in forward deployed locations and it is not uncommon for contractors presently in Iraq to 
have firearms for self-defense.  Moreover, and more significant, is that the asymmetric 
threat presented by the insurgents in Iraq and terror networks worldwide do not 
discriminate between uniformed military personnel and civilians.  In his open videotapes 
Osama bin Laden has stated unequivocally that he and his followers do not differentiate 
between military and civilian, they are all equally viable targets.1  The general American 
public at home, and especially the civilians deployed overseas in support of the military 
missions, is at risk.  This has been made patently clear by the attacks of September 11, 
2001; the public desecration of four Blackwater civilian contract employees in Fallujah, 
Iraq in March of 2004; and the kidnapping and public beheading (via internet broadcast) 
of civilian contractors working in Iraq.
Alternately, if militariness is defined by the degree of sacrifice demanded by the 
institution of the service member (Biderman 1967), then there is a distinct difference 
between service members and civilians.  Service members and civilians operate under 
separate legal and judicial systems.  Failing to comply with directives from supervisors 
has very different consequences for the two groups.  Whereas the military more or less 
owns the service member and can coerce physical tasks, extra duty, and even press 
criminal charges for failing to follow orders, supervisors and employers have much less 
latitude in dealing with civilian employees who fail to execute directives satisfactorily.
What is military, or militariness, is also influenced by similarities and differences 
between military personnel and civilians.  Increased bureaucratization and rationalization 
1 At the most extreme, the Cold War that continues in Asia represents the ultimate in equal 
opportunity risk of death and injury across the military-civilian spectrum should one of North 
Korea’s nuclear bombs target Alaska.
5within the military (and society) in the modern era has pushed workers toward 
specialization.  Similarly, technological advances foster specialization among military 
and civilian personnel, and in this specialization the jobs of service members begin to 
mirror more closely jobs performed by civilians (Biderman 1967; Boëne 1990).  Thus, it 
is not clear where the line is drawn between jobs that constitute inherently military work 
and those that are non-military, but support the military – or whether this distinction itself 
is arbitrary and outdated.
Building on Biderman’s work, Boëne (1990) argued for understanding the 
military as two different components, the teeth (or combat component) and the tail (or the 
supply and support component).  The actions of those operating in the teeth of the 
military – i.e., the taking of life and destroying things by military personnel in the name 
of freedom, democracy, sovereignty – are not rational (Boëne 1990).  To counter this 
irrationality, there must be structural and normative boundaries surrounding military 
personnel and the actions they are called on to perform.  Even those in the tail (i.e., 
supply and support), who are not expected to kill people and destroy things in the course 
of their daily duties, must be prepared to do so.  Indeed, should the need arise, service 
members of all specialties are not only expected to perform such acts, they are duty bound 
to do so.  
Not only are these inherently military acts, killing people and destroying property 
in defense of freedom, democracy, sovereignty, they are uniquely military acts.   This 
behavior is explicitly prohibited for civilian contractors and Department of Defense 
civilian employees.  In fact, if they were to perform such acts they would forfeit their non-
combatant status and any benefits and protections that status might convey.
6Civilianization of the Military
The civilianization of the military is at the heart of the Institutional –
Occupational Model of military organization (Moskos 1977).  The institutional military is 
one in which Soldiers serve in response to a call to duty and honor.  Traditional values 
and norms are paramount in manning the armed forces in an institutional military, 
shaping the service members into a distinct and cohesive group (Moskos 1977). By 
fostering internalization of these values by their constituent members, the military is able 
to elicit performance and dedication above what might otherwise be expected (Moskos &
Wood 1988).
In contrast to the institutional military, individuals in an occupational military are 
driven by self-interest and the free market (Moskos 1977).  They are externally 
motivated, especially by monetary compensation. These occupational qualities run 
counter to the institutional model’s emphasis on the collective group’s benefit as 
expressed via values, norms, and internal motivation.
The Institutional–Occupational Model asserts that, “the overarching trend within 
the contemporary military is the erosion of the institutional format and the ascendancy of 
the occupational model” (Mokos’s 1977: 44).  This trend is linked to the influence of 
civilian norms and values on the military.  Until 1967 and the publication of the Gates 
Commission Report, the U.S. armed forces were characterized as an institutional military 
(Moskos 1977).  The Commission recommended conversion from a conscription based 
military force in America to one based on volunteers, recruited through the dynamics of 
the labor market (see Segal 1989).  Moskos observed the shift from conscription to an all-
volunteer force as a departure from military personnel engaging in public service through 
civic obligation and toward military “service” as another of many alternative jobs.  
7The shift to an all-volunteer force in 1973 compelled the military to compete for 
personnel with the private sector.  To be competitive, the military transformed its policies 
and manpower models.  Changes included:  adjustments in pay scales, the use of 
monetary and educational enlistment incentives, marketing campaigns highlighting the 
specialized training provided by the military, the development of more family friendly 
policies, and the increased recruitment and participation of women.  
The degree to which the military can civilianize and still retain its distinctive 
organizational identity remains to be seen.  The military currently engages in two forms 
of civilianization of personnel – DoD civilians and civilian contractors.  Though distinct 
in their organizational position, both types of civilian employees are central to the 
military’s strategy to increase efficiency and effectiveness.   These two categories of 
employees are best understood as variations of the same theme (i.e., civilianization), 
rather than categorically different forms of personnel within the total force.  Further, the 
way these civilians are integrated into and used by the armed forces may affect the extent
to which the organization is successful in this mission. 
Department of Defense Civilian Employees
The Department of Defense employs roughly 700,000 civilians which makes it the 
second largest Federal employer after the U.S. Postal Service (General Accounting Office
2003, hereafter GAO).  The DoD civilian workforce constitutes approximately 20% of 
the personnel working for the Department of Defense (Defense Manpower Data Center
2001).  The Army employs roughly one-third of these civilians, the Air Force and Navy 
approximately one-fourth each, and the remaining 12-15% are divided between the 
Marines and the general DoD department offices (Defense Manpower Data Center 2001).  
8These employees are hired through the same processes as any other Federal employee.
As civilians they are subject to the laws and procedures of the civilian legal and judicial 
system, as opposed to service members who fall under the laws and procedures of UCMJ.  
With few exceptions, pay for DoD civilians is set by the Federal general schedule (GS), 
the Federal wage system, or the Federal Senior Executive Service (SES) schedule.
The Department of Defense is in the midst of a major reorganization effort that 
includes fundamental changes in the type and allocation of personnel in the Department 
(GAO 2003; GAO 2004).  In 2003 the Department of Defense began plans for the 
development of a new department-wide personnel strategy aimed at consolidating the 
various civilian workforce plans it currently had in place. The move to integrate the DoD
civilian workforce was motivated by the goal of harnessing management resources to 
optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of allocating the scarce resources of the 
Department (Gruber 2003).  The DoD reorganization effort, culminating in the 
authorization of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) under the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, was mandated by the Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (CHR 2004; GAO 2003).  This 
reorganization of the DoD civilian workforce was designed to reduce redundancies in 
organizational management and centralize oversight of the workforce.  Further, the NSPS 
is designed with the explicit goal of providing managers with the ability to manage their 
civilian workers in a more flexible and efficient manner to respond to changing 
conditions relating to national defense needs.  To address the issue of attracting and 
retaining the highest quality personnel, the NSPS seeks to reduce the time and red tape 
associated with the hiring process, and to move to a promotion system based on merit as 
opposed to the historic precedent of promotion through tenure in the system.  The 
9increased number of DoD civilians performing jobs previously done by military personnel 
should be understood in the context of this more general transformation of the DoD 
workforce.
A number of reports voice concern over what has been called a crisis in the DoD 
civilian workforce (e.g., GAO 2003; GAO 2004).  The primary concern is the “significant 
imbalance in the shape, skills and experience of [the DoD] civilian workforce” (GAO 
2003: 4).  More than half of the DoD civilian workforce is within five years of age-
eligible retirement (GAO 2003; GAO 2004).  This imbalance in experience and 
knowledge has serious implications for the transfer of institutional knowledge and the 
potential for a leadership/management and skills vacuum in the wake of the baby-boomer 
retirements.  The NSPS was developed with the overt attempt to “more strategically 
manage [the DoD’s] workforce and respond to current and emerging challenges” (GAO 
2003: 4).
The Department of Defense recognizes the critical role that civilian employees 
play in the missions of the Department.  Jobs that DoD civilian employees perform 
include, but are not limited to, air traffic control, law enforcement, intelligence gathering 
and analysis, managing finances, crewing maritime ships, acquiring and maintaining 
weapons systems, and ever expanding roles in combat support functions (GAO 2003; 
Gruber 2003).  In the past decade the size of the DoD has been dramatically decreased.  
This has been a result of the general drawdown of forces as a result of the resolution of 
the European Cold War in the late 1980s and the recognition that cost savings are best 
achieved by reducing the number of workers on the payrolls (GAO 2001).  While the 
number of military personnel is expected to continue to decline (especially with the Navy 
and Air Force looking to reduce their numbers further), in the first two years of the NSPS 
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alone (i.e., 2004 and 2005), the DoD is planning to transfer 20,000 military positions to 
civilian employees (GAO 2004).  More civilianization conversions are anticipated in 
2006 and beyond.  The negative relationship between the number of military personnel 
and the number of civilians working for DoD is not a coincidence.  The demands on the 
military and its service members have increased dramatically over the same time that the 
number of military personnel has decreased.  In order to accomplish its missions, the 
Department of Defense, out of pure necessity if nothing else, was compelled to turn to 
civilians to pick up the slack.  Even in instances where the Department of Defense is 
downsizing its Federal civilian personnel, in many cases this translates into the 
outsourcing of these jobs through Office of Management and Budget A-76 (hereafter 
OMB A-76) competitions2 (GAO 2001).
The Department of Defense is increasingly relying on civilians to perform jobs 
that are critical to its mission success.  The two ways in which civilians are brought into 
the DoD’s total force are as civilian DoD employees and as DoD civilian contractors.  I 
argue that these two categories of workers represent differences in degree of 
civilianization of the military.  Conceptually, DoD civilians represent a less extreme form 
of civilianization of the military compared to the outsourcing of jobs via civilian 
contractors.  At a basic level, the civilianization of military jobs through transferring them 
to civilian Federal employees maintains the positions as public domain and a public 
resource.  Civilianizing jobs formerly performed by military personnel through 
contracting is a specific form of outsourcing: privatization.  In this instance, the job shifts 
from public to private domain and becomes much less transparent and is more subject to 
2 The OMB A-76 process will be discussed in more detail below.
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the demands and constraints of the marketplace.  
Another major issue is that Department of Defense employees may perform jobs 
that are inherently governmental – something that is not possible for civilian contractors.  
While certainly not all DoD civilians perform inherently governmental jobs, this 
distinction is a critical one differentiating these two groups of employees.  Finally, the 
DoD has more control (and purportedly better oversight) over DoD civilians than they do 
over civilian contractors.  Federal agencies do not engage in subcontracting as do civilian 
contracting firms.  Subcontracting has become a major issue with firms that have been 
awarded military contracts to provide goods and services to the various military 
departments.  Three major issues related to subcontracting include reduced quality of 
workmanship and products over what was expected having awarded the bid to a certain 
company, the use of foreign labor to execute the contract, and lack of oversight (Donahue 
1989; GAO 1995; Singer 2003).
Federal Outsourcing: OMB Circular A-76
The federal mandate driving the movement of jobs performed by federal 
employees to the private sector is the Office of Management and Budget circular A-76 
(OMB A-76) first issued in 1966.  This mandate was born from the belief that 
government should not compete with its citizens.  Rather, it should foster a free enterprise 
economy through contracting business to private industry based on identified needs 
(OMB 1999).  Revisions in 1967, 1979, 1983, 1999, and 2003, and an updated 
supplemental handbook issued in 1996 have kept outsourcing in the eye of Congress and 
the Federal agencies responsible for its implementation.  
OMB A-76 tasks the government with identifying any and all possible 
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government operated commercial activity, performing a cost-benefit analysis of all 
permissible jobs, and shifting the work to private industry whenever the work can be done 
as well or better at less cost (OMB 1999).  The term “permissible jobs” refers to the 
constraint that some jobs are considered inherently governmental (i.e., intimately related 
to the public interest), and are thus not subject to consideration for privatization.  Cost 
analyses and comparisons must be realistic and fair.3
There are four conditions under which governmental performance of commercial 
activities are expressly authorized: 1) no satisfactory commercial source is available, 2) 
issues of national defense, 3) patient care in government hospitals, and 4) when the 
government can provide the service at a lower cost than qualified businesses in the 
private sector (OMB 1999).
The goals of outsourcing mandated through OMB A-76 include increased 
effectiveness and efficiency of an organization’s operations, and increased cost savings.  
In order to achieve these goals, the following objectives are identified:
1.  Identify potential jobs for outsourcing
2. Perform a competitive cost analysis comparing in-house completion versus 
outsourcing for a given job.
3. Monitor contracts to evaluate the degree to which they achieve the program’s 
goals.
A thorough analysis of the effects of military outsourcing should also identify 
potential unanticipated outcomes.  A weakness of OMB A-76 is that if focuses on 
economic outcomes to the exclusion of social outcomes.  Social outcomes may indirectly 
3 New guidelines that take effect in 2005 will allow A-76 competition evaluators to use best 
value as a criterion in determining the best proposal.  Currently, the process rewards contracts to 
the cheapest bid – which is often not the best value.  This change is expected to increase the 
proportion of A-76 competitions won by civilian contracting organizations (Hill 2005).
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affect the dependent variables of interest, and should be of concern to stakeholders.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2003) examined the effects of pecuniary versus social identity 
motivators in military and civilian settings.  They found that increasing employees’ 
identification with the organization (and thereby internalizing its goals and practices) has 
positive effects on employees’ production, net of pecuniary incentives.  This work is in 
the relatively new, but rapidly expanding tradition on transaction cost economics.  This 
field of economics focuses on the costs of “making exchange or the indirect production 
expenses” through motivation (i.e., motivating specialized interest agents to align their 
interests) and coordination (e.g., obtaining and coordinating production input, 
measurement costs) of expenses (Encycogov 2005).  In short, transaction cost economics 
focuses on the social-psychological factors affecting production costs.  The fact that 
Akerlof received the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics for his work in this area suggests 
that analyses of the military’s organizational outcomes should include social-
psychological as well as economic outcomes.  Thus, an additional objective should be 
added to those expressly identified by the federal mandate:
4. Evaluate the outsourcing program for potential unintended social-psychological 
consequences that might positively or negatively affect the program’s success.
The revised OMB A-76 (1999) states that it is U.S government policy to achieve 
economy and enhance productivity in providing federal services for the American people.  
Competition through free markets, it argues, improves quality of goods and services, 
increases economy, and enhances productivity. Though not stated in the OMB A-76 
circular explicitly, Bush’s (2002: 13) FY2002 management plan recognizes that social 
consequences should be considered as part of the outcome goals.  In his management 
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plan, Bush’s first priority is to “make government citizen centered” by reducing the layers 
of government through the dual processes of restructuring and downsizing.  Bush 
highlights the following short and long term goals.
Short Term Goals:  “Agencies will determine their ‘core competencies’ 
and decide whether to build internal capacity, or contract for services 
from the private sector.  This will maximize agencies’ flexibility in 
getting the job done effectively and efficiently” (Bush 2002: 14).
Long Term Goals:  “The workforce will adapt quickly in size, 
composition, and competencies to accommodate changes in mission, 
technology, and labor markets; Government employee satisfaction will 
increase; Civil service system will attract and retain talented people who 
will demand and deliver sustained excellence and high levels of 
performance; and Agencies will meet and exceed established 
productivity and performance goals” (Bush 2002: 14). 
The Effect of Contractors
Contractors are hired to increase the flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency of an 
organization by streamlining the full-time workforce and allowing it to focus on the core 
mission or specialty of the organization (Edwards 2002).  In the federal government, the 
use of private industry contractors is desirable whenever possible for the simple reason 
that the government should not compete with its citizens in producing products and 
performing services.  Despite these motivations, assessments of contractors, both 
objective and subjective, reveal that employing contractors is not necessarily achieving 
the intended goals (GAO 1995; GAO 2000; Singer 2003).  
Incorporating contractors into an organization’s structure may negatively impact 
social-psychological, structural, and economic outcomes.  Some full-time employees see 
the loss of jobs due to downsizing and/or contracting as a source of instability (Baron &
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Kreps 1999; Wong & McNally 1994).  The ambiguity of contractors’ status can also 
foster unease among full-time employees, as well as tension between full-time employees 
and contractors (Callan 1993; Nelson et al. 1995).  For example, with regard to the 
military, to whom does the civilian contractor answer and take directives (not orders!)?  
Will a given civilian contractor remain with his/her military peers when they are deployed 
(especially to a war zone)?  What are contractors’ job descriptions and can they perform 
duties not specifically itemized therein?  Depending on how questions such as there are 
answered, organizational effectiveness, efficiency, cost saving, and even morale may be 
negatively impacted.
The benefit most often cited in using contractors is cost effectiveness.  Assessments 
of contracting-out work by the federal government indicate that anticipated cost savings 
have not been clearly achieved.  For example, citing a multitude of hidden costs in 
employing contractors, Robbert (2003) states that the military’s reliance on civilian 
contractors is essentially as expensive as hiring service men and women, and could 
actually increase project costs.  While civilian contractors may “cost less as a rule, some of 
the savings are wiped out by the need for more oversight of contractor performance,” 
(Robbert 2003: 11) as well as overhead charges to execute the contracts.  The fact that the 
monetary impact of introducing contractors into the federal work force is not well 
understood is reflected in the GAO conclusion: 
We cannot convincingly prove nor disprove that the results of federal 
agencies’ contracting out decisions have been beneficial and cost-effective.
 GAO (1995: p.i)
One obvious example of the ambiguous relationship between contractors’ costs and 
benefits is the alleged contribution of poor contract oversight and lack of emphasis on 
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contractor performance outcomes by NASA to the Columbia space shuttle disaster (Broder 
2003; Smith & Stephens 2003; Smith et al. 2003).
The Effect of Outsourcing on Contractors
While many observers of the civilian contracting system in the military may view 
contractors as having more advantages than disadvantages in comparison to their military 
peers, the relationship between full-time employees and contractors is not as clear-cut in 
other arenas.  Contractors working for federal agencies other than DoD, as well as state 
agencies, may have some advantages in salary and flexibility; however, they do not have 
the job security, retirement benefits, and health benefits that their full-time peers enjoy.  
Private industry too has had a proliferation in the use of contracting.  Employees of 
private companies enjoy many of the same advantages as government full-time 
employees, with additional potential benefits such as stock options and bonuses (FindLaw 
2004; Moody 1997).  Some contractors are enticed by the flexibility and salary of 
contracting in the private sector.  Others resent the double standards set by some 
companies that disadvantage contractors relative to the full-time employees.  
Perhaps the most well-known of such instances were the successful lawsuits filed 
in early 1990s by contract IT workers against Microsoft claiming unfair discrimination in 
the workplace based on employment status (Levin 2002; Moody 1997).  Examples of 
differential treatment of contractors at Microsoft included providing contract workers 
with different color ID badges than regular employees, excluding contractors from 
company picnics, and banning contractors from using company social and recreation 
facilities (Levin 2002).  Levin (2002) argues that a company may intentionally use 
contractors as a way of signaling to those “employees” that they are not interested in a 
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long-term commitment.  An extension of this argument would suggest that contractors, by 
their very nature, are not committed to any given organization for which they perform 
work on behalf of their employer (i.e., their contracting firm).  For many organizations 
and job specialties this difference in commitment is not problematic.  For normative and 
safety reasons that will be discussed in more detail in later sections, this difference in 
commitment can be perceived negatively in the military, even to the extent that it may 
pose a physical threat to uniformed service members.
At its foundation, hiring employees as contractors (independent or via a 
contracting firm) institutionalizes a separateness among employees; this separateness by 
its very nature precludes equality.  In addition to tangibles like benefits, office space and 
the like, unequal status lends itself to coloring perceptions about those in the “other” 
group.  Natural comparisons between group members fuelled by ambiguity and potential 
threats to one’s own status, performance, job security, or physical safety can lead to 
segregation by worker status and generalized negative attitudes toward the “other” group.  
Thus, while introducing contractors into an organization inevitably has an impact on 
workers of both statuses, context matters with regard to which category of employees 
appear more advantaged or disadvantaged by the structural arrangement.
Military Outsourcing
If we look at …the Department of Defense we would see…a reduced official 
work force where we know how many people are employed and in what 
function, and what their salaries are in addition to a private contractor work 
force that has grown dramatically and at alarming rates.  Their influence and 
impact is becoming more and more significant.
David Pryor (2003, P. 45)
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Historical Context
The employment of civilians to enhance military strength has its roots in 
European and Middle Eastern practices of war.  Examples of military outsourcing 
include: mercenaries serving in the army of King Shulgi of Ur (2094-2047 B.C.E.);
private warriors fighting for Greek and Roman city-states; Condottieri - from the Italian 
“contract” - selling their skills around Europe in the middle ages; and privateers sailing 
for the European colonial powers (e.g., British East India Company) (Howard 1976; 
Singer 2003; Thomson 1994). Historically, outsourcing military functions has been the 
rule rather than the exception.  In the modern era the practice fell into disfavor, only to 
resurface as an open and legitimate convention of military organization within states in 
the late 20th century.
The use of civilian contractors by the U.S. military has been an integral part of the 
American war-making capacity since before the Civil War (Avant 2001; Robinson 2002;
Schwartz 2003).  Indeed, the history of outsourcing military functions in the U.S. 
parallels the history of national defense itself.  The multitude of contractors serving with 
the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq is a continuation of this trend.  However, this 
increased reliance on contractors in recent times should not be mistaken for a linear trend.  
To the extent that reliance on civilian contractors varies over time, the use of contractors 
is best understood as a continuous variable that ebbs and flows with the socio-political 
changes within and among states (Thomson 1994).
The end of the Cold War in Europe in the late 1980s brought about an 
organizational change in the U.S. military.  The armed forces shifted from a large 
standing professional force that had been dictated by the Soviet Union’s challenge as a 
world super power, to a smaller, more specialized fighting force.  Since the number of 
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missions and frequency of deployments have continued to rise in the wake of the 
European Cold War resolution, increasing numbers of civilian contractors have been 
hired to compensate for the reduction in military personnel (Avant 2002; Brooks 2001;
Lee 2002; Light 1999; Moskos 2000; Singer 2003).
Total Force
The movement to streamline the military as part of the “peace dividend,” is part of 
the larger “total force” concept.  The total force notion conceptualizes all military assets 
(i.e., regular forces, National Guard and Reserve forces, Coast Guard, DoD civilian 
employees, and civilian contractors) as part of an interdependent force, mustered when 
needed and stood down when possible.  This organization of defense forces is consonant 
with the pre-Cold War model of force structure and is expressly designed with flexibility, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in mind.
The notion of total force is one of great interest and import given the 
organizational changes in the military currently underway.  This organizational 
conceptualization raises a number of questions.  To what extent are contractors and DoD 
civilian employees truly part of the military organization?   When service members leave 
the military and join private military firms or return as DoD civilians, is it best 
understood as an issue of retention or a lateral move within the same organization?  
Alternatively, is the total force concept simply a marketing technique to build cohesion 
and solidarity among the various components of the “total force”?  Since civilian 
contractors and DoD civilians are already defined by the military as part of the total force 
should the government consider taking steps that would allow the military to deputize or 
conscript these individuals in times of national crisis for the sake of effectiveness, 
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efficiency, and cohesion?  While these questions are indeed important to contemplate, 
and will likely emerge as more central discussions among military, political, and 
academic leaders in the coming years, they are not central to this study.  The brief 
discussion of total force is intended to serve as part of the motivation for the current study 
as another example of the blurring of lines between what is military and what is not.
Civilianization of the Military in Practice
This study focuses on the effects of civilianization of the military on attitudes and 
behavioral intentions of military and civilian personnel that have the potential to impact 
the dynamics and structure of the military.  Regardless of the conceptualization or 
categories applied to the actors involved, I am interested in how the integration of 
structurally distinct groups of workers affects the attitudes and intended behaviors of 
employees within a specific organizational context.  Thus, the structure of the 
organization provides the context in which military and civilian personnel become 
explicit employment reference groups for each other, and as a result produces favorable 
or unfavorable views of one’s employment situation.
Unfavorable social comparisons may lead to reduced satisfaction for some while 
maintaining high levels of commitment.  Alternatively, even though satisfaction may be 
high as a result of some aspects of one’s work, other aspects may trump such satisfaction 
and promote reduced commitment and/or the intention to separate from the organization.  
For military personnel, decreased satisfaction and commitment may prompt separation 
from the military for a multitude of other employment options (contracting being only 
one), or with no other specific option in mind – only that employment with the military is 
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not desirable.  Contractors and DoD civilians may or may not have similar patterns of 
attitudes and behaviors as their military co-workers.
Jobs transferred to civilians may take the form of either product or service related 
jobs.  In addition to performing menial jobs such as grounds maintenance and various 
mess hall duties, the increased reliance on civilians “is due to the military’s greater 
reliance on technically complex weapons systems, with the corresponding need for 
technical experts, both contract and direct hires, to work in the field and at sea” 
(Robinson 2002: 21, see also Avant 2002 and Moskos 2000).  Light (1999) argues that if 
the service contract work force for DoD followed the same downward shift in numbers as 
the product-related contract work force from 1984 to 1996, the combined contract work 
force would have been reduced by approximately 3.4 million.  As it happened, the service 
contract work force increased 14% from 1984 to 1996.  In relative terms, the service 
contract proportion of the total DoD contract work force (i.e., product and service 
contracts) increased more than 50 percent from 1984 to 1996.  In actual numbers, this 
increase in service contractors accounted for approximately three quarters of the total 
DoD contract work force by 1996.  High-tech related jobs (e.g. installation, maintenance, 
integration, and operation of weapons and surveillance systems) account for nearly the 
entire 14% increase in civilian contractors employed by the Department of Defense over 
this time period.
The increasing technological sophistication required of many military specialties 
has resulted in a greater reliance on private sector support in order to maintain a cutting 
edge military.  Light (1999) notes that outsourcing is motivated by a desire to increase 
flexibility by targeting qualified labor for specific project goals without carrying long 
term costs for training and maintaining personnel (and their families).  Economic 
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constraints and personnel caps have also motivated force reductions and base closures.  
Thus, aside from soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines perhaps becoming more 
“occupation” oriented themselves (Moskos 1977), there has been a conscious effort to 
infuse into the military a pure form of occupationally oriented personnel via civilian 
contractors.  Indeed, today America’s military cannot function effectively without these 
contractors.  
Singer (2003) calculates the total number of full-time equivalent jobs generated by 
military contracts with private companies in 1996 at over 5.6 million. A recent report 
indicates that DoD plans to competitively source an additional 67,800 jobs, which 
constitutes approximately 17 percent of the department’s 410,700 commercial jobs 
(Phinney 2003).   Continued commitment to the wedding of civilian contractors with 
uniformed service members is witnessed in President Bush’s call for further increases in 
the use of contractors in the future.  The extent of civilian contractors employed for the 
current military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq testify to this ongoing commitment to 
outsource some formerly military functions.  For example, the number of civilian 
contractors used in the invasion of Iraq is estimated to be ten times that used in the first 
Gulf War (Singer in Van Dongen 2003).  Moskos (2000, 22) argues that is it “more than a 
historical footnote that the first American casualty in Operation Provide Comfort in 
Somalia was an Army civilian employee who died when the vehicle in which he was 
traveling hit a mine.”  Further, in February 2004 DoD announced that another 230,000 
military jobs would be considered for either outsourcing or transfer to the civil service 
(Barr 2004).
Yet with all the administrative, legal, and normative support for outsourcing of 
government functions, there has not been a systematic study of the non-monetary (i.e., 
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social-psychological) effects of such programs for the military.  Given that the military is 
responsible for national defense and protecting national interests abroad, in addition to 
the vast monetary sums allocated to the Department of Defense, an examination of the 
social-psychological and concomitant behavioral effects of a program of this magnitude is 
warranted.
The OMB A-76 Process in the Military
The OMB A-76 directive has met with varying levels of support and execution by 
presidential administrations over the years.  The Reagan administration used OMB A-76 
extensively, whereas the Clinton administration invoked it only sparingly (Light 1999: 
148-49).  The George W. Bush administration is again pushing for increased privatization 
of government jobs via OMB A-76.  This push is especially evident in the DoD.
To implement OMB A-76 administrators in the Department of Defense are 
required to identify non-core military jobs that are then subjected to cost comparison with 
bids from private contractors.  When a job currently being performed by military 
personnel is found to be appropriately and more economically performed by civilian 
contractors the job gets outsourced (OMB 1999).  Since the jobs performed by civilian 
contractors are necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the military, the 
civilians contracted to perform these jobs are effectively, if not conceptually, integrated 
into the Total Force (Ehab et al. 1999; Robinson 2002; Singer 2003).  Indeed, the military 
often refers to civilian contractors as force multipliers (Ehab et al. 1999;  McAllister 
1996).  
Examples of defense related commercial activities targeted by OMB A-76 
competitions include, but are not limited to: engineering, installation, operation, 
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maintenance, and testing for communications systems, missile ranges, satellite tracking 
and data acquisition; radar detection and tracking; and operation of motor pools, vehicle 
and aeronautical operation and maintenance, and air/sea/land transportation of people and 
supplies (OMB 1999).  Civilian contractors are employed in stateside locations, overseas 
maintenance depots, on ships deployed in the naval fleet, and in forward deployed 
positions during peacekeeping and combat operations.
Despite the ubiquity of civilian contractors on America’s military posts and ships 
the impact of outsourcing on the military is not well understood.  Evaluation criteria in 
OMB A-76, and those criteria implied by the current Bush administration, focus almost 
exclusively on the economic aspects of the policy.  However, it is likely that any policy 
with such far-reaching structural and economic impacts will have significant social-
sociological impacts.  Preliminary studies support this.  As noted previously, the typical 
pattern in turning to contractors is to reduce the full-time work force, hire contractors to 
fulfill non-core duties, and transfer the remaining full-time employees to positions 
aligned with core duties of the organization.  Deavel (1998) and Wong and McNally 
(1994) suggest that downsizing and/or outsourcing of military jobs has significant 
negative effects on the organizational commitment and satisfaction of those remaining in 
service (see also Baron & Kreps 1999; Levin 2002).  
Kennedy et al. (2002) argue that outsourcing can result in the remaining full -time 
employees becoming disenfranchised or simply disenchanted and leaving the 
organization.  Consequently, precisely those employees counted on most to carry out the 
organization’s core missions separate from the organization, leaving behind a problematic 
(and most likely unanticipated) skill and leadership vacuum. In addition, Moskos (1977) 
and Kim et al. (1996) argue that increases in occupational orientation of the military and 
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transferability of skills to the civilian sector lead to recruitment and retention challenges.  
Job satisfaction is also linked to retention intentions directly and indirectly through 
organizational commitment (Kim et al. 1996).
There is a clear sense that military leaders are looking to utilize contractors so that 
uniformed personnel can increase their time and energy focusing on the core mission of 
the military: fighting and winning America’s wars.  Lt. Col. Bill McNight (2003: 1), 
Chief of the 9th Reconnaissance Wing Manpower and Organization Office, voices this 
goal of the U.S. military:  “We want to apply our resources most directly to war fighting 
because that’s what we do.”
Donahue (1989) identifies three broad indictments against civilian contracting 
agencies, and contractors by extension.  First is that the services and material supplied by 
contractors cost too much.  Historically there has been little competition in the military 
contracting business, but as the number and types of jobs being contracted out by the 
military increases (combined with increasing numbers of ex-military due to downsizing 
and other factors) there has been a rush in the past decade to set up businesses to compete 
for the billions of dollars aimed at contracting firms.  Yet, even with increased 
competition the cost of services provided by civilian contractors appear to be inflated 
(GAO 2000b).
The second major criticism of contracting firms is that they do not deliver enough.  
This broad criticism covers the gamut from providing personnel who are not fully 
qualified to perform the function for which the contract was awarded, to slow progress or 
delays in work, to lack of attention to detail and quality on the job.  Moreover, military 
personnel are on call around the clock and bound by both normative and legal codes to 
perform whatever duty is asked of them, provided it is not an illegal order.  This contrasts 
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sharply with contract employees who may refuse to do work not in their contract, may be 
contractually restricted from performing overtime work, and are perhaps less motivated to 
perform to their best because of the flexibility of their employment and the alternatives 
available to them for different work settings.
Finally, Donahue argues that the contracting system as a whole lacks 
accountability.  Oversight of contracts and contractors is notoriously poor.  Under the 
current system of competing for, awarding, and monitoring contracts there appears to be a 
fundamental flaw in that little or no actionable recourse is taken to sanction contractor 
incompetence once they have been awarded the job (Inspector General of DoD report 
2000; Light 1999).  This may be attributed to lack of political will, poorly written 
contracts that contain numerous loopholes and plenty of room for add-ons, and/or an 
unwillingness by military leaders to accept the time delays and cost overrun that would be 
incurred by firing a contractor and finding a new one (Light 1999; Singer 2003).  This 
triad of issues is likely to highlight the distinctive differences between those who wear the 
uniform of the U.S. military and those that do not, and elicit some level of animosity 
between members of the two groups.
Research Question
The Department of Defense has dramatically expanded the quantity of civilians it 
employs and the range of jobs that they are hired to perform as part of its civilianization 
effort to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and cost savings.  The impact of bifurcating 
the workplace by combining military and civilian personnel across an ever-widening 
array of positions is not well understood.  This study addresses the question, what impact 
does the structural change of civilianizing jobs formerly performed by military personnel 
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have on the attitudes and retention intentions of service members and the civilians with 
whom they work?  Specifically, this research examines whether and to what extent 
military and civilian personnel’s level of contact and social comparisons with one another 
affect their retention attitudes.  To answer this question, the effect of level of contact and 
social comparisons between groups on job satisfaction and organizational commitment is
assessed, as these have been identified as critical social-psychological variables in 
predicting retention.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
The study of employee retention has been primarily motivated by the desire to 
learn which variables most strongly influence stay and quit behaviors of employees.  
Organizations seek a well-specified model of turnover to maximize economy.  
Researchers’ initial models were simple by today’s standards, but over time they have 
grown more complex, with increased theoretical validity and greater predictive capacity.  
Studies of job satisfaction and organizational commitment have been nearly 
synonymous with attempts to increase understanding of personnel retention and 
productivity.  Many retention studies have been funded by private companies, and were 
undertaken not to increase satisfaction or commitment per se, but as a means to identify 
ways in which companies could become more profitable and successful through 
instituting and/or altering programs, policies, and work conditions that affect employee 
satisfaction and commitment.  Thus, models developed for the pragmatic world of 
business examine satisfaction and organizational commitment of employees vis-à-vis the 
effect they have on economic outcomes for the company.  From a social-psychological 
perspective, each is interesting and important in its own right.
Model of Retention-Turnover 4
Extensive research has been conducted on models of employee retention for 
civilian workforce populations.  The military has been systematically excluded from all 
4 This study’s focus on turnover is limited to voluntary separation from an organization.  As such, 
employees who are fired, “downsized”, not given the option of re-enlisting, or otherwise 
separated from their employer are not included in this model or subsequent discussion.
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but a very few of these studies (exceptions include Hulin et al. 1985;  Orthner 1990; and 
Waite and Berryman 1986).  While some models acknowledge social-psychological 
factors as variables that contribute to the overall development of job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment attitudes, explicit examination of social comparisons is 
conspicuously lacking in the literature.  Notable exceptions include Hodson (1985), 
Crosby (1982), and Rakoff et al. (1992).  However, neither Hodson nor Crosby examined 
military personnel.  
Rakoff et al. (1992) ask ed Army personnel to compare quality of Army jobs to 
civilian jobs and Army life to civilian life.  Comparisons were made on six job 
characteristics  (opportunity for advancement, pay, retirement benefits, job security, 
opportunity to serve country, and opportunity for excitement/adventure) rated on a five-
point scale ranging from “much worse in civilian life” to “much better in civilian life.” 
While this study is important for its contribution in using social comparisons to predict 
retention rates, several limitations are evident.  A number of salient characteristics are not 
measured vis-à-vis the retention model (e.g., autonomy, job hazards, routinization, and 
leadership support).  Data for this study were collected in 1988 – prior to the increase in 
military outsourcing that began in the early 1990s.  Comparisons were based on a generic 
civilian “other”, not the more tangible, obvious, and enticing civilians working in close 
proximity to the service member.  Finally, Rakoff et al.’s sample is all male and restricted 
to soldiers in the earlier stages of their career, and excludes soldiers who said they 
planned to retire at the end of their current service obligation. 
Further empirical analysis is needed to understand more fully the effect of civilian 
contractors on service members’ social comparisons (and satisfaction, commitment and 
retention attitudes).  At the time this dissertation was written, no research has been found 
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that examines the effect of service members on civilians’ social comparisons.
The retention-turnover model advanced for this study is based on the works of 
Price, Mueller, and colleagues (Kim et al. 1996; Mueller & Price 1990 ; Price1977; and 
Price & Mueller 1986a, 1986b) and is built on the major theoretical traditions in the field 
(Figure 2.1).  The model identifies structural, environmental, and personal variables that 
affect job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment are identified as intervening variables affecting stay/quit 
intentions.  The model explicitly includes intentions as the immediate precursor to 
turnover/retention behavior (Kim et al. 1996;  Mobley et al. 1979) .  The vertical dashed 
line following intention intentions indicates the separation between attitudes and 
intentions to the left and behaviors to the right.  This study focuses on the attitude portion 
of this model (to the left of the dashed line).  The causal ordering of variables in the 
model presented by Kim et al. (1996) is consistent with that advanced by Mobley (1982).
Job related variables that are identified as structural antecedents are external to the 
individual.  Environmental variables are both external to the individual and 
outside the individual’s work environment.  Thus, non-work factors affect an 
individual’s attitudes and behaviors directly related to work.  Finally, variables 
identified as personal antecedents capture qualities of the individual him/herself 
that impact job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  While personal 
antecedent variables are affected by an individual’s work and social environments, 
they are in fact located within the individual (see Kim et al. 1996; and Porter & 
Steers 1973).  Each category of antecedent variables interacts with and influences 
the others.  Social comparisons affect satisfaction and commitment by virtue of 
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the fact that all antecedent variables are experienced by employees in a social 
context and understood (if not constructed) via social processes.5
*Adapted from Bowen 1989, Kim et al. 1996, and Mueller and Price 1990.
5A more detailed discussion of the relationship between social comparisons, satisfaction, 
commitment and retention is provided in a later section of this chapter.
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Figure 2.1.  Model of Retention-Turnover*
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A more concise and focused model of retention that will be used in this study is 
presented in Figure 2.2.  The three categories of antecedent variables (structural, 
environmental, and personal) are no longer specified in the graphic representation of the 
model, but are included in the items that comprise the social comparison, job satisfaction 
and organizational commitment scales in the model.  Intent to stay is the dependent 
variable in this working conceptual model.  The omission of the stay/quit and impulsive 
behaviors contained in the original model (Figure 2.1) is necessitated by the 
methodological limitations of the current cross-sectional study.
The model in Figure 2.2 identifies direct and indirect effects of the independent 
variables on retention intentions.  The model predicts that greater levels of contact 
between military personnel and civilian co-workers will result in more negative social 
comparisons among service members.  Further, level of contact with civilians is shown to 
have negative effects on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and retention 
intentions.  Thus, the more contact military personnel have with civilians, the lower their 
job satisfaction, commitment to the military, and desire to remain with the military. 
The relationship between social comparisons and satisfaction, commitment and 
intentions to remain in the military are all hypothesized to be positive.  This means that 
when individuals’ social comparisons with their reference groups are positive they will be 
more satisfied with their work, more committed to their employer, and more likely to 
want to remain with their current organization.  Figure 2.2 also indicates that when job 
satisfaction is high, so too will be organizational commitment and intentions to stay with 
one’s employer.  Finally, organizational commitment is identified as having a positive 
relationship with retention intentions.  Greater commitment will result in higher levels of 
intention to stay with the organization.
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Figure 2.2  Working Conceptual Model of Retention-Turnover*
     *Adapted from Bowen 1989, Kim et al. 1996, and Mueller and Price 1990.
Job Satisfaction
“We can never compete dollar-for-dollar with outside firms.  We compete on 
job satisfaction.”
Command Chief Master Sgt. (USAF) Robert Martens, Jr., 2004, P. 3
Job satisfaction is conceptualized as an attitude people hold regarding the work 
roles they occupy and the work they perform (Kalleberg 1977; Vroom 1964).  This is 
necessarily a subjective assessment on the respondent’s part indicating how much an 
individual likes his/her current work (Kalleberg 1977; Kim et al. 1996; Spector 1996).  
Further, the attitudes that form a sense of job satisfaction have both cognitive and 
affective characteristics (Brief & Weiss 2002; Motowidlo 1996).  
The literature on satisfaction and turnover has established that a significant 
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negative relationship exists between satisfaction and turnover: increased levels of 
satisfaction decrease the likelihood of turnover (Locke 1976; Mobley 1977; Porter & 
Steers 1973; Vroom 1964).  This relationship is observed in studies where the unit of 
analysis is individual as well as those that take groups or organizations as the unit of 
analysis (Vroom 1964).
Initial theories on turnover used a variety of measures of job satisfaction to 
directly predict retention (Mobley 1977; Mobley et al. 1979).  However, these studies 
failed to predict turnover to the extent hypothesized (Locke 1976; Porter & Steers 1973), 
suggesting that measures of job satisfaction (at least those instruments employed to date) 
were less useful than theory predicted.  This led to refinements of the model, ultimately 
including multiple variables to predict job satisfaction, and the identification of intentions 
to stay/quit as the immediate precursor to retention/attrition behavior (Porter & Steers 
1973; Mobley 1977; Mobley et al. 1979;  Kim et al. 1996).  These additional 
specifications have added both theoretical clarity and increased predictive power to the 
model.
A meta-analysis of 34 studies predicting employee turnover (civilian and military 
subjects combined) by Steel and Ovalle (1984) revealed that behavioral intentions to stay 
in one’s current job were consistently better predictors of retention than overall job 
satisfaction (a global attitude), satisfaction with work itself (attitudes specific to the actual 
work one performs, net of pay, social milieu, supervision, etc.), or organizational 
commitment (loyalty to one’s organization).  Military personnel had much higher levels 
of agreement between attitude and turnover intention than civilian employees. Time-lag 
between expressed intention and retention behavior moderates the relationship between 
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intention and retention (see also Carsten & Spector 1987). 6  Fuller et al. (1996) found the 
structural constraint imposed by the formal service commitment of military personnel 
moderates the relationship between job satisfaction and withdrawal cognitions.  Unlike 
civilian employees, service members are not free to break their employment contract at 
any time of their choosing.
Further, the work of Steel and Ovalle (1984) revealed that exogenous economic 
factors facilitate or constrict employees from acting on their intentions.  Thus, in times of 
high unemployment, high levels of dissatisfaction may not lead to quit behavior since a 
dissatisfying job is often preferable to no job.  Similarly, a meta-analysis of retention 
studies by Carsten and Spector (1987) found that the relationship between job satisfaction 
and turnover is moderated by constraints on alternative job opportunities available to the 
employee.  Low levels of job satisfaction are associated with relatively high levels of 
turnover during periods of low unemployment.  Conversely, during periods of high 
unemployment, the relationship of job satisfaction and turnover is relatively weak (see 
also Mobley et al. 1979 for a review of other studies supporting this finding).
Focusing on the critical influence of social comparisons on job satisfaction, 
Hodson (1985) employed panel study data to examine the effect of different kinds of 
social comparisons on job satisfaction.  Comparisons examined included the respondent’s 
current family income versus the income of the family they grew up in, and versus the 
respondent’s own aspirations expressed at high school graduation.  This study also 
examined comparisons of the respondent’s occupational prestige versus that of their 
6
 Rakoff et al. (1992) also found a strong correlation between intention to stay/quit and actual 
stay/quit behavior.  Their findings also suggest time to end of enlistment period moderates this 
relationship.
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spouse and sibling, respondents’ aspirations at the end of high school versus their current 
satisfaction, and respondent’s current job satisfaction versus projected satisfaction for 10 
years in the future. Results showed that of those comparisons included in the study, 
comparisons of current status with expected future status had the most influence on job 
satisfaction (see also Mobley et al. 1979).  Comparisons with one’s spouse and one’s own 
high school aspirations also had a significant effect on job satisfaction, but to a lesser 
degree than comparison to future expectations.  Comparisons of occupational status with 
the head of respondents’ household of origin, with the level of income in their household 
of origin, with siblings’ and peers’ occupational status, and with respondent’s prior 
occupational position were found to have no significant impact on respondents’ current 
job satisfaction.
Hodson (1985) did not explicitly ask respondents social comparison questions.  
For example, questions about the respondents’ occupational prestige were compared to 
the occupational prestige of their sibling in order to get a measure of social comparison 
between respondent and their sibling.  The problem with this methodology is that it does 
not establish that the respondents actually include their siblings in their reference groups 
when evaluating satisfaction with their own employment level.  Further, Hodson 
operationalized job satisfaction using a three-item scale with binary (positive/negative) 
responses, achieving a low alpha value (alpha = .36) for his scale.  This suggests that the 
three items used for the scale are not tightly clustered around the same construct.  In sum, 
there appear to be issues of measurement reliability and construct validity that detract 
from the strength of Hodson’s findings.  More research is needed to better understand the 
relationship of social comparisons and job satisfaction.
Variables commonly identified as important to employees’ job satisfaction 
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calculus include pay, benefits, promotion opportunities, working conditions (e.g., safety, 
pace, pleasant environment), job security, stimulation/challenge of work performed, 
autonomy, co-worker relations, scheduling/hours worked, perceived 
supervisor/organizational support, expectations, and occupational status (Kalleberg 1974;
Kalleberg 1977; Locke 1976; Scarpello & Campbell 1983).  
Organizational Commitment
The study of organizational commitment emanates principally from 
conceptualizations and theories developed to analyze organizations in the civilian work 
force (see Mowday et al. 1979 ; Porter & Steers 1973; and Porter et al. 1974). Many of 
the variables that influence job satisfaction also impact organizational commitment (see 
Figure 2, p.26).  This occurs directly as well as indirectly via job satisfaction.  The 
definition used in this study is adopted from Mowday et al. (1979: 226):
Organizational commitment is the relative strength of an individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization… 
characterized by at least three related factors: 1) a strong belief in and 
acceptance of the organization’s goals and values; 2) a willingness to exert 
considerable effort on behalf of the organization; and 3) a strong desire to 
maintain membership in the organization.
Commitment represents an active (not passive) loyalty to one’s organization.
Factors antithetical to organizational commitment
A number of variables have been shown to impact organizational commitment
negatively.  Work-family conflict has been found to reduce employees’ organizational 
commitment (Spector 1996).  The military in particular tends to foster this type of conflict 
because both institutions are considered “greedy” in their demand for service members’
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time and attention, resulting in increased distress/tension (Bourg & Segal 1999).  
Army/family conflict increases with assignment to combat duty or presence of a child, 
and decreases with age and length of marriage.  This follows logical and theoretical
expectations that increased stress or demands in one arena will spill over into the other 
and cause distress.  Additionally, the maturity and self-selection associated with increased 
age and time married among career soldiers would be expected to translate into lower 
levels of work/family conflict in the military among the more senior personnel.
Wong and McNally (1994) showed that military downsizing has a significant 
effect on remaining soldiers’ organizational commitment.  Qualitative data used to 
augment the Occupational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) in this study suggests that 
the driver behind this decrease in occupational commitment is officers’ perceptions that 
the military institution has failed to keep its implicit contract of job security with its 
soldiers.  
The Army’s provision of incentives for soldiers to take early retirement was 
perceived by the remaining soldiers as an attempt to honor the promise to “take care of 
their own.”  Indeed, this perception mitigated the decrease in organizational commitment 
reported by the “surviving soldiers.”  However, the more early retirement incentive-takers 
known by a “surviving soldier,” the lower was their organizational commitment (Wong 
and McNally 1994).  Thus, while the incentives lessen the blow of seeing one’s fellow 
soldiers “volunteer” to leave service, they do not appear to neutralize the generalized 
feeling of betrayal and anxiety experienced by those soldiers who remain (see also Baron 
& Kreps 1999; Levin 2003; Meyer et al. 1993).
Kim and colleagues (1996) propose an extensive model, based on the work of 
Price, Mueller and others, that includes clusters of variables associated with structural and 
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environmental characteristics of military employment, and personal characteristics of 
military personnel, that affect the organizational commitment of service members.  This 
model is tested on a unique and narrow group of service members – 244 Air Force 
physicians, all of whom are officers.  Variables negatively impacting organizational 
commitment in this model include job stress (via inconsistent job obligations), realities of 
the job meeting one’s expectations, and availability of alternative forms of (civilian) 
employment.  The response rate for this study approached 50% and the sample was drawn 
from a single Air Force hospital.  The combination of limitations on the generalizability 
of the findings from this sample of military personnel necessitates caution in the 
extension of the results to service members not in the target population (Air Force 
physicians), and highlights the need for additional studies to examine the fit of this model 
to a more representative sample of service personnel.
Factors that facilitate organizational commitment
Work-family conflict was identified in the prior section as a major factor 
contributing to decreased organizational commitment among service members.  To 
address the toll this kind of conflict takes on service members’ commitment, Bourg and 
Segal (1999) recommend reducing the conflict by establishing and advocating family
friendly policies.  Specifically, their study showed that by institutionalizing family 
oriented policies and programs, and coupling them with strong leadership support (to 
increase knowledge and normative accessibility) the military can reduce work-family
conflict, and by so doing raise the organizational commitment of both the soldier and his 
wife.  Since this study only looked at enlisted men and their civilian wives, this model’s 
generalizability to other populations (e.g., dual military couples, women service members 
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with civilian husbands, officers, and other branches of the military) remains an empirical 
question.
Social support is a significant factor in soldiers’ organizational commitment.  Kim 
et al. (1996: 951) note that social support functions on at least three levels: family 
support, supervisor support, and peer workgroup support.  Additionally, Bourg and Segal 
(1999) found that a wife’s commitment is the single biggest influence on male soldiers’ 
commitment.  By way of illustrating the relative effect of a wife’s commitment on 
military husband’s commitment, their study showed it to be nearly three times the total 
effect of Army/family conflict.  Further, family-friendly policies and leadership support 
have equivalent effects on soldiers’ organizational commitment suggesting that the 
military needs to invest in both to maximize soldier retention (Bourg & Segal 1999).  
Interestingly, the work status of civilian wives did not have a significant effect on 
Army/family conflict or, by extension, commitment of soldiers or their spouses (Bourg & 
Segal 1999).  This is surprising given the strong positive relationship observed between 
civilian wives’ labor force participation and satisfaction with military life (Cooney 2003).
Spousal support for soldiers’ organizational commitment increased with the 
presence of a child in the family (Bourg & Segal 1999).  Service members’ commitment 
increased by rank and age (both related to self-selection in the military), as well as with 
the presence of a child in the household (Bourg & Segal 1999).  The increased 
commitment associated with presence of children may be explained through increased 
need for the benefits offered through military service (continuance commitment) or 
through the perception that the military community is a good place to raise a child 
(affective commitment).  Moreover, Segal and Harris (1993) note that considerations of 
general quality of life issues (e.g., safe, healthy environment for kids; satisfactory 
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work/social opportunities for spouse; and time with family) are critical factors considered 
by service members and their spouses when making retention decisions.
Clear and accurate communication on policies related to downsizing and the 
incentives to retire early serve to reduce the negative impact of the drawdown process 
(Wong & McNally 1994).  Having leadership that is forthcoming and honest with 
relevant information, especially when undesirable action must be taken serves to bolster 
soldiers’ resolve to remain committed to the military organization.
Job motivation and organizational commitment have reciprocal effects on one 
another.  Higher motivation leads to better performance, which is then rewarded by 
recognition and promotion.  In turn, official recognition and promotion for one’s work 
accomplishments leads to greater job satisfaction, which positively impacts motivation 
and commitment.  Thus, the receipt of positive feedback from military leaders fosters 
greater commitment among soldiers (Kim et al. 1996).  
A study by Leiter et al. (1994) examined gender differences in organizational 
commitment among members of the Canadian Armed Forces.  Their study looked at 
organizational commitment among men and women in both traditional and non-
traditional work settings. Results from this study indicate that there is a gender difference 
in the mechanism driving organizational commitment.  There is a direct relationship 
between co-worker relations (i.e., horizontal cohesion) and organizational commitment 
among women.  Conversely, organizational commitment for men was directly determined 
by the extent to which they perceived supervisor support (i.e., vertical cohesion).  While 
supervisor support also affects organizational commitment in women, its importance for 
women is eclipsed by the relative magnitude of the effect of co-worker relations.  These 
results further specify prior findings of the general significance of leader support on 
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soldier commitment (Segal & Harris 1993).
Finally, Bourg and Segal (1999) contend that commitment need not be viewed as 
a scarce resource.  Rather than viewing soldiers’ work/family conflict as a competition for 
limited commitment resources, soldiers should be viewed as capable of being highly 
committed to their military career and to their family.  Bourg and Segal suggest that this 
dualistic, non-competing environment is facilitated through programmatic and leadership 
support for family friendly policies in the military.
Special considerations for job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment in the military
Coser (1974: 7) defines greedy institutions as organizations or groups that “make 
total claims on their members and which attempt to encompass within their circle the 
whole personality… They seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and they attempt to 
reduce the claims of competing roles and status positions on those they wish to 
encompass within their boundaries.”  Greedy institutions secure high levels of 
commitment from their constituent members primarily through symbolic and normative 
means, though physical separation may also be incorporated (e.g., traditional military 
garrisons in which personnel were compelled to reside) (Coser 1974).  For greedy 
institutions to survive, they must find ways to facilitate commitment among their 
members for maintaining ties with the organization (M. Segal 1986).
The Military as a Greedy Institution
The military has been identified as a greedy institution because of its demands on 
the service members’ time and energy (Segal 1986).  Orthner (1990) notes that 
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increasingly career decisions are made by both spouses in consideration of the anticipated 
costs and benefits of the work-family linkages.  Several studies have found that retention 
intentions and attrition behaviors of service members are significantly influenced by their 
spouse’s satisfaction with and commitment to military life (Bourg and Segal 1999; Kirby 
& Naftel 2000; Lakhani 1994; Lakhani 1995; Segal 1989; Segal & Harris 1993).
Service members and their families are often confronted with financial, familial, 
emotional, and/or logistical challenges that may overwhelm the many benefits of military 
employment.  These challenges are likely to result in decreases in a service member’s job 
satisfaction and reduced commitment to the military as an employer.  To the extent that 
service members separate from the military due to dissatisfaction and/or reduced 
commitment, the military not only loses valuable assets in experienced personnel, but 
incurs the additional expense of training new recruits to fill the vacated positions (Orthner 
1990).  The military has designed and revised numerous programs aimed at increasing 
satisfaction of service members and their spouses, with an eye toward increasing the 
military’s benefit from the human capital which it has invested a good deal of time, effort, 
and money to develop (Orthner 1990; Segal & Harris 1993).
Several aspects of military employment tend to heighten the importance of some 
of the structural, environmental, and personal factors identified in the retention-turnover 
model for military personnel in comparison to the civilian workers.  Segal (1986) 
identifies five demands placed on service members and their families:
1. Risk of death or injury to service member,
2. Geographic mobility (movement of household every 2-3 years on average),
3. Periodic separation of service member from his or her family,
4. Living overseas (on accompanied tours), and
5. Normative pressures placed on spouses of service members (especially 
officers’ wives).
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In addition to those identified by Segal, two other factors related to military employment 
are worthy of inclusion in this discussion: moral motivation for joining and remaining in 
military service, and the unique contractual obligations of service that constrain when 
service members’ are able to voluntarily leave the service.
Job hazards exist in many civilian jobs (e.g., mining, construction, police), but 
these hazards are usually accidental or at least a minor part of the job.  In contrast, the 
combat service member faces an enemy intent on killing or physically subduing him or 
her.   Even non-combat arms service members are vulnerable to direct, intentional 
aggressive acts of lethal force, as seen most recently in the ambushes of supply and 
support convoys (using both conventional weapons and improvised explosive devices) 
during the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Service members are bound by a separate legal code (i.e., the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice), and different operational and normative expectations than civilian law 
enforcement officers.  The primary mission of service members is to support and/or 
engage in the business of destruction and killing.  Though the military engages in 
operations other than war, they continue to define their primary mission as fighting and 
winning America’s wars (Moskos 2000).
Frequent relocation is normative for military households.  Rosen and Durand 
(2000) note that each relocation may require several moves, from guest quarters to 
apartments, before establishing “permanent” residence at a new post (where permanent 
generally means three years or less).  The impact of frequent geographic relocation is 
often most acutely felt by the spouse and children of the service member.  Further, the 
pattern of mobility experienced by military families results in significant job market and 
wage penalties for the trailing spouse (Cooney 2003).  The frustration and anxiety of 
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moving to new schools and making new friends is taxing on children of service members, 
especially once they reach their teenage years (Rosen & Durand 2000). 
An additional distinctive characteristic associated with military employment is 
long and sometimes unexpected separation from one’s family secondary to off-base 
training exercises or deployment.  Further, separations may be of unspecified length.  Not 
only does separation cause emotional and psychological stress through the displacement 
of a primary support person (Kirby & Naftel 2000; Segal 1989; Segal & Harris 1993;
Schumm et al. 1998), it also causes logistical and financial problems for th e military 
family (Lakhani 1994; Schumm et al. 1998).  This stressor is also experienced by 
Reservists, National Guardsmen, and their families when their units are called-up 
(Lakhani 1995; Schumm et al. 1998).
The drawdown of forces and closure of many overseas bases since the end of the 
cold war have significantly reduced the number of service members serving overseas.  As 
a consequence, fewer families accompany their military spouse on overseas tours.  
Nevertheless, those who are stationed overseas are likely to experience social and cultural 
stressors.  For those living “on the economy” (not within a military post), routine tasks 
may become frustrating adventures.  Further, should the service member stationed 
overseas with his/her family be deployed (to Afghanistan, for example), the challenges of 
separations are compounded for the family left behind.  These families not only lack the 
physical and emotional support of the absent service member, they are far from stateside 
family and friendship support networks and familiar surroundings that might otherwise 
serve as social-psychological buffers.
The persistence of normative expectations of wives of military servicemen 
generates negative affect toward the greediness of the military community.  There is a 
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long-standing tradition in the military of enlisting voluntary support from the wives of 
commissioned and senior noncommissioned officers.  For example, this may take the 
form of volunteering at the local thrift shop, coordinating a social event for the unit, or 
leading a family support group for unit members.  In all cases, there is a normative 
expectation that the women will volunteer.  The assumption made by the military that the 
opportunity cost on the part of soldiers’ wives for engaging in volunteer activities on 
behalf of the military unit is negligible is a broad based anachronistic notion (Papanek 
1973).  Yet, despite increased education and labor force participation of military wives, 
normative pressures surrounding volunteer time commitments remain a source of 
dissatisfaction for many service members’ wives, especially officers’ wives (Durand 
2000; Harrell 2001).
Moral motivation is another somewhat distinctive aspect of military employment.  
Several authors argue that a moral component of military employment suppresses quit 
intentions. When a service member believes that the work he/she performs is “more than 
just a job,” it motivates retention even when he/she experiences dissatisfaction with 
his/her work (Cotton 1988; Fuller et al. 1996;  Hulin et al. 1985;  Janowitz 1960; Moskos
1977).  This argument derives from the institutional component of Moskos’s (1977) 
institutional versus occupational model of military service wherein some join the military 
for more affective motivations (e.g., moral principals, patriotism, and sense of duty), 
while others join for reasons that are more aligned with the work aspect of the job (e.g., 
acquisition of skills, training, and education).  What is important to understand is that the 
motivations for joining (institutional versus occupational) will frame how service 
members experience their time in the service, as well as impact their retention decisions.
Reed and Segal (2000) found that soldiers’ job satisfaction decreased as their 
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number of peacekeeping deployments increased.  However, the number of peacekeeping 
deployments experienced by a soldier did not have a significant negative impact on 
retention intentions.  This apparent contradiction may be explained to a large degree by 
the moral commitment soldiers have to the service they are performing.  The study 
conducted by Reed and Segal did not measure moral commitment, so this hypothesis 
remains an empirical question.
In addition, the study conducted by Reed and Segal examined attitudes, morale, 
and retention of soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division approximately two months 
after returning from a peacekeeping mission in Haiti.  The case study design employed in 
this study limits the generalizability of the findings to soldiers in other units, and to 
service members in other branches of the military.  Moreover, given the unique history of 
the 10th Mountain Division, and the tradition and pride it instills in its personnel, the 
hypothesized moral motivation suggested in this case may not generalize to all soldiers.
Another factor that figures significantly into soldiers’ satisfaction and 
organizational commitment (and ultimately their retention decisions) is perceived family 
support from military leadership (Segal & Harris 1993).  Whether or not the soldiers and 
their families need any particular support, the mere knowledge that support is available is 
often enough to keep satisfaction and morale high.  Moreover, the more that the 
leadership can foster the general perception that the military is family friendly (by 
supporting family friendly programs, informing soldiers about them, and encouraging 
their use) the more positive the impact these programs have on retention (Orthner 1990).
Military service is contingent on a time-based service contract.  Service members 
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enlist, or are commissioned,7 for a specific length of time.  Early termination does occur 
(usually at the government’s request), but is the exception rather than the rule.  Indeed, a 
service member no longer desiring military employment is not sufficient to induce the 
military to release him/her prior to the termination of his/her contract.  Moreover, 
“quitting” is not an option available to service members, with the exception of those who 
are eligible for retirement.  In addition, the all-or-nothing retirement system (no 
retirement pension or benefits prior to 20 years of service) places powerful structural 
pressures on service members’ retention decisions (Schumm et al. 1998;  Segal & Harris 
1993).
Taken individually, civilian cognates may be found for nearly all of the 
“distinctive” military employment related variables discussed above.  What is truly 
distinctive about the military as a job is the clustering of these variables.  These demands 
represent differences both in degree and kind compared to the antecedent variables 
identified for the vast majority of civilian workers.  Regardless, the model adopted for 
this study can accommodate these differences.  Further, given the combination of 
distinctive demands required of military personnel and the close proximity to civilians 
experienced by many in uniform while performing their daily duties, social comparisons 
would seem inevitable.  The model presented easily accommodates inclusion of social 
comparisons as another of many factors that influence job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment.
7
 Officers can resign at any time once their initial obligation is fulfilled.  Additional service 
obligations may also be tied to some types of promotions as well as accepting military funding 
for advanced schooling, for example.  In addition, during wars stop-loss procedures can compel 
officers to remain in service even though they desire to leave and no longer have any formal 
service obligations.
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Social-Psychological Aspects Driving Retention:  Theories of Information 
Processing, Expectations, and Social Comparisons
Information Processing Theory
The turnover-retention model used in this study draws from social information 
processing theory.  Social information processing theory argues that job characteristics 
are inherently neither satisfying nor dissatisfying (Salancik & Pfeffer 1978).  Further, job 
characteristics are viewed as fundamentally neutral in their capacity to foster 
commitment.  Rather, positive and negative job related feelings are socially learned 
through experience and social contexts.  They are constructed, reaffirmed, and 
renegotiated by social processes.  Relative job satisfaction or dissatisfaction, commitment 
to an organization or lack thereof, stems from socially available information and can only 
be generated in the context of social comparisons.  Individuals’ expectations help create 
the foundation from which neutral job characteristics generate positive or negative 
feelings of satisfaction and commitment.
Perceived congruence between one’s expectations and the reality of the job 
characteristics one experiences has important implications for the development of 
satisfaction and commitment.  Porter and Steers (1973) argue that whether or not one’s 
expectations are met is central to that individual’s retention decisions.  In addition, 
Mobley et al. (1979: 519) state that it is “not merely the visibility of alternatives, but the 
attraction of alternatives and the expectancy of attaining the alternatives that are most 
salient” in determining retention intentions.  Expectancy theory makes this social-
psychological process explicit and is important in understanding the context through 
which individuals experience their work and its associated structural and environmental 
variables.
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Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory was initially championed within organizational research by 
Vroom (1964).  Porter and his colleagues (Porter & Steers 1973; Mowday et al. 1982) 
have been the most ardent advocates of the utility of this theory in more recent studies.  
The fundamental concept on which this theory is based is that each individual has a 
unique combination of beliefs, desires, expectations, experience, personality disposition, 
and interpretations of events such that the same job may be highly satisfying for one 
individual but unbearable for another.  By the same reasoning, a given work situation may 
engender high levels of organizational commitment from one individual but low levels of 
commitment for another.  The extent to which the realities of work and its associated 
characteristics are consistent with one’s expectations will figure significantly into the 
degree to which one is satisfied with his job and committed to a given organization 
(Locke 1976).  Dissatisfaction and reduced commitment resulting from the incongruence 
of expectations and actual experience increases the probability of employee resignation.
Information processing theory and expectancy theory compliment one another to 
construct a richer understanding of the social-psychological process of the retention-
turnover process.  However, neither of these theories specifies how one’s work 
expectations and evaluations are developed.  To address this issue, social comparison 
theory is needed.  Runciman (1966) argues that individuals construct expectations and 
judgments by means of intra-psychic comparisons with one’s social reference groups.
Social Comparison Theory
Social comparison is defined as individuals’ comparisons with others, or with 
oneself at some prior or future point in time.  Social comparison is believed to be a 
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fundamental social-psychological phenomenon (Suls & Wheeler 2000), used by 
individuals to gauge their own ability, normalcy, uniqueness, sanity, sense of fairness in 
rewards and punishments, level of sacrifice or privilege, and so on.  One may make such 
comparisons based on abilities, attitudes, emotions, observed inequalities in advantages 
or deprivations, or any number of criteria.
Festinger is the founder of modern social comparison theory and research.  Earlier 
thinkers and philosophers recognized this process generally (Suls & Wheeler 2000), but 
Festinger (1954) was the first to lay out a formal theory of social comparison processes 
based on assumptions of human nature and specifying numerous testable hypotheses.  A 
fundamental assumption of social comparison theory is that human nature drives 
individuals to evaluate their opinions and abilities (Festinger 1954).  Festinger (1954: 
119) argues that, “to the extent that objective physical bases for evaluation are not 
available, subjective judgments of correct or incorrect opinion and subjectively accurate 
assessment of one’s ability depend upon how one compares with other persons.”  Even 
when objective measures may be applied to behavior, opinion, or social outcomes, those 
measures must always be interpreted in a comparative manner if they are to meaningfully 
inform individuals about their standing relative to others.  Judgments of good, accurate, 
poor, or normal are all based on social comparison.  
A second important component of social comparison theory is that self-
evaluations made in the absence of comparisons are highly unstable.  In other words, 
considering oneself excellent at some skill (or normal in some social opinion) in the 
absence of some kind of confirmatory comparison is much more likely to be affected by 
future comparisons than self-understanding substantiated with known comparison targets.
Third, Festinger (1954: 120) hypothesized that, “the tendency to compare oneself 
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with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability 
and one’s own increases.”   Thus, this theory predicts that those included in one’s 
comparison (or reference) group are perceived to have characteristics highly similar to 
one’s own.  Comparing oneself to those with substantially different abilities or opinions 
provides one with little usable knowledge about oneself.  While there are exceptions to 
this rule (e.g., upward and downward comparisons) that serve psychological coping and 
motivating functions, this study focuses on the core comparison process that predicts 
highly similar characteristics between the one performing the comparison and reference 
group for the comparisons.  In addition, this theory predicts that the more salient the 
characteristic to the individual, the more likely it is to be a point of comparison.
Finally, social comparisons can cause changes in behavior or opinion.  Social 
comparisons not only identify relative physical and mental abilities, as well as normative-
ness of opinions, they also motivate an individual to “reduce discrepancies which exist 
between himself and others with whom he compares himself” (Festinger 1954: 124).  
Reducing discrepancies may be accomplished either by changing one’s behavior or 
opinion to more closely mirror that of one’s comparison group, or changing one’s 
comparison group such that it better matches existing behavior or opinion.  
Fundamentally, this aspect of comparison theory assumes a drive to achieve high levels of 
similarity between individuals and their reference group.  
While Festinger’s theory emphasizes attitudes and behaviors, as was noted above, 
social comparisons may be equally well applied to any number of criteria such as housing 
quality, success of one’s children, or in the case of the current study, job characteristics.  
In the military, change motivated by social comparisons with civilians may translate into 
leaving the service.  Conversely, social comparisons with civilians may lead to much 
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higher institutional commitment and/or military identity among service members in order 
to validate their continued affiliation with the military.
Social comparisons may take many forms: upward, downward, future, past, self, 
and other (see Masters & Keil 1987 for a discussion and taxonomy of various types of 
social comparisons).  The type of social comparison of interest in this study is the 
comparison of oneself to parallel others.  In this study, parallel comparisons are those 
where military personnel and civilians performing the same, or comparable, job tasks 
compare themselves with each other (e.g., civilian and military employees are both IT 
specialists, or workers with comparable levels of skills/training).  Comparisons may be 
made based on any of the structural or environmental antecedent variables identified in 
the retention model.
With regard to work related social comparisons, if a man observes that his friends 
and family work primarily in white-collar jobs, he is less likely to be satisfied if he has a 
blue-collar job.  Conversely, if his social comparison group consists mainly of individuals 
with blue-collar jobs, he is more likely to be satisfied if his own job is also a blue-collar 
job.  This is to say, people expect to achieve proportionally to their reference group, 
regardless of the criteria in question.  To the extent that people fall short of their socially 
constructed expectations vis-à-vis social comparisons with their reference groups, they 
may experience a sense of relative deprivation (Crosby 1982; Hodson 1985; Runciman 
1966).  Relative deprivation is a psychological state that contributes to feelings of 
dissatisfaction and reduced commitment.  Thus, the experience of job satisfaction (or 
dissatisfaction) and organizational commitment (or non-commitment) is viewed as 
fundamentally a social-psychological construction based on social comparisons on highly 
salient work-related variables.
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Hypotheses
Based on the preceding theoretical and empirical literature review, it is 
hypothesized that social comparisons affect retention intentions directly, as well as
indirectly through job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  The specific research 
hypotheses tested in this study are presented below.  To contextualize the hypotheses,
Figure 2.3 presents the conceptual retention-turnover model introduced earlier in this 
chapter.  The reader will note that hypotheses 4 through 9 are designed to test the various 
pathways in the model.
Figure 2.3.  Working Conceptual Model of Retention-Turnover
H1:  Military personnel will compare themselves negatively to civilians.
H2:  Civilians will compare themselves positively to military personnel.
Retention 
Intentions
(-) 
direct effect on retention intentions
indirect effect on retention intentions
Social 
Comparisons
Job Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Contact w/ 
Civilians
(+)
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
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H3:  Military personnel will report lower levels of job satisfaction but higher levels of 
organizational commitment than their civilian co-workers.
H4:  Increased contact between military personnel and their civilian co-workers will result 
in service members comparing themselves negatively in relation to their civilian co-
workers.8
H5:  Increased contact between military personnel and their civilian co-workers will result 
in decreased job satisfaction and organizational commitment among military personnel.
H6:  Negative social comparisons in relation to one’s reference group (i.e., military versus 
civilian) will result in decreased job satisfaction and organizational commitment for both 
military personnel and civilians.
H7:  Contact with civilians (for military personnel) and social comparisons (for both 
groups) will each have direct and indirect effects on retention intentions.  Further, the 
effect on retention intentions will be negative for level of contact with civilians, but 
positive for social comparisons.
H8:  Higher levels of job satisfaction will produce higher levels of organizational 
commitment and greater retention intention levels among both military personnel and 
civilians.
H9:  Greater organizational commitment levels will result in greater intentions to remain 
with their current employer among both military personnel and civilians.
8 Level of contact between groups was only measured on the service members’ surveys.  This 
instrumentation issue is discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3.  Methods
This study employs a multiple case study design, using survey data and informal 
interviews with military and civilian personnel.  This design is appropriate for practical 
and logistical reasons.  A case study design enables testing the retention model in this 
study in a quasi-experimental setting.  The two cases incorporated in this study vary on 
several important social and structural characteristics (e.g., status of civilian employees, 
the types of jobs civilians perform, and how the civilians are integrated).  Testing the 
retention model on each case study allowed for the examination of possible effects of 
these variables.
Additionally, gaining access to military personnel through formal channels during 
a time of active hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq proved quite challenging.  A case study 
design made it possible to rely on personal contacts and informal channels to secure 
access to research subjects.  Through this approach, the number of military and civilian 
leaders required to grant permission to access their personnel for the study was 
minimized.  The case study design also reduced the logistical difficulties inherent in 
coordinating multiple sample selection sites that would be necessary to approximate a 
representative sample of military personnel.  
It is recognized that in choosing this design there are limitations on 
generalizability of findings. Using the subject selection procedure outlined above will 
yield neither random nor representative samples of Army, Navy, and civilian personnel.  
However, a case study design facilitates a clearer understanding of the social comparison 
dynamics of the given military communities under examination, potentially highlighting 
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contextual differences in the civilianization of military units that might be obscured by 
more aggregate data collection methods.
Subject Selection
Subjects for this study come from an Army combat aviation squadron located 
outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) and a Navy ship in the Pacific fleet.  
In both units civilians worked in close proximity to uniformed service personnel and were 
organic to their units, meaning that they performed duties critical to the ongoing 
operations and mission success of their respective units.  While in both cases the civilians 
were critical to the overall functioning and mission of their units, the Army and Navy 
incorporated their respective civilians in different ways.  The civilians working with the 
Navy were DoD (Federal) employees, while those working with the Army were civilian 
contractors (not Federal employees).  With rare exceptions, the Army contractors were 
brought in to work alongside the soldiers.  Conversely, the civilian mariners (CIVMARs)
with the Navy performed jobs that had been categorically civilianized so that there were 
no sailors performing the same duties as the civilians.  The civilian contractors who 
worked with the Army and the CIVMARs who worked with the Navy have been included 
in this study.
Soldiers and sailors of all ages, races, ranks, time in service, and available military 
specialties, as well as both genders are included.  However, given the nature of the Army 
squadron and Navy ship from which the samples were drawn, there were not enough 
women or minorities in the sample to run statistical analyses separately for these groups.  
There is good reason to think that there might be important differences in the effects of 
civilianization of the military based on gender and race.  It is hoped that the methods and 
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findings of this study will lead to future research that will examine these differences.
Instrument Development
This research analyzes quantitative data collected using paper and pencil 
questionnaires.  The instrument was developed specifically for this project since no
existing data sets contained the information necessary to test the research hypotheses of 
this study.  However, construction of the survey instrument was grounded in prior 
research.  Three scales were included in the instrument measuring social comparisons 
with civilians or military personnel (depending on the respondent’s status), job 
satisfaction, and organizational commitment.  The social comparison scale was based on 
items used by Crosby (1982) in her study Working Women and Relative Deprivation.  The 
measure used in this study has a broader range of response categories and asks 
respondents to reference specific others (those who work with them, but are not in their 
own group) as opposed to the abstract categories of workers (e.g., comparing oneself to 
lawyers in general) used by Crosby.  The items in this scale were developed using 
literature on job attitudes to determine which job characteristics are most salient and 
likely to be a point of comparison among workers.
The job satisfaction and organizational commitment scales are borrowed directly 
from well-established protocols.  Job satisfaction was measured using the Minnesota 
Satisfaction Questionnaire (short form) developed by Weiss et al. (1967).  The 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire developed by Mowday et al. (1979) was 
adopted to measure organizational commitment.  Wording for military items were 
adapted to refer to “Army” or “Navy” rather than the generic “company” or 
“organization” used in the original scales.  Scale wording was not altered for either of the 
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two civilian groups.
A final independent variable used in this study is level of contact military 
personnel have with their civilian co-workers.  This variable applies only to the two 
military groups.  This item was not modeled after any existing question.
The dependent variable for this study is retention intentions of military and 
civilian personnel.  This variable is measured with an adapted form of the question used 
by Reed and Segal  (2000) who examined the impact of peacekeeping on military 
retention attitudes.  More detailed descriptions of the model variables are included in a 
later section.
Survey development consisted of several stages.  First, an informal and 
exploratory stage involved interviews with military and civilian personnel to identify 
information relevant to the research goals of the study.  This process facilitated 
instrument development so that the wording and sequencing of questions were suited to 
the subject population completing the survey.
The second phase included testing the instrument through of a series of cognitive 
interviews with soldiers, sailors, and airmen, both active duty and retired.  Cognitive 
interviews involve extensive probing of the respondents’ interpretation of questions and 
the thought processes they use in selecting/formulating their answers.  This phase further 
refined the question wording and was especially helpful in developing response 
categories for several of the items.  
The final stage of instrument development consisted of reviews of the protocols
by experts in the field of survey methodology and questionnaire design.  This process 
aided greatly in focusing the instrument on the goals of the study, balancing response 
categories, simplifying and clarifying question wording, and formatting the instrument to 
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be more respondent friendly.  Any omissions or lingering problems with the instrument 
are the responsibility of the researcher.  Full survey instruments for the military and 
civilian samples are included in Appendixes I (p. 167) and II (p. 180), respectively.
Data Collection
Quantitative Data
Data were collected in the field in November and December of 2004.  The 
procedures used were essentially similar for the Army and Navy samples, but with some 
differences due to the units’ structures and operations. Each unit was surveyed and 
interviewed over the course of seven days.  The survey was self-administered by 
respondents with the researcher available for clarification as needed.  The instrument took 
respondents 25-30 minutes to complete.  Respondents were given an oral orientation to 
the goals of the survey and general directions for completing the questionnaire.  All 
respondents were given an informed consent form (see Appendix III, p. 191) that they 
read and signed prior to completing the questionnaire.  This form informed them of the 
nature of the study, provided sample questions to be asked, and indicated that their 
participation was voluntary - that they could refrain from participating in the study 
without any negative consequences.  In all cases, surveys were completed anonymously.
For both samples, the majority of military personnel completed the survey in a 
conference room setting (for the Navy this was the empty mess deck).  Since the Army 
sample was an aviation unit with a heavy training schedule roughly half of the personnel 
were surveyed in their respective shops at the hangar.  An additional 15-20 soldiers were 
captured at a unit-wide training session at the base theater.  
The Navy ship to which the sailors and civilian mariners in this study were 
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assigned had returned from an 8 1/2 month overseas deployment two weeks prior to data 
collection.  As a consequence the ship was operating daily with a skeleton crew, with 
each sailor working only every six days.  A majority of Navy personnel were surveyed on 
a single day when those returning from their two-week shore leave overlapped with those 
preparing to take their two-week leave.
The civilian contractors working with the Army unit were surveyed in their 
respective offices at the squadron’s hangar.  The civilian mariners aboard the Navy ship 
were all surveyed in a single day over three sessions, one each for those in the 
engineering department, the deck/maintenance department, and the services department.
Qualitative Data
In addition to collecting survey data, informal interviews were conducted with 
personnel from all four groups in the study.  In most cases this was done on a one-on-one 
basis, but occasionally groups of 2-5 personnel were interviewed simultaneously.  
Interviews were much easier to arrange with individuals aboard the Navy ship compared 
to the soldiers and the contractors with whom they worked.  This difference was primarily 
structural.  The personnel on the Navy ship were often simply manning a station that was 
not currently in operation since the ship was on stand-down orders.  These sailors had to 
be at their posts, but did not have much real work to keep them busy so they were a 
captive audience and welcomed the interaction.  This situation contrasted sharply with the 
high training tempo of the Army combat squadron where they were either in the field, 
getting ready to go into the field, debriefing the most recent field exercise, or involved in 
the constant airborne training exercises.  It was a real challenge to find a soldier with 
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“free” time for an interview.  Civilian contractors who took formal lunch breaks and were 
limited in the number of hours they worked were easier to interview.
Additional factors also contributed to differential access to personnel in the Army 
and Navy research sites for informal interviews.  The researcher’s time for pursuing 
interviews was more limited in the Army location compared to the Navy since more time 
had to be dedicated to arranging and administering the survey to the more diffuse 
personnel in this unit.  Additionally, on the Navy ship sailors had to remain aboard for 
24-hour shifts (and civilian mariners were aboard 24/7 unless on a pass), making them 
more available for interviews than the soldiers who dispersed to their respective quarters 
on- and off-post each night.  As a result, less qualitative interview data were obtained 
from the personnel in the Army squadron compared to those aboard the Navy ship.
Measures
Independent Variables 
Level of Contact with Civilians:  This question was not based on prior surveys.  It 
was constructed with seven response categories to capture as wide a range of experiences 
in contact with civilians as possible.  Response categories were developed with the 
assistance of military and civilian personnel working for various military departments 
during the cognitive interview stage of survey development.  Response categories were 
coded 1 = “never” to 7 = “daily.”  Question wording was adjusted for the Navy sample 
substituting “civilian mariners” for “civilian contractors.”  This question was asked only 
of the two military samples.
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In your current assignment, how often do you work directly with civilian contractors?
     Please circle ONE.
a. Daily
b. Several times a week
c. About once a week
d. About once every couple of weeks
e.  About once a month
f. Less than once a month
g. Never
Social Comparisons:  This variable captures whether Army and Navy personnel 
and the civilian contractors/mariners with whom they work compare themselves 
positively or negatively in relation to each other (i.e., do they feel they have it 
better/worse than their civilian or military parallel other?).  This scale includes 17 items 
(e.g., pay, benefits, autonomy, promotional chances) which a review of the literature 
suggests are highly salient job characteristics and likely to be a source of comparison 
among workers.  Inter-item reliability analysis prompted dropping two items from the 
scale (marked with strikethrough below): “organizational control over employee
behavior” and “requires one to spend time away from their family”.  The scale used in 
analyses for all groups consisted of the remaining 15 items.  Response categories were 
coded for analysis so that 5 = “much greater for myself” and 1 = “much greater for
civilian contractors.”  Items followed by “(R)” indicate that they were then reverse-coded 
for analysis.  For example, a response stating that risk is “greater for [other]” actually 
indicates that the respondent fares better by comparison with regard to risk.  The survey 
administered to respondents did not include “(R)” in the question.  Question wording and 
response categories 4 and 5 below were adjusted appropriately for the Navy sample 
(substituting “civilian mariner”), the civilian contractors working with the Army 
(substituting “Army personnel”), and the civilian mariners working aboard the Navy ship 
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(substituting “Naval personnel”).  Items (h) and (m) were omitted from the scale used in 
the analyses for this study in order to achieve acceptable levels of reliability.  The social 
comparison scale used for all groups in this study consists of the remaining 15 items.
If you were to compare yourself to civilian contractors (assuming comparable duties), 
how would you rate the following factors using the 5-point scale below? 
        (1)                        (2)               (3) (4)                 (5)
Much Greater           Greater for     About         Greater for             Much Greater
   For Myself              Myself             Equal for                       Civilian               for Civilian
     Both                        Contractors               Contractors
a. ____  Pay
b. ____  Benefits
c. ____  Level of risk of personal injury (R)
d. ____  Freedom to make decision about how a job is done
e. ____  Task variety within one’s job
f. ____  Promotion opportunities based on merit
g. ____  Quality leadership in one’s organization
h. ____  Organization control over employee behavior (i.e., what employees 
can/cannot do) (R)
i.  ____  Negative impacts on family members’ happiness (R)
j.  ____  Satisfying relations with co-workers
k. ____  Freedom to negotiate employment contract
l.  ____  Degree to which the organization takes care of its employees
m. ____  Requires one to spend time away from their family (R)
n. ____  Gaining a feeling of accomplishment from one’s work
o.  ____  Feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society
p.  ____  Feeling of leadership support in facilitating completion of job tasks
q.  ____  Time spent working per day (R)
Intervening Variables
Job Satisfaction:  This variable is a key intervening variable in the retention model 
adopted for this study.  The job satisfaction facet scale chosen for this study is the 
Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) short form (Weiss et al. 1967).  This scale 
is twenty questions in length.  While the longer form provides slightly better reliability, 
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the short form is recognized as being a valid and reliable measure of job satisfaction 
(Price & Mueller 1986, Weiss et al. 1967).  This scale was chosen over the longer form 
due to time constraints and the fact that reliability is only marginally impacted in the 
trade-off.  One of the original items in this scale (“My pay and the amount of work I do”)
Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of your 
opinion for each statement.
          (1)     (2)           (3)      (4) (5)
        Very              Dissatisfied              Neither Satisfied            Very
    Dissatisfied   Satisfied nor                                    Satisfied
     Dissatisfied
On my present assignment, this is how I feel about:
a. _____ Being able to keep busy all the time
b.  _____ The chance to work alone on the job
c.  _____ The chance to do different things from time to time
d.  _____ The chance to be “somebody” in the community
e.  _____ The way my supervisor handles his/her men and women
f.  _____ The competence of my supervisor in making decisions
g.  _____ Being able to do things that don’t go against my conscience
h.  _____ The way my job provides for steady employment
i.  _____ The chance to do things for other people
j. _____ The chance to tell people what to do
k. _____ The chance to do something that makes use of my abilities
l. _____ The way the Navy’s policies are put into practice
m. _____ My pay
n.* _____  The kind of work that I do
o.   _____  The amount of work I do
p. _____  The chances for advancement on this job
q. _____ The freedom to use my own judgment
r. _____ The chance to try my own methods of doing the job
s. _____ The working conditions
t. _____ The way my co-workers get along with each other
u. _____ The praise I get for doing a good job
v. _____ The feeling of accomplishment I get from doing my job
w.*_____  The support I get from my coworkers
x. *_____  The support I get from my supervisors
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was split into two items (“my pay” and “the amount of work I do”) for this study because 
it was double barreled in its initial formulation.  An additional 3 items were included in 
the scale for this study and are indicated with an asterisk in question presented on the 
previous page.  All items in the job satisfaction question on the survey were included in 
the scale used in analyses.
Organizational Commitment:  Commitment to one’s organization is a second 
intervening variable identified in the retention model used in this study.  The instrument 
selected to measure organizational commitment was the Organizational Commitment 
Questionnaire (OCQ) (Mowday et al. 1979).  Reliability and validity associated with this 
instrument are high (Mowday et al. 1979; see also Price and Mueller 1986).  Whereas job
satisfaction research has not settled on the consistent use of a single assessment tool, the 
OCQ is the standard instrument for operationalizing organizational commitment in 
psychological and social-psychological research (Bourg & Segal 1999, Price & Mueller 
1986, Sommer et al. 1996, Spector 1996).  The OCQ is a fifteen -item scale.  All of the 
items listed in this question were included in the scale for analyses.  Items followed by 
“(R)” indicate that they were reverse coded for analysis.  Again, the surveys administered 
to respondents did not include “(R)” in the question.  Responses were coded from 1 = 
“disagree strongly” to 7 = “agree strongly.”  Response categories substituted “Navy” and 
“my organization” for “Army” in the Navy and civilian surveys, respectively.
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Using the 7-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of your 
opinion for each statement.
(1)                    (2)                 (3)           (4)         (5)                  (6)                 (7)
  Disagree        Disagree          Disagree           Neither             Agree              Agree Agree
  Strongly     Somewhat         Agree           Somewhat            Strongly
           Nor Disagree
a. ____  I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help the Army be successful.
b. ____  I talk up the Army to my civilian friends as a great organization to work for.
c. ____  I feel very little loyalty to the Army. (R)
d. ____  I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for 
the Army.
e. ____  I find that my values and those of the Army are very similar.
f. ____  I am proud to tell others that I serve in the Army.
g. ____  I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type 
  of work was similar. (R)
h. ____  The Army really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance.
i. ____  It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to 
leave the Army. (R)
j. ____  I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the Army over other 
  organizations I was considering at the time I joined.
k. ____  There’s not too much to be gained by sticking with the Army for a career. (R)
l. ____  Often, I find it difficult to agree with the Army’s policies on important 
  matters relating to its personnel. (R)
m. ____  I really care about the fate of the Army.
n. ____  For me the Army is the best of all possible organizations to work for.
o. ____  Deciding to work for the Army was a definite mistake on my part. (R)
Dependent Variable
Retention intentions:  Respondents’ intentions toward remaining with their current 
employer is the outcome variable of this study.  This variable is used instead of actual 
measures of retention because of time constraints limiting data collection to a cross-
sectional method.  To measure actual retention of military personnel one may need to 
follow subjects upwards of six years since they may be in the very initial stages of an 
enlistment commitment at the time of the initial data collection wave.
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Retention intentions have been shown to be a good predictor of future retention 
behavior in both civilian employees and military personnel (Carsten & Spector 1987, 
Hom & Hulin 1981, Rakoff et al. 1992).  The question used to measure retention 
intentions was taken from the work of Reed and Segal (2000).  Responses were coded 1 = 
“planning to leave” through 5 = “planning to remain”.  For the Navy and civilian surveys 
response categories were altered appropriately.
Right now I am…   (Please circle ONE.)
a.  planning to remain in the Army,    
b.  leaning toward remaining in the Army,   
c.  undecided,   
d.  leaning toward leaving the Army for a civilian job, 
   e.  planning to leave the Army for a civilian job.
Control Variables
Age:  Age is positively correlated with rank and time in service, and all are 
associated with self-selection for military service.  The older a service members are, the
more likely they are to have opted to stay with the military despite the opportunity to 
separate from service since those who did not wish to continue service left once their 
obligations were fulfilled.  Given these characteristics, it is important to control for age in 
studies of retention.  The question used to measure age asked respondents to identify their 
age in years.
Race: Attrition rates differ by race.  Even in the face of perceived and 
experienced racism, blacks in the junior enlisted ranks remain in service in larger 
numbers than whites (Moore 2002).  While this study does not have sufficient numbers to 
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run separate retentions models by race, it remains an important variable to control for in 
analyses.  Race was measured using the U.S. census question asking respondents to 
identify the racial category to which they belong from among the following choices:  
white, Black or African-American, Asian (e.g., Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, 
Asian Indian, Vietnamese), American Indian or Alaskan Native, Pacific Islander or 
Native Hawaiian, Multi-racial (specify), multi-racial, and Other (specify).  For analytic 
purposes, the last four categories were collapsed into an “other” category.  White, Black 
or African-American, Asian, and other were converted to dummy variables, with whites 
as the excluded category.
Gender:  Leiter et al. (1994) found that peer relations are a more central 
component leading to organizational commitment for women than for men.  Conversely, 
men develop commitment more through relationships with supervisors than do women.  
In a rigid hierarchical structure that is 85% male such as the military one would expect to 
see differences in commitment levels by gender.  Men and women are included in 
analyses, but separate models will not be run by gender since there are not enough women 
in the samples.  Respondents were asked to self-identify as either male or female.
Education.  Education is a strong measure of human capital in the civilian labor 
market.  Military personnel entertaining leaving the service may be influenced by this 
factor, leading those with higher levels of education to feel more confident about their 
long-term opportunities in the civilian labor market than individuals with less education.  
In a related manner, Moore (2002) found that among junior enlisted personnel a negative 
relationship existed between education and retention in the military.  The less educated 
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are more likely to remain in service.  Education is operationalized using a question that 
asks respondents to identify the highest educational degree they have attained from the 
following response set: less than high school, high school or equivalent, associates 
degree, bachelors degree, masters or professional degree (e.g., JD, MD), and doctoral 
degree.  There were no respondents with less than a high school education or with a 
doctoral degree.  For analyses, the remaining four categories were transformed into 
dummy variables, with high school or equivalent as the excluded category.
Marital Status:  Marriage tends to increase retention for male officer and enlisted 
personnel. Conversely, work/family conflict is thought to account for reduced retention 
rates among military women (Moore 2002).  This variable was measured by a question 
asking respondents to identify which marital category described their current marital 
status: never married, married, separated, divorced, widowed.  For analyses the last three 
categories were collapsed.  The resulting three categories were converted to dummy 
variables, with never married as the excluded category.
Children:  Extant literature indicates that having children in the household impacts 
service members’ commitment and retention (Segal and Harris 1993, Orthner 1990).  
Moreover, there are gender differences in intent to stay in military when the service 
member has children at home, with women much more likely to leave the service than 
men (Pittman and Orthner 1989).  This variable was operationalized by asking 
respondents to identify the number of children they have as legal dependents, regardless 
of whether or not the children resided with them.  Response categories included zero to 
five in one-unit steps, and “6 or more” as a final category.
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Number of permanent moves due to work:  The measure for this variable was 
adopted from the Survey of Army Families IV (2001).  It is included because frequent 
permanent changes of station (i.e., geographic relocations) are common for military 
personnel and their families and are known to have a negative impact on satisfaction with 
the military lifestyle (Rosenberg 1995).  Respondents were asked to identify from 0 to 10 
or more how many times their family had to move to a new location due to relocations 
related to their military employment.
Number and length of separations from family:  Separation from family is one of 
the more significant factors contributing to work-family conflict among service members 
and their families.  As such the challenges and frustrations associated with family 
separations can be expected to negatively impact retention of military personnel (Bell & 
Schumm 2000; Bourg & Segal 1999; Croan et al. 1992; Rosen & Durand 2000).  This 
study controls for both aspects of separation using questions modeled from those in the 
Survey of Army Families IV (2001).  Number of separations is measured with the 
question, “During the last 12 months, how many separate times were you away from your 
permanent duty station for at least one night because of your military service?”  Length of 
separations was operationalized with the question, “During the past 12 months, how long 
were you away from your permanent duty station due to your military duties?”  These two 
questions were preceded with a definition of military duties, defined as “deployments, 
TADs/TDYs, training, military education, time at sea, and field exercises/alerts.”
Response categories for number of separations ranged from zero to 6 or more.  
Respondents indicated which among six options reflected the length of time they have 
been separated from their family in the past 12 months: less than one month, one to less 
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than three months, three to less than five months, five to less than seven months, seven to 
less than ten months, and ten to twelve months.  Question wording was adjusted for the 
two civilian surveys, but response categories were consistent across all four forms of the 
survey.
Years in Service:  Research on military personnel retention has shown that the 
stage of service member’s career is likely to have an impact on their retention decisions 
(Rakoff et al. 1992, Stewart and Firestone 1992).  To some degree this is self -selection 
into the military for a career (20+ years).  It also has to do with the all-or-nothing 
retirement system.  Military personnel must put in 20 years of service to receive any 
benefits unless injured in the line of duty.  This retirement system appears to constrain 
service members’ retention intentions (Rosen and Durand 1995, Segal & Harris 1993, 
Schumm et al. 1998).  There appears to be a point in service members’ tenure that  a 
decision is made that to leave the military would be less advantageous than “sticking it 
out” a few more years in order to retire at 20 years with full benefits.  This tipping point 
seems to be somewhere between 7-10 years of service.  However, given the proliferation 
in private military firms (PMFs) and their attractive salary, benefits, and work 
opportunities even service members with short time horizons to full retirement are being 
lured to the private sector (Schmitt and Shanker 2004).  In an attempt to capture this 
relatively recent phenomenon, I have included enlisted personnel and officers regardless 
of their time in service.  This variable is measured with a question asking military (but 
not contract personnel) how many years and months they have served.  Responses were 
converted to months for analyses.
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Years left in Service:  Steele and Ovalle (1984) suggest that the relationship 
between retention intentions and subsequent retention behavior is mediated by the time 
horizon to making such a decision.  This variable was measured by asking military (but 
not contract personnel) how many more years and months they were obliged to serve in 
the military.  Again, responses were converted to months for analyses.
Rank:  Rosen and Durand (1995) demonstrated that one’s rank is a significant 
predictor of retention among noncommissioned officers.  Rank is measured by pay rating 
using the enlisted ratings (E1-E9) for the Navy, and the enlisted ratings plus warrant 
officer (WO1-CW5) and officer (O1-O6) ratings for Army personnel.  For the Army 
sample this variable was converted to a series of dummy variables defined by junior 
enlisted (E1-E4), senior enlisted (E5-E9), warrant officers, and officers.  Junior enlisted 
soldiers were the excluded group in the Army sample.  Since the Naval personnel who 
completed surveys were all enlisted a simple dichotomous variable (junior versus senior 
enlisted) was used for the Navy sample.
Statistical Analysis
Analysis for this dissertation will focus on the central question of whether, and to 
what extent, having military personnel work along side contract personnel affects 
attitudes and behavioral intentions of members in each group.  The variables examining 
the effects of civilianization of the military on service personnel are level of contact with 
civilians and social comparisons with civilians.  For the civilian groups, social 
comparisons with their military counterparts is the sole civilianization effect variable.  In 
all groups, job satisfaction and organizational commitment are included as intervening 
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variables through which the civilianization variables affect retention.  
Statistical analyses in this study consist of several components.  First, analyses 
incorporate descriptive statistics to define the characteristics of the sample and the 
distributions of the variables to be analyzed.  Correlation analysis is conducted including 
all model variables to establish basic relationships among the variables.  A third 
component includes analyses of reliability of scale items to establish the internal 
consistency of each scale.  Exploratory factor analysis is conducted on the scale items to 
identify whether one or multiple components are underlying the theoretical constructs.  
Two separate tests of means are conducted for the social comparison, satisfaction, 
and commitment scales.  First, t-tests are conducted comparing the individual item scores
and total scale scores against the neutral midpoints of their respective scales.  This 
analysis identifies which items deviate significantly from neutral in either direction.  The 
second set of t-test compares individual item scores and the overall scale scores between 
military personnel and their civilian co-workers.  This analysis establishes where the two 
groups have significant differences from one another.  
Finally, the retention model is tested using path analysis.  This method of analysis 
enables simultaneous specification of the direct and indirect effects of the model’s 
independent variables on retention intentions.  Path analysis uses mean scores for the 
scale items and controls for a number of factors known to be important in predicting 
satisfaction, commitment, and retention.  The results of quantitative data analysis that 
follow are presented in two chapters.  The first focuses on the Navy case study and the 
second on the Army case study.  Quantitative data analyses are conducted using SPSS 
version 11.0 and EQS version 6.1.
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Chapter 4.  A Case Study of Sailors and Civilian Mariners Aboard
a U.S. Navy Command and Control Ship
Military Sealift Command
The Navy operates two categories of ships.  U.S. ships (designated USS) are 
commissioned U.S. Navy ships that are crewed and captained by U.S. Navy (USN) 
personnel.  These ships can be either combatant (e.g., destroyer, aircraft carrier) or non-
combatant (e.g., salvage, command and control).  The second category of ships is U.S. 
Naval ships (designated USNS).  These ships are owned by the Federal government and 
crewed by civilian mariners (CIVMARs) employed through military sealift command 
(MSC), though small military detachments often serve aboard USNS ships to perform 
duties such as communications and aviation (MSC 2005a).  Further, USNS ships are not 
commissioned Navy vessels and as such all are non-combatant ships.
A CIVMAR is defined as “a Federal government employee who works and sails 
on U.S. government owned Military Sealift Command ships” (MSC 2005b).  Military 
Sealift Command operates over 120 U.S. government ships worldwide, of which greater 
than 80% serve at sea (MSC 2005a).  The mission of the MSC is to “provide ocean 
transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces 
worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long as operational requirements dictate” 
(MSC 2005b).  Military Sealift Command is an echelon II operating force under the 
command of the Chief of Naval Operations.  The current commander of MSC is Vice 
Admiral David L. Brewer III who oversees five area commands (MSC Atlantic, MSC 
Pacific, MSC Europe, MSC Far East, and MSC Central) each of which is headed by a 
USN Captain.
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Military Sealift Command (est. 1970) was formerly the Military Sea 
Transportation Service (MSTS, est. 1949).  The MSTS was organized in the wake of 
World War II as a move to coordinate the mission and assets of military maritime 
organizations that were under the control of various military departments and civilian 
organizations during the war (MSC 2005a).  Currently, MSC has four primary operational 
objectives that are organized into more or less separate components of the organization.  
The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force has the responsibility of providing fuel, food, combat 
logistics services, and spare parts to U.S. Navy ships at sea.  The Special Mission 
component of MSC provides a wide range of scientific and communications functions for 
the U.S. Navy, including oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater 
surveillance, missile tracking, and submarine support functions.  The objective of MSC’s 
Prepositioning Program is to locate military equipment and supplies aboard ships 
strategically placed around the globe in the event that they are needed for a major theater 
war, humanitarian operation or other contingency.  Finally, the Sealift Program operated 
by MSC is designed to provide ocean transportation for DoD and other federal agencies.
Sample
The sailors and CIVMARs surveyed in this study were all detailed to the same 
command and control vessel with the U.S. Navy’s Pacific fleet.  The CIVMARs aboard 
ship performed duties in one of three job categories: deck/maintenance, shipboard 
services (e.g., laundry, dining, cleaning), and engineering.  As a consequence, there was 
no military-civilian redundancy on the ship.  Those jobs performed by the civilian 
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mariners were not (theoretically)9 to be performed by the sailors, and vice versa.  In this 
sense, though they were incorporated as organic components of the ship’s personnel, they 
were not structurally integrated with the sailors on a small organizational level.  All 
CIVMAR personnel aboard ship, from cooks to engineers, were employees of Military 
Sealift Command (MSC).  What makes this ship especially interesting is that this ship 
was the first USS command ship to employ a joint military and civilian crew (Crutchfield 
2005).  The number and types of jobs the CIVMARs performed were a Navy experiment 
designed to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of integrating sailors and CIVMARs 
on a deployed USS ship.  It should be clear that the jobs the civilians performed were 
routine jobs for CIVMARs – they do these kinds of jobs on all USNS ships.  Rather, it 
was the situational context of integrating the two groups of employees on a USS ship that 
was novel.
Response Rates
A total of 125 sailors were assigned to the naval ship at the time of this study.  
Approximately a dozen sailors were not available due to leaves, training, or other 
temporary duties (TDYs) that took them off the ship.  Of the sailors present during the 
time of data collection, surveys were given to approximately 110 sailors.  One hundred 
and three surveys were returned (94% response rate), of which 84 were usable for 
9
 Several sailors expressed dissatisfaction and frustration at having to pick-up the slack of the 
CIVMARs in preparing for a major formal ceremony on board which involved cleaning the 
decks, scraping and reapplying paint, and hanging the ceremonial decorations.  While historically 
this was a job that routinely fell upon the shoulders of the sailors, and they were fully capable of 
carrying out the duty, because the deck and maintenance duties had been civilianized the sailors 
felt doubly aggrieved.  They had to perform menial extra duty with the recognition of a 
substantial pay differential between themselves and the CIVMARs, whose job it was to do the 
work in the first place.
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analysis (76% response rate).  The sailors’ analysis presented in this study includes 67 
percent of all sailors aboard ship during its deployment with civilian mariners.  
Approximately 85 surveys were administered to the CIVMARs aboard the ship, of 
which 75 were completed and returned.  Ten CIVMAR surveys were subsequently 
excluded due to item non-response to questions critical to analysis. This reduced the 
number of CIVMARs included in analysis to 65, which represents 57 percent of the 114 
CIVMARs assigned to the ship.
Those who are included in this analysis do not differ dramatically from the 
characteristics of their respective populations (military and civilian) aboard ship with 
respect to race, age, and gender.  The distribution of rank for the sailors in the sample is 
representative of all enlisted sailors and NCOs aboard ship.  Population distributions were 
not available for years in service, years left in service, number of children, or marital 
status for either group in this case study.
Descriptive Statistics of the Ship’s Military and Civilian Personnel
The social-structural characteristics of the sailors and CIVMARs included in this 
study are summarized in Table 4.1.  The modal sailor is an unmarried, white male with a 
high school education and no children.  He has served for almost seven years and has just 
over 2 years of service obligations remaining.  The mean age for sailors is approximately 
27 years.  Conversely, CIVMARs have a mean age of nearly 45 years.  This difference in 
mean ages reflects the bottom-heavy personnel structure of the military services broadly 
(Segal & Segal 2004) as compared to the much more experienced personnel being 
brought in as CIVMARs.  Consistent with the differences in age between the two groups 
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are the findings that, on average, CIVMARs more likely to be married, to have more 
children, and to have higher education than their military co-workers.
Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistics for Sailors and CIVMARs
Sailors CIVMARs Sailors CIVMARs
Variable ƒ % ƒ % mean
Age 27.05 44.92
Years in service 6.71 -
Years left in service 2.30 -
Number of children (mode=0) (mode=0) 0.73 2.02
Gender
men 78 92.9 64 98.5
women 6 7.1 1  1.5
Education
high school or equivalent 62 73.8 35 53.8
associates 15 17.9 20 30.8
bachelors 7 8.3 9 13.8
masters 0 0.0 1 1.5
Marital Status
never married 41 48.8 10 15.4
married 34 40.5 42 64.6
separated/divorced 9 10.8 13 20.0
Rank/Pay Grade
E1-E4 37 44.0 --- ---
E5-E9 47 56.0 --- ---
Race
white 45 53.6 12 18.5
black 14 16.7 6 9.2
Asian 6 7.1 42 64.6
other 19 22.6 5 7.6
N=84 N=65
The difference in racial composition of the two groups is striking.  Whites are a 
clear majority among sailors (53.6%) but a distant second among CIVMARs (18.5), being 
outnumbered by more than 3-to-1 by Asians.  Conversely, sailors self-reporting as Asians 
numbered only 6, or 7.1 percent of the sample.  Proportionally, many more sailors 
(22.6%) identified with a race captured in the “other” category (e.g., American Indian, 
Native Islander, multi-racial) than did CIVMARs (7.6%).  One of the major causes for the 
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extreme difference in racial composition of the two groups stems from the Navy’s 
historical, and continued, employment of South-East Asians (Segal & Segal 2004) in the 
service specialties that were civilianize d on this ship.  Most specifically, there is a long-
standing tradition of Filipinos enlisting in the Navy as a means of upward mobility and 
obtaining U.S. citizenship.
Control Variables
The path analyses in this study include several control variables in addition to the 
controls based on social-structural characteristics of the respondents.  Prior research 
(reviewed in Chapter 2) has demonstrated that these variables affect satisfaction, 
commitment, and retention.  They are included to capture better the unique contribution 
of the independent variables in explaining the variance in retention intentions.  Table 4.2 
presents the distribution of sailors’ confidence in finding a job in the civilian labor force 
if they were to separate from the Navy “today.”  The finding that upwards of 97% of the 
sailors surveyed felt “confident” or “very confident” in being able to find civilian 
employment suggests that they perceived viable alternatives to remaining in service.  
Controlling for this “pull” from alternative civilian employment is important so that it 
does not spuriously affect results of analysis.  This item does not specify whether the 
civilian alternatives perceived by the sailors are more attractive (e.g., pay more, have 
better supervisors, or provide greater autonomy), or whether they are simply alternatives 
but not necessarily any better than military service.
Geographic mobility and separations from one’s family have been identified as 
major stressors for military personnel and their families (Lakhani 1994; Rosen & Durand 
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2000; Schumm et al. 1998; Segal & Harris 1993).  Since it is clear that civi lians (DoD 
and contractor personnel) also get relocated around the globe in support of military 
Table 4.2 Frequency Distribution of Confidence in Ability 
to Obtain Civilian Employment among Naval Personnel
Confidence in finding civilian job ƒ %
not at all confident 0 0.0
not very confident 2 2.4
confident 33 39.3
very confident 49 58.3
Total 84 100.0
operations, data were collected from both military and civilian personnel for these 
variables.  Table 4.3 displays the distributions for the number of times personnel aboard 
ship have had to relocate their families due to their professional duties with the Navy 
during their tenure with their respective employers, as well as the number and duration of 
family separations in the past 12 months.
A strong majority of both the sailors (64.3%) and CIVMARs (76.9%) report that 
they have not had to relocate their family as a result of having to move to a new duty 
station for their jobs with the Navy and MSC, respectively.  This particular result is 
somewhat difficult to interpret since the version of the survey administered to these 
groups did not include the “not applicable” response category. The “not applicable” 
category captures those who do not have a family and/or have not been stationed at more 
than one duty station.  As a result, individuals meeting either of these criteria are captured 
in the “0” category for the sailors and CIVMARs.
On balance, the two groups appear to have experienced essentially similar 
numbers of job-related moves requiring the relocation of one’s family.  One difference 
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between the two groups that emerged in the qualitative interviews was that since the MSC 
does not pay to move the families of the CIVMARs, many of their families are 
Table 4.3 Distribution of Geographic Mobility and Family Separation among Sailors 
and CIVMARs
Sailors CIVMARs
Variable ƒ % ƒ %
Number of relocations with family in career
Not applicable10 0 0.0 0 0.0
0 54 64.3 50 76.9
1 8 9.5 6 9.2
2 9 10.7 6 9.2
3 8 9.5 3 4.6
4 5 6.0 0 0.0
5 0 0.0 0 0.0
6 0 0.0 0 0.0
7 0 0.0 0 0.0
8 0 0.0 0 0.0
9 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 or more 0 0.0 0 0.0
Number of family separations in last 12 months
0 8 9.5 1 1.5
1 20 23.8 4 6.2
2 7 8.3 6 9.2
3 11 13.1 1 1.5
4 2 2.4 0 0.0
5 1 1.2 3 4.6
6 or more 35 41.7 50 76.9
Duration of family separations in last 12 months
< 1 month 7 8.3 0 0.0
1 to <3 months 6 7.1 1 1.5
3 to <5 months 1 1.2 3 4.6
5 to <7 months 9 10.7 19 29.2
7 to <10 months 56 66.7 22 33.8
10 to 12 months 5 6.0 20 30.8
N=84 N=65
geographically remote from the ship’s home-port in California.  The families of 
CIVMAR personnel were located in places as varied as Washington State, Oklahoma, 
10 The addition of this category was one of the few changes that were made in the survey 
instrument administered to the military and civilian personnel in the Army case study, a result of 
lessons learned from the first administration of the instrument with the Navy and CIVMAR 
personnel.
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and Massachusetts.  Conversely, none of the sailors interviewed had their families located 
outside of the immediate area.
The structural issue that appears to constrain CIVMARs from relocating their 
families near their duty station also ties into the observed differences between groups in
the distribution of number and duration of family separations.  Nearly twice as many 
CIVMARs (76.9%) as sailors (41.7%) report having had 6 or more separations from their 
families in the last 12 months.  CIVMARs (30.8%) are also substantially more likely than 
sailors (6.0%) to report family separation durations in the most extreme category of 10 to 
12 months during the past 12 months.  This can be explained by their families living 
remotely from the home port so they are commuting to visit, increasing their number of 
separations, whereas the sailors have their families with them when they are not at sea.
An additional factor that plays into the longer durations of family separation 
reported by the CIVMARs is that they do not get paid leave (they are only paid for days 
spent on the ship), so they are less likely to take extended leave to travel home to see their 
families.  Whereas frequent and extended family separations are the norm for CIVMARs 
even when they are in their home port, the reason that the sailors’ family separation 
durations are so elevated in this sample is that they had just returned from an 8 1/2 month 
overseas deployment.  The deployment served as somewhat of an equalizing agent in this 
regard.
Model Variables
The path analysis model for sailors used in this study includes four independent 
variables used to predict retention intentions.  The two independent variables used to 
capture the effects of civilians on retention are level of contact sailors have with 
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CIVMARs and their social comparisons with CIVMARs on 15 highly salient job 
characteristics.  These two variables are hypothesized to have direct and indirect effects 
on retention intentions.  Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are included as 
intervening variables, providing indirect pathways from the civilianization variables to 
retention intentions.
The retention model for CIVMARs is the same as for sailors with the omission of 
the variable measuring level of contact with sailors.  This variable was not included in the 
CIVMAR survey because in talking with the ship’s officers in the process of constructing 
the instrument, I was told that this variable was not relevant given the way the 
civilianization had been implemented.  In reality, there was interaction between naval and 
CIVMAR personnel.  This interaction was most common among the deck and 
maintenance personnel, and much less common among the engineers who spent most of 
their time in self-contained portions of the ship and service personnel who worked in 
many common areas but not “with” the sailors.  In future studies this variable should be 
included in surveys for civilian personnel.
Level of Contact with CIVMARs
The distribution of sailors’ level of direct contact with CIVMARs is presented in 
Table 4.4.  Nearly a quarter of the sailors reported working directly with CIVMARs on a 
daily basis (23.8%) but a fifth (21.4%) reported that they never work with CIVMARs.  
Approximately 60% indicated that they work directly with CIVMARs at least once a 
week.  Given the close quarters nature of shipboard life and the fact that there were 
roughly equal proportions of military and CIVMAR personnel on board, it is remarkable 
that the level of direct contact reported between the two groups is not higher.  This speaks 
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to the degree of compartmentalization of the military versus civilian work, which is a 
result of the decision to civilianize entire departments aboard ship.
Table 4.4 Sailors' Level of Contact with CIVMARs
Level of Contact ƒ %
daily 20 23.8
several times a week 15 17.9
about once a week 14 16.7
about once every couple of weeks 6 7.1
about once a month 4 4.8
less than once a month 7 8.3
never 18 21.4
Total 84 100.0
Social Comparisons
Social comparisons are a subjective assessment of how one stacks-up in relation 
to a specific individual or group of people in one’s reference group.  Sailors were asked to 
compare themselves to the CIVMARs across a number of job characteristics.  Similarly, 
CIVMARs were asked to compare themselves with sailors on the same set of job-related 
items.  A Likert-type scale was used for the response categories, which were coded for 
analysis such that 1 = “much greater for [other group]” and 5 = “much greater for 
myself.”11  A neutral midpoint was included.  High scores indicate that the respondent 
feels relatively advantaged compared to his/her “other” group co-workers.  Low scores 
indicate that the respondent feels relatively deprived compared to his/her “other” group 
co-workers.
11 The items risk, negative impacts on family, and hours worked per day have been reverse coded.  
The values presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 align with the other items; higher values mean greater 
impact on the respondent in comparison to their “other” group.
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Two separate tests of means were conducted for each of the items in the social 
comparison scale.  The first tested the mean of each item in both groups against the 
neutral midpoint of the scale.  This test determined whether the groups felt relatively 
advantaged or deprived on each item.  The second test compares the two groups against 
each other.  This set of tests identified those items for which the two groups’ relative 
assessment of their advantage/deprivation relative to the other group differed 
significantly.  Both sets of t-tests were performed using the scale means for each group as 
well.
Table 4.5 presents the mean for each item in the social comparison scale and the 
deviation of each mean from the neutral midpoint (3.0) of the scale.12  Positive values in 
the “deviation from midpoint” columns indicate that on average the group feels relatively 
advantaged on those items.  Conversely, if the values in these columns are negative it 
signifies that on average the group feels relatively deprived on those items.  Data in Table 
4.5 indicate that when tested against the neutral midpoint eight social comparison item 
means reached significance for the CIVMARs and six items for the sailors achieved 
significance.  
CIVMARs’ means are above the neutral midpoint for six of their eight significant 
items.  This finding indicates that they feel advantaged in relation to sailors with regard to 
pay (3.65), autonomy (3.71), task variety (3.42), satisfying relationships with peers (3.20), 
the ability to negotiate contract of employment (3.39), and the feeling of accomplishment 
they experience through their work (3.65).  The two items for which the CIVMARs’ 
12
 Since the data in this study are not randomly collected they violate a basic assumption 
of inferential statistics.  The analyses based on significance tests using these data should 
be understood as a guideline, not an exact measure of statistical significance.
87
means are below the midpoint of the scale, indicating they feel relatively deprived in 
comparison to sailors, are benefits (2.26) and the number of hours they work per day 
(2.37).
Table 4.5  Sailors’ and CIVMARs' Social Comparison Item Means Tested Against Neutral 
Midpoint of Scale
Sailors CIVMARs
Social Comparison Item
neutral 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
Pay 3.00 1.42 -1.58*** 3.65 0.65***
Benefits 3.00 3.51 0.51*** 2.26 -0.74***
Risk of personal injury (R) 3.00 3.01 0.01 3.05 0.05
Autonomy 3.00 2.38 -0.62*** 3.71 0.71***
Task variety 3.00 2.82 -0.18 3.42 0.42**
Promotion chances based on merit 3.00 2.66 -0.34*** 2.81 -0.19
Quality leaders in organization 3.00 2.86 -0.14 3.03 0.03
Negative impacts on family (R) 3.00 2.84 -0.16 2.81 -0.18
Satisfying relations with peers 3.00 3.07 0.07 3.20 0.20**
Ability to negotiate contract 3.00 1.81 -1.19*** 3.39 0.39***
Degree to which organization cares for 
its workers 3.00 2.73 -0.27* 2.74 -0.26
Feeling of accomplishment from one's 
work 3.00 3.07 0.07 3.65 0.65***
Feeling that one's work contributes to 
society 3.00 3.12 0.12 3.17 0.17
Leadership support in facilitating task 
completion 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.15 0.15
Hours worked per day (R) 3.00 3.24 0.24 2.37 -0.63***
Total 3.00 2.77 -0.23*** 3.09 0.09
** p < .01
***p < .001
Sailors’ mean social comparisons were below the midpoint for five of the six 
items that reached significance (Table 4.5).  Naval personnel reported feeling relatively 
deprived in comparison to CIVMARs on pay (1.42), autonomy (2.38), task variety (2.82), 
promotion chances based on merit within their organization (2.66), the ability to negotiate 
the terms of their employment (1.81), and the degree to which their organization cares for 
its employees (2.73).  Conversely, sailors reported feelings of relative advantage over 
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CIVMARs on benefits (3.51).  This was consistent with the finding that CIVMARs feel 
relatively deprived on benefits compared to sailors.  The level of agreement between 
sailors and CIVMARs on which group, if any, is relatively advantaged/deprived is 
striking.
None of the item means for either group exceed 4.0, which would indicate a 
perception of very high magnitude relative advantage.  However, two of the sailors’ social 
comparison item means are below 2.0, pay (1.42) and the ability to negotiate employment 
contract (1.81), indicating strong feelings of relative deprivation on these job 
characteristics relative to CIVMARs.
Results of testing the overall scale means for each group with the scale’s midpoint 
produced mixed results.  The sailors’ overall social comparison scale mean (2.77) is 
significantly below the neutral midpoint.  This finding suggests that, on average, sailors 
perceive themselves to be relatively deprived in comparison to CIVMARs.  Conversely, 
CIVMARs’ overall scale mean (3.09) failed to reach significance when tested against the 
neutral midpoint.  On average, the CIVMARs feel neither advantaged nor deprived in 
relation to their military co-workers.
A second analysis of social comparison means examined the difference in means 
between sailors and CIVMARs.  Data on the means and standard deviations for both 
groups on each of the 15 social comparison items are presented in Table 4.6.  As before, 
lower mean scores indicate the group feels relatively deprived, whereas higher scores 
indicate the group feels relatively advantaged.
Tests of social comparison item means between sailors and CIVMARs produced 
significant findings on 6 of the 15 scale items.  CIVMARs have the higher mean values 
for five of the six items for which the two groups have significantly different means: pay, 
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autonomy, task variety, the ability to negotiate employment contract, and gaining a 
feeling of accomplishment from one’s work.  The lone social comparison item that
significantly favored the sailors (3.24) over CIVMARs (2.37) was the number of hours 
worked per day.  This result runs counter to anticipation given that military personnel are 
on-call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  But, the decision to civilianize entire departments 
aboard ship eliminated much of the personnel redundancy that would cause the Naval 
personnel to have to put in additional hours to get various jobs done around the ship.  
Table 4.6  Comparison of Mean Social Comparison Scores Between Sailors and CIVMARs
Sailors CIVMARs
Social Comparison Item Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
Pay 1.42*** 0.76 84 3.65*** 1.12 65
Benefits 3.51*** 0.86 84 2.26*** 1.22 65
Risk of personal injury (R) 3.01 0.81 84 3.05 1.01 65
Autonomy 2.38*** 0.94 84 3.71*** 1.04 65
Task variety 2.82*** 0.98 84 3.42*** 1.05 64
Promotion chances based on merit 2.66 0.89 83 2.81 1.11 64
Quality leaders in organization 2.86 0.83 83 3.03 1.09 65
Negative impacts on family (R) 2.84 0.96 83 2.81 0.98 65
Satisfying relations with peers 3.07 0.58 83 3.20 0.73 65
Ability to negotiate contract 1.81*** 0.77 84 3.39*** 0.88 64
Degree to which organization cares for its
workers 2.73 0.99 83 2.74 1.12 65
Feeling of accomplishment from one's 
work 3.07*** 0.69 84 3.65*** 0.86 65
Feeling that one's work contributes to 
society 3.12 0.74 84 3.17 0.95 65
Leadership support in facilitating task 
completion 3.00 0.79 83 3.15 0.94 65
Hours worked per day (R) 3.24*** 1.14 83 2.37*** 1.10 65
Total Scale Score 2.77*** 0.35 84 3.09*** 0.31 65
***p < .001
Also contributing to this finding is the fact that the departments aboard ship that 
have been civilianized are being manned by significantly fewer personnel than if they 
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were manned by sailors.  Thus, when work has to be done it falls on the shoulders of 
fewer individuals, and may increase their number of hours of worked per day.
The test of overall social comparison scale means between sailors (2.77) and 
CIVMARs (3.09) was significant (p < .001).  This indicates that on a continuum of 
perceived relative advantage/deprivation CIVMARs report significantly higher 
perceptions of relative advantage compared to sailors.  Alternatively stated, sailors 
indicate significantly greater feelings of relative deprivation compared to CIVMARs.
Job Satisfaction
Responses to the job satisfaction scale items were analyzed in the same manner as 
the data for social comparisons.   The first set of analyses examines differences in mean 
item scores from the neutral midpoint (3.0) of the scale to identify those items that each 
group identified as satisfactory or dissatisfactory. A second analysis tests the mean of 
each item between groups to assess whether there are significant differences between 
naval and CIVMAR personnel in the expressed (dis)satisfaction with these job 
characteristics.
Results from the t-tests of item means compared to the neutral midpoint of the 
scale are presented in Table 4.7.  The CIVMARs report significant positive satisfaction 
means for all but one of the scale items:  the way the organization’s policies are put into 
practice (2.17).  Those items that the CIVMARs are most satisfied with in terms of their 
positive deviation from the neutral mean are the ability to keep busy all the time (4.14), 
the chance to work alone on the job (4.09), task variety (3.95), steady employment (4.26), 
the chance to do things for other people (4.00), the kind of work they do (4.02), the 
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Table 4.7  Sailors' and CIVMARs’ Job Satisfaction Item Means Tested Against Neutral 
Midpoint of Scale
Sailors CIVMARs
Satisfaction Items
neutral 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
Being able to keep busy all the time 3.00 3.29 0.29** 4.14 1.14***
The chance to work alone on the job 3.00 3.61 0.61*** 4.09 1.09***
The chance to do different things from 
time to time 3.00 3.33 0.33** 3.95 0.95***
The chance to be "somebody" in the 
community 3.00 3.42 0.42*** 3.66 0.66***
The way my supervisor handles his/her 
men and women 3.00 2.99 -0.01 3.57 0.57***
The competence of my supervisor in 
making decisions 3.00 3.01 0.01 3.54 0.54***
Being able to do things that don't go 
against my conscience 3.00 3.64 0.64*** 3.71 0.71***
The way my job provides for steady 
employment 3.00 4.24 1.24*** 4.26 1.26***
The chance to do things for other people 3.00 3.64 0.64*** 4.00 1.00***
The chance to tell people what to do 3.00 3.38 0.38*** 3.45 0.45***
The chance to do something that makes 
use of my abilities 3.00 3.43 0.43*** 3.83 0.83***
The way the Navy's/organization's 
policies 
are put into practice 3.00 2.71 -0.29** 3.17     0.17
My pay 3.00 2.62 -0.38** 3.80 0.80***
The kind of work that I do 3.00 3.45 0.45*** 4.02 1.02***
The amount of work that I do 3.00 3.39 0.39*** 4.11 1.11***
The chances for advancement on this job 3.00 2.92 -0.08 3.63 0.63***
The freedom to use my own judgment 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.77 0.77***
The chance to try my own methods of 
doing the job 3.00 3.13 0.13 3.80 0.80***
The working conditions 3.00 3.21 0.21* 3.71 0.71***
The way my co-workers get along with 
each other 3.00 3.44 0.44*** 3.77 0.77***
The praise I get for doing a good job 3.00 3.04 0.04 3.42 0.42**
The feeling of accomplishment I get from 
doing my job 3.00 3.38 0.38** 3.97 0.97***
The support I get from my co-workers 3.00 3.32 0.32** 3.78 0.78***
The support I get from my supervisors 3.00 3.18 0.18 3.60 0.60***
Total Scale 3.00 3.28 0.28*** 3.78 0.78***
*p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
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amount of work they do (4.11), and the feeling of accomplishment they get from doing 
their job (3.97).
Sailors’ results also identify a majority of the item means deviating significantly 
from the neutral midpoint.  Four of the sailors’ means fall below the neutral midpoint 
indicating dissatisfaction, two of which are statistically significant: the way the Navy’s 
policies are put into practice (2.71) and their pay (2.62).  These findings contrast with the 
lack of any means falling at or below the neutral midpoint for the CIVMARs.  In 
comparison to the two items with which sailors indicated being significantly dissatisfied, 
CIVMARs’ means were split.  They did not differ significantly from the neutral midpoint 
on implementation of MSC policies (3.17), but their mean for the item asking about pay 
was significant and positive (3.80).  Whereas sailors are dissatisfied with their pay, 
CIVMARs are satisfied with theirs.  This was the sole satisfaction item on which 
significant findings were observed for both groups but in opposite directions.
Of the numerous items with which the sailors indicated feeling satisfied, just one 
item approached or exceeded a mean of 4.0: the way their job provides for steady 
employment (4.24).  By comparison, 8 item means for CIVMARs reached this 
magnitude.  Comparison of the overall scale means for sailors (3.28) and CIVMARs 
(3.78) to the neutral midpoint was significant at p < .001.  Taken collectively, these 
findings indicate that although both groups report being on the satisfied end of the job 
satisfaction continuum for a majority of their individual job characteristics, as well as 
their overall scale score, CIVMARs appear more satisfied than sailors.  To empirically 
examine this observation a second set of t-tests, comparing means between groups, was 
performed.
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Comparison of mean scores on the job satisfaction items between groups 
identified significant differences on 20 of the 24 job characteristics (Table 4.8).  The four
items for which the two groups did not differ significantly include the chance to be 
Table 4.8  Comparison of Mean Job Satisfaction Scores between Sailors and CIVMARs
Sailors CIVMARs
Satisfaction Items Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
Being able to keep busy all the time 3.29*** 0.96 84 4.14*** 0.68 65
The chance to work alone on the job 3.61** 0.99 84 4.09** 0.84 65
The chance to do different things from time 
to time 3.33*** 1.10 84 3.95*** 1.02 65
The chance to be "somebody" in the 
community 3.42 0.98 84 3.66 0.87 65
The way my supervisor handles his/her 
men and women 2.99** 1.37 83 3.57** 1.27 65
The competence of my supervisor in 
making decisions 3.01* 1.31 83 3.54* 1.25 65
Being able to do things that don't go 
against my conscience 3.64 0.86 84 3.71 1.01 65
The way my job provides for steady 
employment 4.24 0.74 84 4.26 0.83 65
The chance to do things for other people 3.64* 0.91 84 4.00* 0.79 65
The chance to tell people what to do 3.38 0.89 84 3.45 1.06 65
The chance to do something that makes use 
of my abilities 3.43* 1.10 84 3.83* 1.17 65
The way the Navy's/organization's policies 
are put into practice 2.71** 0.95 84 3.17** 0.98 65
My pay 2.62*** 1.12 84 3.80*** 1.15 65
The kind of work that I do 3.45*** 1.02 84 4.02*** 0.99 65
The amount of work that I do 3.39*** 1.05 84 4.11*** 0.81 65
The chances for advancement on this job 2.92*** 1.19 84 3.63*** 1.07 65
The freedom to use my own judgment 3.00*** 1.13 83 3.77*** 1.12 65
The chance to try my own methods of 
doing the job 3.13*** 1.03 84 3.80*** 1.09 65
The working conditions 3.21** 0.93 84 3.71** 0.96 65
The way my co-workers get along with 
each other 3.44* 0.91 84 3.77* 0.77 65
The praise I get for doing a good job 3.04* 1.06 84 3.42* 1.07 65
The feeling of accomplishment I get from 
doing my job 3.38*** 1.15 84 3.97*** 0.81 65
The support I get from my co-workers 3.32** 1.12 84 3.78** 0.91 65
The support I get from my supervisors 3.18* 1.17 84 3.60* 1.17 65
Total Scale 3.28*** 0.59 84 3.78*** 0.67 65
*p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
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“somebody” in the community, being able to do things that don’t go against my 
conscience, the way my job provides for steady employment, and the chance to tell people 
what to do.  Among the 20 items for which sailors and CIVMARs did have significant 
differences in mean satisfaction, all were in favor of the civilian mariners.  This indicates 
that while sailors identify themselves to be on the satisfied end of the job satisfaction 
continuum for a majority of their job characteristics, they appear less satisfied than their 
civilian co-workers.  Not surprisingly, the total satisfaction scale mean for CIVMARs 
(3.78) is significantly higher than the sailors’ (3.28).
Organizational Commitment
Commitment scale values range from 1 = “disagree strongly” to 7 = “agree 
strongly,” and include a neutral midpoint.  Table 4.9 displays the sailors’ and CIVMARs’ 
individual item and overall means for the organizational commitment scale tested against 
the neutral midpoint (4.0).  Results of the t-tests comparing the groups’ means to the 
neutral midpoint of the scale indicate a number of similarities, but also several 
differences.  The two groups had ten common items with means that differed significantly 
from the neutral midpoint.  Eight means on these common significant items had means 
above the midpoint.  Of the two remaining jointly significant items, both groups’ means 
were below the midpoint on one, and the groups were split on the other. Of the eight scale 
items that were significant and positive for both groups, the four for which both group 
means exceeded 5.0 are being willing to extend a great deal of effort to help their 
respective organizations be successful, being proud to tell others they work for their 
respective organizations, caring about the fate of their respective organizations, and 
feeling that joining their respective organizations was not a mistake.  The item for which 
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Table 4.9  Sailors’ and CIVMARs’ Organizational Commitment Item Means Tested 
Against Neutral Midpoint of Scale
Sailors CIVMARs
Organizational Commitment Items
neutral 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
I am willing to extend a great deal of effort to 
help the Navy/this organization be successful 4.00 5.57 1.57*** 5.89 1.89***
I talk up the Navy/this organization to my 
friends as a great organization to work for 4.00 4.27 0.27 5.49 1.49***
I feel very little loyalty to the Navy/this 
organization (R) 4.00 5.05 1.05*** 4.64 0.64*
I would accept almost any job assignment to 
keep working for the Navy/this organization 4.00 2.73 -1.27*** 4.37 0.37
I find that my values and those of the Navy/this 
organization are very similar 4.00 4.38 0.38* 4.69 0.69***
I am proud to tell others that I serve in the 
Navy/work for this organization 4.00 5.71 1.71*** 5.75 1.75***
I could just as well be working for a different 
organization as long as the work was similar (R) 4.00 3.77 -0.23 3.52 -0.48*
The Navy/this organization really inspires the very 
best in me in the way of job performance 4.00 4.18 0.18 5.32 1.32***
It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave the Navy/this 
organization (R) 4.00 4.05 0.05 3.58 -0.42*
I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the 
Navy/this organization over other alternatives I 
was considering at the time I joined 4.00 4.64 0.64*** 5.71 1.71***
There's not too much to be gained by sticking with 
the Navy/this organization for a career (R) 4.00 4.57 0.57** 4.57 0.57*
Often, I find it difficult to agree with the 
Navy's/this organization's policies on important 
matters relating to its personnel (R) 4.00 3.19 -0.81*** 3.48 -0.52*
I really care about the fate of the Navy/this 
organization 4.00 5.31 1.31*** 5.65 1.65***
For me the Navy/this organization is the best of all 
possible organizations to work for 4.00 3.58 -0.42* 4.98 0.98***
Deciding to work for the Navy/this organization 
was a definite mistake on my part (R) 4.00 5.23 1.23*** 5.74 1.74***
Total 4.00 3.97 -0.03 4.89 0.89***
*p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
both groups reported disagreement (indicating reduced commitment) was the item “often, 
I find it difficult to agree with the Navy's/this organization's policies on important matters 
relating to its personnel,” which was reverse coded for analysis, meaning that they tended 
to agree with this (negative) statement.
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Sailor and CIVMAR group means differed significantly from the neutral 
midpoint, but in opposite directions, on the item asking whether their current employer 
was the best of all possible organizations for which to work.  While the sailors feel it 
might be better to work for another employer (3.58), CIVMARs perceive their current 
positions with MSC as the most desirable among their employment options (4.98).
The only item mean that failed to reach a significant difference from neutral for 
the CIVMARs was that asking whether they would accept almost any job assignment in 
order continue working for MSC (4.37).  The sailors’ mean on this item (2.73) was 
significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale (4.0).  Neither group appears so 
enthralled with their employer that they are willing to work outside their specialty area in 
any unspecified capacity just to stay with the same organization, but this is especially so 
among the sailors.
Four commitment items were significant for the CIVMARs but not for the sailors.  
Two items deviated above the midpoint and two deviated below the midpoint.  
CIVMARs stated that they talk up MSC to their friends as a great organization to work 
for (5.49), they feel their organization really inspires them to perform well (5.32), and 
disagree that only slight changes in their current working conditions would motivate them 
to quit (3.58).  At the same time, they report that they could just as well be working for a 
different organization as long as the work was similar (3.52). Sailors’ responses 
indicated their attitudes were essentially neutral on these items.
Comparing overall scale means to the neutral midpoint revealed that CIVMARs 
are significantly committed to working with MSC (4.89), whereas sailors are not 
significantly inclined one way or the other with regard to their organizational 
commitment to the Navy (3.97).
97
Examination of the differences in individual item and overall mean organizational 
commitment scores between sailors and CIVMARs resulted in several highly significant 
findings (all p < .001; Table 4.10).  All significant differences follow the same pattern; 
Table 4.10  Comparison of Mean Organizational Commitment Item Scores Between Sailors 
and CIVMARs
Sailors CIVMARs
Organizational Commitment Items Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
I am willing to extend a great deal of effort to help 
the Navy/this organization be successful 5.57 1.20 84 5.89 1.19 65
I talk up the Navy/this organization to my friends 
as a great organization to work for 4.27*** 1.49 84 5.49*** 1.44 65
I feel very little loyalty to the Navy/this 
organization (R) 5.05 1.75 84 4.64 1.97 64
I would accept almost any job assignment to keep 
working for the Navy/this organization 2.73*** 1.76 83 4.37*** 1.75 65
I find that my values and those of the Navy/this 
organization are very similar 4.38 1.61 84 4.69 1.42 65
I am proud to tell others that I serve in the 
Navy/work for this organization 5.71 1.34 84 5.75 1.34 65
I could just as well be working for a different 
organization as long as the work was similar (R) 3.77 1.77 84 3.52 1.56 64
The Navy/this organization really inspires the very 
best in me in the way of job performance 4.18*** 1.64 84 5.32*** 1.54 65
It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave the Navy/this 
organization (R) 4.05 1.81 84 3.58 1.65 64
I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the 
Navy/this organization over other alternatives I 
was considering at the time I joined 4.64*** 1.49 84 5.71*** 1.34 65
There's not too much to be gained by sticking with 
the Navy/this organization for a career (R) 4.57 1.72 84 4.57 1.81 65
Often, I find it difficult to agree with the 
Navy's/this organization's policies on important 
matters relating to its personnel (R) 3.19 1.51 84 3.48 1.60 65
I really care about the fate of the Navy/this 
organization 5.31 1.36 84 5.65 1.24 65
For me the Navy/this organization is the best of all 
possible organizations to work for 3.58*** 1.74 84 4.98*** 1.68 65
Deciding to work for the Navy/this organization 
was a definite mistake on my part (R) 5.23 1.67 84 5.74 1.45 65
Total 3.97*** 0.64 84 4.89*** 0.90 65
***p < .001
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higher mean values for CIVMARs compared to sailors.  CIVMARs are significantly more 
likely than their military co-workers to agree that they talk their organization up to their 
friends, that they would accept almost any assignment to maintain employment with their 
current organization, that their organization inspires them to perform at their best, that 
their organization is the best of all possible employers for which to work, and that 
deciding to work with their current employer was a good decision.
Results of the t-test comparing each groups’ mean organizational commitment 
scale score indicate that CIVMARs are significantly more committed to working with 
MSC (4.89) than sailors are to serving with the Navy (3.97).
Retention Intentions
The dependent variable for the model in this study is retention intentions.  
Response categories for the question measuring intent to remain with one’s employer 
ranged from 1 = “planning to leave” to 5 = “planning to stay,” with a neutral midpoint.  
Figure 4.1 displays the frequency distributions of sailors’ and CIVMARs’ retention 
intentions.  Sailors appear to be about equally divided between those planning to leave 
(31.0%) and those planning to stay (28.6%).  Their pattern differs dramatically from that 
of the CIVMARS.  Nearly 70% of CIVMARs report that they are planning to stay with 
MSC as opposed to less than 30% of sailors indicating they plan to remain with the Navy.  
On the other end of the continuum, the proportion of sailors indicating they were 
planning to leave the Navy (31.0%) was more than six times greater than the proportion 
of CIVMARs intending to leave MSC (4.6).
The significance test comparing mean retention intentions between sailors (mean 
2.89, s.d. 1.62) and CIVMARs (mean 4.31, s.d. 1.19) achieved significance at p < .001.  
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On average, CIVMARs are significantly more likely to indicate that they plan to remain 
with MSC than sailors are to indicate intentions to remain in service with the Navy.  
Given the extreme negative skewness and the concomitant low variability of the 
CIVMARs’ retention intention responses, a weak prediction model is anticipated for this 
group since there is very little variation to explain.
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Figure 4.1.  Percent Frequency Distribution of Sailors' and 
CIVMARs' Retention Intentions
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Path Analyses
Reliability and Correlation Statistics for Variables in the Path Models
Reliability estimates and correlations among variables in the sailors’ and 
CIVMARs’ path models are presented in Table 4.11 and 4.12, respectively.  Standardized 
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reliability estimates for the social comparisons, job satisfaction, and organizational 
commitment scales range from .71 to .89 for the sailors, and from .83 to .94 for the 
CIVMARs.   Reliability coefficients of these magnitudes indicate that the three scales 
used in the path analyses have strong internal consistency.
Correlations presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 are partial correlations, controlling 
for age, sex, race, education, marital status, number of dependent children, number of 
work-related relocations, and number and length of family separations in the past 12 
months.  Additional controls used only in the sailors’ analyses include confidence in 
finding civilian employment, rank, time in service, and time remaining in current service 
obligation.
The results of the inter-item correlations of the sailors’ model (Table 4.11) 
indicate that the social comparison variable is significantly and positively correlated with 
each of the other four variables in the path model.  This means that increases in sailors’ 
level of contact with CIVMARS are related to more positive social comparisons (p < .05).
Table 4.11  Estimates of Internal Consistency and Correlations among Study 
Scales for Sailors
Intercorrelations
Measure alpha† 1 2 3 4 5
1. Contact with contractors --- 1.00
2. Social comparisons .84  0.25* 1.00
3. Job satisfaction .89  0.02 0.48*** 1.00
4. Organizational commitment .71  0.11      0.38**      0.53***     1.00
5. Retention intention --- -0.09      0.25*      0.23      0.33** 1.00
N = 84
†
standardized Chronbach’s alpha
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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This result was counter to what was anticipated.  Further, more positive social 
comparisons are associated with higher levels of satisfaction and commitment, and 
increased intention to remain with the Navy.  Significant positive correlations are also 
observed between job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and organizational 
commitment and retention intentions.  These results are in line with expectations.  
Interestingly, level of contact with contractors was not related to satisfaction, 
commitment, or retention intentions.  Also counter to expectations, job satisfaction was 
not significantly related to retention intentions.
The path model for the CIVMARs is nearly identical to that of the sailors.  The 
one exception is that the variable for level of contact respondents have with members of 
the “other” group was not included in the surveys administered to the CIVMARs, as 
noted previously.  Thus, the CIVMAR model has three, rather than four, independent 
variables.  Table 4.12 presents the inter-item correlations for the CIVMAR model 
variables.  Social comparisons are not significantly related to any of the other model 
variables for CIVMARs.  This stands in sharp contrast to sailors’ findings.  The 
Table 4.12  Estimates of Internal Consistency and Correlations among Study 
Scales for CIVMARs
Intercorrelations
Measure Alpha† 1 2 3 4
1. Social comparisons .86 1.00
2. Job satisfaction .94 -0.17 1.00
3. Organizational commitment .83 -0.18 0.65*** 1.00
4. Retention intention ---  0.03 0.54*** 0.61*** 1.00
N = 171
†Standardized Chronbach’s alpha
*** p < .001
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significant correlation observed between satisfaction and retention intentions is also 
opposite the finding for sailors.  Similar to sailors, however, are the observed significant 
positive correlations between satisfaction and commitment, and between commitment 
and retention intentions.  As with the sailors, all significant correlations are positive.
Path Models 
The first step in analyzing the path model of retention intentions was to determine 
the fit of the data for the conceptual model presented earlier.  Tables 4.13 and 4.14 
present a summary of various fit indices commonly used in path analysis.  The fit of the 
independence model, a model where the variables are not related at all, produced a chi-
square of 71.26 for the sailors and 73.27 for the CIVMARS, which were significant at the 
p < .05 level.  Conversely, the chi-square statistics for the proposed model in this study 
were 0.00 for the sailors and 4.63 for the CIVMARs.  These results indicate that the 
proposed model does a much better job accounting for the variance in retention intentions 
for the sailors than does a model where the independent variables have no relation to one 
another.  The chi-square statistic for the CIVMAR model is significant, but small in 
relative magnitude indicating that the model may not fit as well for them.  The Bentler-
Bonett normed fit index (NFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI) surpass acceptable fit 
levels of .90 for both groups, lending additional support for the strength of the proposed 
model (Hoyle & Panter 1995).  The chi-square statistic for the independence model is 
greater than both the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bozdogan’s consistent 
version of the AIC (CAIC) for both sailors and CIVMARs, providing further evidence 
that the data are a strong fit with the proposed model (Bentler 1995).  All fit indices 
suggest a strong model for the sailors, and when taken as a whole, the fit indices indicate 
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an adequate, though less strong fit for the CIVMARs.  Chi-square and RMSEA are both 
sensitive to sample size, so part of the difficulty in achieving strong fit statistics for the 
CIVMARs, in addition to low variances in retention intentions, may be due to sample 
size (n =65).
Table 4.14  Fit Indices for CIVMARs’ Model
Model df 2 AIC CAIC NFI CFI RMSEA
Independence Model 6 73.27 61.27 42.23 -- -- --
Proposed Model 1 4.63 2.63 -0.55 0.94 0.95 0.24
Path analyses were used to examine both the direct and indirect effects of 
civilianization on retention intentions among sailors and CIVMARs.  Controls for the 
path analyses were the same as those used in the partial correlation analysis presented 
above.  Results of path analyses of retention intentions are presented in Figure 4.2 for the 
sailors and Figure 4.3 for the CIVMARs.  The coefficients presented on the pathways of 
the models are the standardized, direct path coefficients.  These path coefficients are 
interpreted in the same way as multiple regression coefficients.  Coefficients with higher 
absolute values indicate that the predictor variable for that pathway is explaining a greater 
amount of variance in the pathway’s outcome variable than a predictor variable with a 
coefficient with a lower absolute value.
Table 4.13  Fit Indices for Sailors’ Model
Model df 2 AIC CAIC NFI CFI RMSEA
Independence Model 10 71.26 51.26 16.95 -- -- --
Proposed Model 1 0.00 -2.00 -5.43 0.99 1.00 0.00
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The two pathways with darker arrows on the sailors’ path model and the single 
darker pathway on the CIVMARs’ path model represent the direct effects of the two 
civilianization variables on retention intentions.  The lighter arrows in the models indicate 
the indirect pathways by which the civilianization variables affect retention intentions.  
The absence of a pathway leading from job satisfaction to retention intentions is 
deliberate.  In order to run the path model at least one degree of freedom is necessary.  
Results from multiple regression models (not presented here) using the same 
control variables as the path analysis showed that job satisfaction did not have a 
significant direct impact on retention intentions.  When the path analysis was rerun 
including the pathway from satisfaction to retention and omitting the pathway from 
contact with contractors to social comparisons the coefficient failed to reach significance.  
While regression analysis revealed that several model variables did not have a significant 
Organizational 
Commitment
indirect effect on retention intentions
direct effect on retention intentions
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* p < .05
Figure 4.2  Sailors’ Path Model with Estimated Path Coefficients
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direct effect on retention intentions, a decision was made to retain all of the pathways 
related to the civilianization variables for illustrative purposes.
Results of the sailors’ path analysis indicate that although the signs of the two 
civilianization pathways are consistent with expectations neither of the two path 
coefficients are significant.  Thus, any effects of civilianization on sailors’ retention 
intentions would have to be indirect.  Additionally, level of contact with CIVMARs failed 
to explain a significant amount of variance in satisfaction or retention, and social 
comparisons was not a significant predictor of organizational commitment among sailors.
The sailors’ path coefficients are positive and significant between level of contact 
with CIVMARs and social comparisons (.25), social comparisons and job satisfaction 
(.50), job satisfaction and organizational commitment (.46), and organizational 
commitment and retention intentions (.27).  Thus, the more contact sailors have with 
CIVMARs, the more positive their social comparisons, which lead to greater satisfaction 
with their work.  Increased satisfaction significantly raises commitment to the Navy, 
which in turn elevates sailors’ intentions to remain in the service.  The civilianization 
variables seem to have a significant impact in the model, but examination of the total 
effects of the model is necessary to be more certain.  
Table 4.15  Total Effects on Sailors' Retention Intentions
Independent 
Variable
Indirect
Effects
Direct
Effects
Total
Effects
Contact with Civilian Mariners 0.08 -0.17 -0.09
Social Comparisons 0.10* 0.19 0.29*
Job Satisfaction 0.13* -- 0.13*
Organizational Commitment -- 0.27* 0.27*
N = 84
* p < .05
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The indirect, direct, and total effects of the model’s independent variables on 
retention intentions for sailors are presented in Table 4.15.  Significant total effects are 
observed for social comparisons, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment.  The 
largest total effect is associated with social comparisons (.29).  The significant total effect 
of social comparisons on retention intentions is the product of a significant indirect effect 
(.10) operating through satisfaction and commitment, and a larger, though statistically 
non-significant, direct effect (.19).  
 The total effect associated with the organizational commitment variable is also 
significant (.27).  This total effect is entirely due to the direct effect since there were no 
indirect pathways leading from organizational commitment to retention intentions.  
Conversely, the total effect of job satisfaction (.13) is entirely indirect, operating via 
organizational commitment.  This is a product of the exclusion of the direct pathway from 
satisfaction to retention in order to maintain one degree of freedom in the model for 
analysis purposes.  If this pathway were included (which theory and prior research would 
support), a non-significant direct effect would be obtained and a concomitant increase in 
the total effect would be observed.  Since the effect of satisfaction is already significant, 
inclusion of the direct pathway would only serve to strengthen (not mitigate or reverse) 
this finding.  
The total effect of level of contact with CIVMARs failed to reach significance.  
The fact that the indirect (.08) and direct (-.17) effects are in opposite directions 
contributes to this non-significant finding because their effects are canceling each other 
out in large measure.  The positive value of the indirect effect of level of contact with 
CIVMARs is due to its significant positive relationship with social comparisons that then 
impacts retention intentions through the significant chain of pathways leading through 
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satisfaction and commitment.  The failure of the level of contact with CIVMARs variable 
to reach significance directly, indirectly, or in combination suggests that exposure to 
CIVMARs is not contributing substantially to the sailors leanings toward or away from 
continued service in the Navy.
The civilian mariners’ path model with estimated path coefficients is presented in 
Figure 4.3.  These path coefficients indicate that social comparisons do not explain a 
significant amount of variance in retention intentions directly.  Further, coefficients 
between social comparisons and both satisfaction and commitment also fail to reach 
significance.  These findings do not correspond with the relationships anticipated in the 
conceptual model and suggest that CIVMARs’ comparisons with their military co-
indirect effect on retention intentions
direct effect on retention intentions
Social 
Comparisons
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Retention 
Intentions
(.64*)
(.63*)
(-.08)
(.15)
(-.17)
* p < .05
Figure 4.3  CIVMARs’ Path Model with Estimated Path Coefficients
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workers affect neither their satisfaction, their commitment, nor their intentions to remain 
with MSC.13
The significant and positive path coefficients between satisfaction and 
commitment, and commitment and retention intentions, are consistent with hypothesized 
expectations and prior research.  Greater satisfaction with work leads to stronger 
commitment to the organization, which leads to an increased likelihood of choosing to 
stay with the organization.  
Table 4.16 presents the indirect, direct and total path effects for the CIVMARs 
retention model.  Significant effects are observed for two of the three predictor variables:  
job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  There is a huge range in total effects 
across the three independent variables, from a low of .04 (not significant) for social 
comparisons to a high of .64 (p < .05) for organizational commitment.  The significant 
total effect of organizational commitment is due entirely to its direct effect since, again, 
there are no indirect pathways specified from commitment to retention intentions.
Table 4.16  Total Effects on CIVMARs' Retention Intentions
Independent 
Variable
Indirect
Effects
Direct
Effects
Total
Effects
Social Comparisons -0.12 0.15 0.04a
Job Satisfaction 0.40* -- 0.40*
Organizational Commitment -- 0.64* 0.64*
N = 64
* p < .05
a
 indirect and direct effects do not add to the total effect due to rounding error.
13 Possible explanations for this finding, as with others, will be presented in the discussion, 
Chapter 6.
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A significant total effect is also observed for satisfaction on retention intentions.  
As with the sailors, the CIVMAR model omitted the direct pathway from job satisfaction 
to retention intentions following exploratory regression analysis to determine an 
appropriate pathway to sacrifice to gain the degree of freedom necessary to run the model.  
The regression analysis indicated a non-significant positive coefficient would be observed 
in the direct effect cell for satisfaction if that pathway were included.  Again, this would 
only strengthen the significant finding already observed.
The finding for the total effect of social comparisons on retention intentions is 
quite small (.04) and fails to reach significance.  Social comparisons do not appear to 
have any measurable impact on CIVMARs’ attitude about whether or not they wish to 
remain with MSC.  This finding is not wholly unexpected given the reduced variability in 
the CIVMARs’ retention intention responses.  It is much more difficult to achieve a 
significant result when the outcome variable has very little variation to explain, especially 
with a sample of the size used in this study.  Even so, the magnitude of the total effects 
coefficient for social comparisons for CIVMARs (.04) is considerably less than that 
observed for the sailors (.29).  The two groups appear to differ on the effects of social 
comparisons on retention intentions even when limitations of the samples are taken into 
account.
Summary of Results
Both sailors and CIVMARs agree that civilians are relatively advantaged 
compared to military personnel.  While both groups are satisfied with their jobs, civilians 
report being more satisfied than sailors.  Sailors express neutral attitudes on 
organizational commitment to the Navy, whereas CIVMARs commitment to MSC is 
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significantly greater than neutral.  Greater than three quarters of the CIVMARs report 
positive intentions to remain with MSC compared to just over a third of the sailors
expressing positive intentions to remain with the Navy. In general, the retention model is 
supported among the sailors.  For sailors, level of contact with CIVMARs had a 
significant positive effect on social comparisons, indicating that the more contact sailors 
had with CIVMARs the more favorably they felt they compared with them (an 
unexpected finding).  Social comparisons have a significant negative impact on 
organizational commitment, but only indirectly through satisfaction and commitment.  
Neither level of contact with civilians, nor comparisons had a direct effect on expressed 
retention intention.  The CIVMAR retention model failed to find significant affects of 
social comparisons on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, or retention 
intentions.
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Chapter 5.  A Case Study of an Army Combat Aviation
Squadron and their Civilian Contractors
Sample
The Army squadron from which the data presented in this chapter were obtained 
was stationed outside of the continental United States.  The civilian contractors who 
worked with this squadron performed duties that were previously done by uniformed 
Army personnel.  The integration of civilian contractors with this squadron was well 
established, having been initiated well before any of the current military or civilian 
personnel arrived on post.  The contracting organizations working with the squadron do 
change over time, however.  Last year Coastal Electronics held a contract with the 
squadron, but was out-bid for the current contract by another company.  While none of 
the Coastal Electronics employees were retained by the new company, it was made clear 
from interviews with several of the contractors on site that it is not uncommon for 
contracting companies to change while the personnel doing the work on the ground 
remain the same.
Response rates
There were a total of 351 soldiers present in the Army squadron during the time of 
data collection.  An additional 35 soldiers assigned to the squadron were not available 
due to leaves, schools, training, or other temporary duties off-post.  Approximately 225 
surveys were distributed to the soldiers in the squadron of which 191 were completed and 
returned.  This constituted a response rate of approximately 85 percent.  Of the 191 
surveys returned by soldiers, 171 or 90% were complete enough for use in analysis (76% 
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of the approximately 225 surveys distributed).  The twenty surveys that were excluded 
from analysis for the soldiers were due to item non-response.  The 171 soldiers included 
in analysis constitute 49% of the 351 soldiers in the squadron physically on post at the 
time data were collected.
The soldiers who are included in this analysis are representative of their 
proportions in the squadron by gender and marital status, and among junior and senior 
enlisted and officer ranks.  Warrant officers are under-represented compared to their 
proportion in the squadron in this study.  They comprise 6.4% of the soldiers surveyed, 
but constitute 12.5% of the soldiers in the squadron.  Those soldiers most likely to hold 
the rank of warrant officer (WO1-CW5) in the squadron are the pilots.  It is not surprising 
that this group would be under-represented given the extreme training demands placed on 
these soldiers.
The total number of civilian contractors working with the Army squadron was 15, 
all of whom turned in completed surveys.  This represents a 100% response rate.  All of 
the contractors working with the soldiers are included in the analysis.
Descriptive Statistics of the Squadron’s Military and Civilian Personnel
A summary of the social-structural characteristics of the soldiers and civilian 
contractors included in this study is presented in Table 5.1.  The modal soldier in this 
study was a white male of the rank E4 or below, has a high school education, has never 
been married, and does not have children.   Mean age for soldiers is approximately 26 
years of age while for contractors it is significantly higher at almost 40 years of age.  As 
with the Navy case study, this age difference between groups reflects the contrast 
between the relatively bottom heavy age distribution comprising the enlisted ranks in the 
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Table 5.1  Descriptive Statistics of Soldiers and Civilian Contractors
Soldiers Contractors Soldiers Contractors
Variable ƒ % ƒ % mean   
Age 25.85 39.93
Years in service 5.03 -
Years left in service 3.32 -
Number of children (mode = 0) (mode = 1, 2) 0.64 1.20
Gender
men 157 91.8 15 100.0
women 14 8.2 0 0.0
Education
high school (orGED) 117 68.4 5 33.3
associates 30 17.5 4 26.7
bachelors 20 11.7 5 33.3
masters 4 2.3 1 6.7
Marital Status
never married 78 45.6 1 6.7
married 76 44.4 11 73.3
separated/divorced 17 9.9 3 20.0
Rank/Pay Grade
E1-E4 100 58.5 - -
E5-E9 47 27.5 - -
WO1-CW3 11 6.4 - -
O1-O6 13 7.6 - -
Race
white 113 66.1 9 60.0
black 18 10.5 5 33.3
Asian 12 7.0 1 6.7
other 28 16.4 0 0.0
  N=171 N=15
squadron’s military personnel compared to the seniority of those hired by the contracting 
agencies.  Indeed, all of the civilian contractors working with the squadron are prior 
military – though not all served a full 20-year career.  The average soldier has been in 
uniform for five years and has an additional three and a quarter years of service 
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obligations remaining.  Data were not collected on the tenure of civilian contract 
personnel with their respective organizations. 
All fifteen contractors working with the squadron were male, whereas women 
comprise 8.2% of soldiers in the squadron.  In addition to being older and all male, the 
civilian contractors are more likely to have higher education, be married, and have 
children than their military counterparts, all of which are characteristics that are to be 
expected with their higher mean age relative to the soldiers.  Proportionally, the civilian 
contractors have more blacks in their ranks than do the soldiers in the squadron.  None of 
the contractors self-identified as being of a race that fell in the catch-all category “other” 
which includes a number of discrete categories and the multi-racial identification.  
Conversely, one in six soldiers self-identified with a racial group falling in the “other” 
category.
A few words should be said about how the soldiers in this squadron are likely to 
compare to soldiers in the Army generally.  Since this is a case study of a combat aviation 
squadron the soldiers in the study are, on average, older and more senior ranking than 
soldiers in an average battalion-size unit in the Army.  This is driven by the greater 
number of high-tech specialties that require more schooling, and the presence of 45 
warrant officers who typically spend their careers specializing in their highly technical 
specialties – mostly aviation pilot in this case.  Since age and rank tend to be correlated 
with education, marriage, and presence of children, this sample is also likely to be better 
educated and more likely to be married and have children than the soldiers Army-wide.  
Finally, the squadron being studied is a combat squadron, which restricts the number of 
specialties open to women.  As a result, women are under-represented in the squadron 
compared to women in the Army generally (Segal and Segal 2004).
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Control Variables
Path analysis and correlation analysis were conducted controlling for several 
variables that have been shown to affect retention.  Table 5.2 displays the frequency 
distribution of soldiers’ responses to the question asking how much confidence they had 
in obtaining a job in the civilian labor market.  Nearly 90% said they were either 
confident or very confident they could find a job in the civilian work force.  This is an 
indication that these soldiers’ subjectively feel they have viable civilian alternatives to 
military service.14  As noted in the previous chapter, this measure does not specify 
whether the alternatives these soldiers are referencing are more attractive or whether they 
are simply alternatives but not necessarily any better than military service.
Table 5.2  Frequency Distribution of Confidence in Ability 
to Obtain Civilian Employment among Army Personnel
Confidence in finding civilian job ƒ %
not at all confident 1 0.6
not very confident 17 9.9
confident 55 32.2
very confident 98 57.3
Total 171 100.0
Frequency distributions of soldiers’ and contractors’ geographic mobility and 
family separations are presented in Table 5.3.  These data indicate that fewer than one 
third of the soldiers have moved their family more than once.  The fact that this number is 
not higher is a reflection of the proportion of soldiers in the sample who are unmarried 
14
 As a group, sailors report being somewhat less confident than sailors in their ability to 
find a job in the civilian economy.  This may be a reflection of the poor state of the U.S. 
airline industry at present.
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and/or at their first duty station.  By contrast, over half of the contractors state that they 
have relocated their families multiple times as a result of their work as a civilian 
contractor.
Table 5.3  Distribution of Geographic Mobility and Family Separation Variables 
for Soldiers and Civilian Contractors
Soldiers Civilian Contractors
Variable ƒ % ƒ %
Number of relocations with family in career
Not applicable 55 32.2 1 6.7
0 52 30.4 4 26.7
1 14 8.2 2 13.3
2 9 5.3 2 13.3
3 14 8.2 2 13.3
4 9 5.3 3 20.0
5 6 3.5 1 6.7
6 4 2.3 0 0.0
7 3 1.8 0 0.0
8 3 1.8 0 0.0
9 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 or more 2 1.2 0 0.0
Number of family separations in last 12 months
0 30 17.5 5 33.3
1 5 2.9 2 13.3
2 10 5.8 0 0.0
3 10 5.8 1 6.7
4 17 9.9 0 0.0
5 11 6.4 1 6.7
6 or more 88 51.5 6 40.0
Duration of family separations in last 12 months
< 1 month 75 43.9 10 66.7
1 to <3 months 58 33.9 2 13.3
3 to <5 months 25 14.6 0 0.0
5 to <7 months 2 1.2 1 6.7
7 to <10 months 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 to 12 months 11 6.4 2 13.3
N=171 N=15
Number of moves must be considered in the context of unaccompanied tours of 
duty since the squadron is based on an overseas post that requires command sponsorship 
in order to bring one’s family.  Command sponsorship is rare for this post and as a rule it 
is reserved for senior officers and NCOs.  Though rare, soldiers who are not command 
sponsored have brought their families with them, but they live off-post and are solely the 
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responsibility of the soldier (e.g., receive no housing subsidies or tuition for children’s 
school).
Number and duration of family separations capture a major stressor of military
(and civilian contractor) employment.  This variable includes separations due to 
unaccompanied tours, training, field exercises, and deployments.  The most striking result 
presented in Table 5.3 for number of family separations is that the civilian contractors are 
nearly twice as likely as the soldiers to report zero separations from their family in the 
past 12 months.  This, again, is a function of the squadron being located on a base that 
requires command sponsorship to bring one’s family.  Conversely, the civilians are more 
likely to relocate their families to be with them as part of their contract negotiation, or to 
leverage their larger salaries to pay out of pocket for their family’s relocation.
Another factor that appears to be affecting the lower rate of family separation 
among contractors is that several of them are married to women from the area.  Thus, they 
already have their family with them.  One contractor related that he has worked for 
multiple contract organizations at this same post – placing a higher priority on geography 
over any particular employer.
Duration of family separations is higher among soldiers than contractors.  Average 
length of time apart from one’s family was between one and three months out of the last 
12 months for Army personnel, but less than one month in the last year for contractors.  
The proportion of contractors identifying the longest duration of family separation (10 to 
12 months) was more than twice that of soldiers.  This difference may be attributable to 
the relative stability of contractors versus the short tours of duty experienced by military 
personnel at this post – typically one year.
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Model Variables
The path analysis model used to analyze the soldier data is identical to that used 
for the Sailors in Chapter 4. The two predictor variables related to civilian contractors are 
the level of contact soldiers have with contractors and their social comparisons with 
contractors.  These civilianization variables affect the dependent variable, retention 
intentions directly, as well as indirectly through job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment.  
The model for civilian contractors deviates only slightly from that used for 
soldiers.  Consistent with the model used for CIVMARs in Chapter 4, a variable 
measuring the level of contact contractors have with soldiers is not included.  This 
question was not included in the contractors’ surveys.  Even so, all contractors work with 
soldiers on a daily basis in this squadron, making contact with soldiers a constant for the 
group of contractors.
Level of Contact with Contractors
Over a third of the soldiers surveyed indicated that they work with contractors on a daily 
basis while only one in eight reported no contact at all with civilian contractors (Table 
5.4).  A majority (55.6%) of soldiers stated they work with contractors at least several 
times a week.  The high percentage of soldiers who work with civilian contractors on a 
regular basis is a clear indication of the central roles that the contractors play in the 
mission of the squadron.  As noted earlier, the squadron could not function effectively 
without the civilian contractors.
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Table 5.4  Soldiers' Level of Contact with Contractors
Level of Contact ƒ %
daily 66 38.6
several times a week 29 17.0
about once a week 17 9.9
about once every couple of weeks 14 8.2
about once a month 6 3.5
less than once a month 12 7.0
never 27 15.8
Total 171 100.0
Social Comparisons
Social comparisons are a subjective assessment of how one stacks-up to a 
particular individual or group of people in one’s reference group.  Soldiers were asked to 
compare themselves to the civilian contractors, assuming comparable duties, across 
numerous job characteristics.  Similarly, contractors were asked to compare themselves to 
soldiers performing similar duties using the same job-related items.  A Likert-style scale 
was used for response categories such that 1 = “much greater for myself” and 5 = “much 
greater for [other group].”15  A neutral midpoint was included.  Two separate tests of 
sample means were conducted for each of the items in the social comparison scale.  The 
first tested the mean of each item in both groups against the neutral midpoint of the scale.  
This t-test determines whether the groups feel relatively advantaged or relatively deprived 
on each item.  The second analysis tested the means of the two groups against one 
another.  This set of t-tests identified those items for which one group felt significantly 
15 The items risk, negative impacts on family, and hours worked per day have been reverse coded.  
The values presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 align with the other items; higher values mean greater 
impact on the respondent in comparison to their “other” group.
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more advantaged (or deprived) compared to the other group.  Both sets of t-tests were 
also performed on the scale means for each group.
Table 5.5 presents the mean for each item in the social comparison scale and the 
deviation of each mean item mean from the neutral midpoint (3.0) of the scale.  Positive 
values in the columns for the deviation from the midpoint indicate that the group feels 
advantaged on that item relative to the other group.  Negative values indicate the group 
feels relatively deprived on that item by comparison.
Table 5.5  Soldiers’ and Contractors’ Social Comparison Item Means Tested Against 
Neutral Midpoint of Scale
Soldiers Contractors
social comparison item
neutral 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
Pay 3 1.57 -1.43*** 4.20 1.20***
Benefits 3 3.10 0.1 2.47 -0.53
Risk of personal injury (R) 3 2.17 -0.83*** 3.27 0.27
Autonomy 3 2.20 -0.80*** 3.60 0.60*
Task variety 3 2.95 -0.05 3.33 0.33
Promotion opportunities based 
on merit 3 2.96 -0.04 2.47 -0.53
Quality leaders in organization 3 2.91 -0.09 3.20 0.20
Negative impacts on family (R) 3 1.94 -1.06*** 3.20 0.2
Satisfying relations w. peers 3 2.94 -0.06 3.27 0.27
Ability to negotiate contract 3 1.66 -1.34*** 3.80 0.80*
Degree to which organization 
cares for its employees 3 2.57 -0.43*** 2.60 -0.40
Feeling of accomplishment 
from work 3 3.07 0.07 3.33 0.33
Feeling that one’s work 
contributes to society 3 3.13 0.13** 3.13 0.13
Leadership support in 
facilitating task completion 3 2.94 -0.06 3.20 0.20
Hours worked per day (R) 3 1.74 -1.26*** 2.67 -0.33
Total Scale Score 3 2.53 -0.47*** 3.18 0.18*
* p < .05                                N=171  N=15
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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The t-tests comparing both groups’ item means to the neutral midpoint (3.0) 
revealed similarities and differences between the two groups.  Civilian contractors 
identified themselves as significantly advantaged relative to soldiers on pay (4.20), 
autonomy (3.60), and the ability to negotiate one’s contract (3.80).  Contractors did not
identify any comparison items as favoring the soldiers.
Soldiers felt they compared negatively to contractors on seven of the fifteen scale 
items.  Soldiers agreed with civilian contractors that those in uniform are relatively 
deprived compared to contractors in terms of pay (1.57), autonomy (2.20), and the ability 
to negotiate their employment contract (1.66).  Soldiers identified four additional items 
for which they feel relatively deprived compared to contractors: risk of personal injury 
(2.17), negative impacts on family (1.94), the degree to which the organization takes care 
of its employees (2.57), and the time spent working per day (1.74).  Contractors’ mean 
scores indicate they felt both groups were equivalent on these four items.  The lone job 
characteristic on which soldiers stated feeling relatively advantaged compared to their 
contractor co-workers was the feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society 
(3.13).  Again, contractors did not indicate either group having a significant advantage on 
this item.  Contractors’ mean for this item is exactly equal to the soldiers’ mean, but the 
very small sample size for contractors requires greater deviation from the midpoint to 
reach significance.
Seven of the job characteristics were judged by both military and civilian 
personnel to be essentially similar.  The items that both groups agreed were about equal 
for military and civilian contract personnel (that is, means were not significantly different 
from neutral) were benefits, task variety, chances for promotion in one’s organization, 
quality of leaders in the organization, satisfying relationships with co-workers, gaining a 
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feeling of accomplishment in one’s work, and the feeling of leadership support in 
facilitating completion of job tasks.  Taken together, the results indicate that while a few
differences are observed, there are more points of commonality in the social comparisons 
between soldiers and civilian contractors.16
Overall, soldiers’ mean social comparison scale score (2.53) is significantly lower 
than the scale’s neutral midpoint.  This indicates the soldiers feel relatively deprived in 
relation to contractors.  Conversely, the civilian contractors’ mean social comparison 
scale score (3.18) is significantly above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting they feel 
advantaged in comparison to the soldiers with whom they work.  These findings provide 
evidence that both groups agree that on average soldiers are relatively deprived compared 
to contractors when considering numerous highly salient job characteristics.
A second analysis of the social comparison scale items examined the difference in 
means between soldiers and civilian contractors on each of the job characteristic items.  
Table 5.6 presents data on the means and standard deviations for both groups on each of 
the 15 social comparison items.  As before, lower scores indicate increased relative 
deprivation and higher scores correspond to feelings of relative advantage.
When soldiers’ mean social comparison item scores are tested against civilian 
contractors’ mean item scores seven items reach significance at the p < 0.05 level.  The 
difference in means between groups on pay, autonomy, and the ability to negotiate terms 
of employment are consistent with the prior finding that both groups felt contractors had 
the advantage on these items.  Significant differences in group means are also observed 
16 The lower number of items reaching significance for contractors may be due the fact that all 
the contractors are prior military and they know life from both sides of the aisle.  This difference 
in insight may account for some of the expressed differences between groups.
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for risk of personal injury, negative impacts on family, and hours worked per day, driven 
by the magnitude of the soldiers’ responses, as observed in Table 5.5 above.
Table 5.6  Tests of Mean Social Comparison Item Means for Soldiers and Civilian 
Contractors
Soldiers Civilian Contractors
Social Comparison Item Mean SD N17 Mean SD N
Pay 1.57** 0.74 168 4.20** 0.68 15
Benefits 3.10* 1.01 168 2.47* 1.41 15
Risk of personal injury (R) 2.17** 0.90 171 3.27** 0.59 15
Autonomy 2.26** 0.89 171 3.60** 0.83 15
Task variety 2.95 1.02 171 3.33 1.11 15
Promotion opportunities based on merit 2.96 1.03 170 2.47 1.19 15
Quality leaders in organization 2.91 0.98 171 3.20 0.56 15
Negative impacts on family (R) 1.94** 0.97 171 3.20** 1.08 15
Satisfying relations w. peers 2.94 0.73 171 3.27 0.59 15
Ability to negotiate contract 1.66** 0.76 169 3.80** 1.21 15
Degree to which organization cares for 
its employees 2.57 1.01 170 2.60 0.91 15
Feeling of accomplishment from work 3.07 0.80 171 3.33 0.82 15
Feeling that one’s work contributes to 
society 3.13 0.72 171 3.13 0.52 15
Leadership support in facilitating task 
completion 2.94 0.85 171 3.20 0.68 15
Hours worked per day (R) 1.74** 0.96 171 2.67** 1.29 15
Total Scale Score 2.53*** 0.41 171 3.18*** 0.32 15
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Previously, when mean scores on the benefits item were compared to the neutral 
midpoint it failed to reach significance for either group (Table 5.5).  When the benefits 
item is compared between groups rather than against the midpoint a significant difference 
is observed (Table 5.6).  This difference is due to the fact that the groups’ means deviated 
from the midpoint in opposite directions.  The benefits item was the only social 
comparison item to reach significance in favor of the soldiers over the contractors.
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Eight of the fifteen social comparison items failed to reach significance in a test 
comparing their mean scores between groups (Table 5.6).  Six of these items are 
consistent with those items in Table 5.5 that did not show significant results: task variety, 
promotional chances in the organization, quality of leaders, satisfying relationships with 
peers, feeling of accomplishment through work, and leadership support facilitating task 
completion.
The two remaining items, degree to which the organization takes care of its 
employees and feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society, had significant 
negative deviations for soldiers when tested against the neutral midpoint of the scale.  
That is, soldiers felt civilian contractors fared much better than did soldiers on these 
items.  However, when the groups’ means for these items are compared directly with each 
other on these items they fail to reach significance.  This is because for both items the two 
groups deviate from the neutral midpoint in the same direction and in essentially similar 
magnitudes.  Soldiers and contractors have means of 2.57 and 2.60 respectively on the 
item asking about the degree to which the organization cares for its employees.  The two 
groups have identical means, 3.13, on the item asking about feeling that one’s job makes 
a contribution to society.  Soldiers and contractors feel that both groups’ jobs allow them 
to contribute to society about equally.
These results indicate that perceptions of military versus contractor personnel 
differ significantly on nearly half of the scale items.  For almost all items that achieve 
significance the contractors have a relative advantage over soldiers.  The one exception is 
17 Respondents were included in analysis if they provided valid answers for at least 14 of the 15 
scale items.
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the benefits item, on which both groups see soldiers having the advantage.  The high level 
of agreement on the individual items is striking, indicating that both groups agree that 
soldiers are less well-off compared to their civilian co-workers.
The difference in social comparison scale means between soldiers’ (2.57) and 
civilian contractors’ (3.18) is significant at the p < .001 level.  Further, soldiers feel they 
compare negatively to contractors (their mean falls above the scale midpoint), and the 
contractors feel they compare positively to soldiers (their mean falls below the midpoint).
Job Satisfaction
Response categories for the job satisfaction scale items ranged from 1 = “very 
dissatisfied” to 5 = “very satisfied.”  Satisfaction data were analyzed in the same manner 
as those in the social comparison scale.  Initial analysis examined differences in mean 
scores from the neutral midpoint (3.0) of the scale to identify those items that are viewed 
as satisfactory or dissatisfactory by each group.  A second analysis tested the mean of 
each item between groups to determine whether there is a significant difference between 
soldiers and contractors in their expressed (dis)satisfaction on the items.
Results for civilian contractors show 17 of 24 job characteristics are significantly 
different from the neutral midpoint, though only four have means  4.00 (Table 5.7).  The 
items that have the highest mean values are being able to keep busy all the time (4.07), 
the competence of my supervisor in making decisions (3.93), being able to do things that 
don't go against my conscience (3.93), the way my job provides for steady employment 
(3.93), the chance to do something that uses my abilities (4.00), the amount of work I do 
(4.13), and the feeling of accomplishment I get from doing my job (4.20).  All 17 
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Figure 5.7  Soldiers’ and Contractors’ Job Satisfaction Item Means Tested Against Neutral 
Midpoint of Scale
Soldiers Contractors
job satisfaction item
Neutral 
Midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
Being able to keep busy all the time 3.0 3.71 0.71*** 4.07 1.07***
The chance to work alone on the job 3.0 3.34 0.34*** 3.80 0.80***
The chance to do different things 
from time to time 3.0 3.61 0.61*** 3.60 0.60*
The chance to be "somebody" in the 
community 3.0 3.39 0.39*** 3.20 0.20
The way my supervisor handles 
his/her men and women 3.0 3.36 0.36*** 3.67 0.67*
The competence of my supervisor in 
making decisions 3.0 3.35 0.35*** 3.93 0.93**
Being able to do things that don't go 
against my conscience 3.0 3.64 0.64*** 3.93 0.93***
The way my job provides for steady 
employment 3.0 4.15 1.15*** 3.93 0.93***
The chance to do things for other 
people 3.0 3.94 0.94*** 3.80 0.80**
The chance to tell people what to do 3.0 3.36 0.36*** 3.20 0.20
The chance to do something that 
makes use of my abilities 3.0 3.80 0.80*** 4.00 1.00***
The way the Army's/organization's 
policies are put into practice 3.0 2.71 -0.29*** 3.33 0.33
My pay 3.0 2.88 -0.12 3.60 0.60*
The kind of work that I do 3.0 3.36 0.36*** 3.67 0.67**
The amount of work that I do 3.0 3.87 0.87*** 4.13 1.13***
The chances for advancement on this 
job 3.0 3.32 0.32*** 3.27 0.27
The freedom to use my own judgment 3.0 3.23 0.23** 3.67 0.67
The chance to try my own methods of 
doing the job 3.0 3.41 0.41*** 3.60 0.60
The working conditions 3.0 3.12 0.12 3.47 0.47*
The way my co-workers get along 
with each other 3.0 3.73 0.73*** 3.53 0.53*
The praise I get for doing a good job 3.0 2.99 -0.01 3.27 0.27
The feeling of accomplishment I get 
from doing my job 3.0 3.70 0.70*** 4.20 1.20***
The support I get from my co-workers 3.0 3.57 0.57*** 3.73 0.73*
The support I get from my supervisors 3.0 3.21 0.21** 3.73 0.73**
Total Scale Score 3.0 3.45 0.45*** 3.68 0.68***
*p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
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statistically significant items for the civilian contractors deviate from the midpoint in the 
positive direction, indicating they are satisfied with these aspects of their job.
Soldiers’ results indicate that all but three of the job characteristics deviate 
significantly from the neutral midpoint.  Interestingly the items that do not differ from 
neutral are pay, working conditions, and receiving praise for doing a good job.  By 
comparison, the contractors’ means for pay and working conditions were positive and 
significant.  Of the 21 characteristics that reached significance, soldiers were satisfied 
with 20 and dissatisfied with only one.  The sole item for which soldiers expressed a 
statistically significant dissatisfaction was the way the Army's policies are put into 
practice (2.71).  This item was not significant for contractors.  Soldiers’ mean satisfaction 
scores were highest for having a job that provides steady employment (4.15), the chance 
to do things for other people (3.94), and the amount of work they perform (3.87).
Comparison of mean scores on satisfaction items between soldiers and contractors 
identified few differences in satisfaction between groups (Table 5.8).  Soldiers and 
contractors expressed differences in satisfaction on only two items: pay and the way their 
employing organization’s policies are put into place.  For both items, the soldiers’ mean 
scores are below the neutral midpoint suggesting dissatisfaction (though only significant 
for implementing policies) while the contractors’ mean scores are above the neutral 
midpoint suggesting satisfaction (but only significant for pay).  For all other items in the 
satisfaction scale both groups are neutral or positive, but in essentially the same 
magnitude relative to each other.  On average, both groups are satisfied with their jobs.  
Means for the satisfaction scale are 3.45 and 3.68 for the soldiers and contractors, 
respectively.  This difference in mean satisfaction scores is not statistically significant.
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Table 5.8  Tests of Mean Job Satisfaction Item Means for Soldiers and Civilian 
Contractors
Soldiers Civilian Contractors
Job Satisfaction Item Mean SD N Mean SD N
Being able to keep busy all the time 3.71 1.01 170 4.07 0.80 15
The chance to work alone on the job 3.34 0.97 171 3.80 0.78 15
The chance to do different things from 
time to time 3.61 1.14 171 3.60 0.99 15
The chance to be "somebody" in the 
community 3.39 1.20 171 3.20 0.68 15
The way my supervisor handles his/her 
men and women 3.36 1.28 171 3.67 1.11 15
The competence of my supervisor in 
making decisions 3.35 1.23 171 3.93 1.03 15
Being able to do things that don't go 
against my conscience 3.64 1.05 171 3.93 0.59 15
The way my job provides for steady 
employment 4.15 0.83 171 3.93 0.48 14
The chance to do things for other people 3.94 0.92 171 3.80 0.86 15
The chance to tell people what to do 3.36 1.00 171 3.20 1.01 15
The chance to do something that makes 
use of my abilities 3.80 1.06 171 4.00 0.85 15
The way the Army's/organization's 
policies are put into practice   2.71* 1.08 171   3.33* 0.62 15
My pay   2.88* 1.21 171   3.60* 0.91 15
The kind of work that I do 3.36 1.09 171 3.67 0.82 15
The amount of work that I do 3.87 1.06 171 4.13 0.83 15
The chances for advancement on this job 3.32 1.15 171 3.27 0.80 15
The freedom to use my own judgment 3.23 1.23 171 3.67 1.23 15
The chance to try my own methods of 
doing the job 3.41 1.13 171 3.60 1.18 15
The working conditions 3.12 1.09 169 3.47 0.83 15
The way my co-workers get along with 
each other 3.73 0.90 171 3.53 0.83 15
The praise I get for doing a good job 2.99 1.18 171 3.27 1.16 15
The feeling of accomplishment I get 
from doing my job 3.70 1.11 171 4.20 1.01 15
The support I get from my co-workers 3.57 1.01 171 3.73 1.03 15
The support I get from my supervisors 3.21 1.20 171 3.73 0.96 15
Total Scale Score 3.45 0.69 171 3.68 0.60 15
*p < .05
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Organizational Commitment
Table 5.9 displays the individual item and overall means for the organizational 
commitment scale.  On this scale the lowest value was 1 = “disagree strongly” and the 
highest value was 7 = “agree strongly.”  Since this scale has seven discrete units, the 
neutral midpoint is four.  Consistent with the analyses of the two prior scales, the 
organizational commitment scale item means were initially tested against the neutral 
midpoint of the scale, followed by tests of item means between groups.
When tested against the neutral midpoint of the scale civilian contractors’ item 
means were significant for being willing to put forth a great deal of effort to help the 
organization be successful (6.07), talking up the organization to friends as a great place to 
work (5.47), feeling very little loyalty to the organization (reverse coded, 5.20), being 
proud to tell others they are members of the organization (5.60), being inspired to do their 
best by the organization (5.00), and feeling as though the decision to work for the 
organization was a definite mistake (reverse coded, 5.73).  Contractors did not have 
significant negative results for any of the individual item means in the commitment scale.
Results of soldiers’ mean item scores indicate that all but one item deviated 
significantly from the neutral midpoint.  The difference in the amount of significant 
findings between groups is a function of the small sample size for civilian contractors, 
which makes it more difficult to achieve significant results.  Three of the significant items 
for soldiers deviate in the negative direction: I would accept almost any job assignment to 
keep working for the Army (2.71), I could just as well be working for another 
organization as long as the work was similar (reverse coded, 3.52), and often, I find it 
difficult to agree with the Army’s policies on important matters relating to its personnel 
(reverse coded, 3.26).  The first two of these negative findings indicate that soldiers have 
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Figure 5.9  Soldiers’ and Contractors’ Organizational Commitment Item Means Tested Against 
Neutral Midpoint of Scale
Soldiers Contractors
organizational commitment item
neutral 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint mean
deviation 
from 
midpoint
I am willing to extend great deal of effort to help 
Army/organization be successful 4.0 5.83 1.83*** 6.07 2.07***
I talk up the Arm/organization to my friends as a 
great organization to work for 4.0 4.70 0.70*** 5.47 1.47***
I feel very little loyalty to the Army/my organization (R) 4.0 5.35 1.35*** 5.20 1.20*
I would accept almost any job assignment to keep 
working for the Army/organization 4.0 2.71 -1.29*** 3.60 -0.40
I find that my values and those of the 
Army/organization 
are very similar
4.0 5.39 1.39*** 4.60 0.60
I am proud to tell others that I serve in the Army/work 
for this organization 4.0 6.09 2.09*** 5.60 1.60***
I could just as well be working for a different 
organization as long as the work was similar (R) 4.0 3.52 -0.48*** 3.47 -0.53
The Army/organization really inspires the very best in 
me in the way of job performance 4.0 4.70 0.70*** 5.00 1.00**
It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave the Army/
organization (R)
4.0 4.32 0.32* 4.73 0.73
I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the 
Army/this organization over other alternatives I was 
considering at the time I joined
4.0 4.69 0.69*** 4.53 0.53
There's not too much to be gained by sticking with the 
Army/this organization for a career (R) 4.0 4.86 0.86*** 4.47 0.47
Often, I find it difficult to agree with the Army's/this 
organization's policies on important matters relating to 
its personnel (R)
4.0 3.26 -0.74*** 4.20 0.20
I really care about the fate of the Army/this organization 4.0 5.48 1.48*** 4.73 0.73
For me the Army/this organization is the best of all 
possible organizations to work for 4.0 3.89 -0.11 4.53 0.53
Deciding to work for the Army/this organization was a 
definite mistake on my part (R) 4.0 5.26 1.26*** 5.73 1.73***
Total Scale Score 4.0 4.67 0.97*** 4.80 0.96**
(R) item reverse coded
* p < .05
**  p < .01
*** p < .001
strong ties to their occupational specialties.  (These items were not significant for 
contractors.)  The third negative finding indicates soldiers have negative evaluations of
the Army’s personnel policies.  However, the data do not capture any further detail on 
which specific manpower policies the soldiers consider problematic.  This finding is 
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consistent with the finding of dissatisfaction among soldiers regarding the way the 
Army’s policies are put into practice.
On the positive side, soldiers are most agreeable that they are willing to put forth a 
great deal of effort to help the Army be successful (5.83), that they are proud to tell others 
they are a soldier (6.09), and that they really care about the fate of the Army (5.48).  
Neither group had significant results for the item stating that their organization was the 
best of all possible employers for whom to work.
Overall means for the organizational commitment scale indicate that soldiers 
(4.67) and contractors (4.80) express commitment to their respective employers above the 
neutral midpoint (4.0).  Soldiers’ organizational commitment appears to
be more robust than contractors’ commitment if one considers the number of items within 
the scale that deviate positively and significantly from the neutral midpoint for each 
group.  However, this finding is tempered by the small sample size in the contractor 
group and by the fact that the soldiers seem more occupationally oriented based on two of 
the items for which they had significant negative findings.
Similar to the results of the satisfaction scale items, tests of differences between 
soldiers’ and contractors’ item means on the organizational commitment scale produced 
few significant results (Table 5.10).  Contractors are significantly more likely than 
soldiers to agree with their organization’s personnel policies.  Conversely, soldiers agree 
more strongly than contractors that their values are similar to those of their employing 
organization.  Finally, while both soldiers and contractors tend to disagree with the 
statement that they would accept almost any job, soldiers’ disagreement is significantly 
stronger than contractors’.
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Table 5.10  Tests of Mean Organizational Commitment Item Scores for Soldiers and Civilian 
Contractors
Soldiers Civilian Contractors
Organizational Commitment Item Mean SD N Mean SD N
I am willing to extend great deal of effort to help 
Army/organization be successful 5.83 1.22 171 6.07 1.22 15
I talk up the Army/organization to my friends as a great 
organization to work for 4.70 1.62 171 5.47 1.36 15
I feel very little loyalty to the Army/my organization (R) 5.35 1.84 171 5.20 1.94 15
I would accept almost any job assignment to keep 
working for the Army/organization   2.71* 1.62 170   3.60* 1.68 15
I find that my values and those of the Army/organization 
are very similar   5.39* 1.44 170   4.60* 1.18 15
I am proud to tell others that I serve in the Army/work 
for this organization 6.09 1.26 171 5.60 1.06 15
I could just as well be working for a different 
organization as long as the work was similar (R) 3.52 1.68 171 3.47 1.92 15
The Army/organization really inspires the very best in 
me in the way of job performance 4.70 1.58 170 5.00 1.13 15
It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave the Army/
organization (R) 
4.32 1.73 171 4.73 1.75 15
I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the Army/
this organization over other alternatives I was 
considering at the time I joined
4.69 1.65 170 4.53 1.55 15
There's not too much to be gained by sticking with the 
Army/this organization for a career (R) 
4.86 1.68 170 4.47 1.92 15
Often, I find it difficult to agree with the Army's/this 
organization's policies on important matters relating to 
its personnel (R) 
  3.26* 1.47 171   4.20* 1.70 15
I really care about the fate of the Army/this organization 5.48 1.51 170 4.73 1.91 15 
For me the Army/this organization is the best of all 
possible organizations to work for 3.89 1.71 171 4.53 1.41 15
Deciding to work for the Army/this organization was a 
definite mistake on my part (R) 5.26 1.78 170 5.73 1.58 15
Total Scale Score 4.67 0.97 171 4.80 0.96 15
(R) item reverse coded
*p < .05
As noted earlier, both groups’ organizational commitment scale means were 
significantly higher than the neutral midpoint, which indicates commitment to their 
respective employers.  However, the test of significance between the scale means of the 
two groups failed to reach significance, indicating that they have essentially equivalent 
levels of commitment to their respective organizations.
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Retention Intentions
The dependent variable in the model for this study is retention intentions.  This 
variable is measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1 = “planning to leave” to 5 = 
“planning to stay,” with a neutral midpoint.  Figure 5.1 shows that soldiers are about 
equally split between those who are leaning toward or planning to stay (45%) and those 
leaning toward or planning to leave the Army (35.1%).  Conversely, civilian contractors 
report intentions to remain with their current employer in much greater proportion (80%) 
than those leaning toward or planning to leave (20%).  These results are similar to those 
obtained from the Navy-CIVMAR sample where approximately 80% of CIVMARs 
reported leaning toward or planning to remain with Military Sealift Command.
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The two groups show a difference in the proportion who are unsure about whether 
or not they will remain with their current employers.  One in five soldiers reported being 
undecided about their future with the Army, whereas all of the contractors placed 
themselves to one side or the other of the continuum.  A test of mean retention intentions 
between soldiers (mean 2.90, s.d. 1.53) and civilian contractors (mean 4.13, s.d. 1.36) 
was significant at the p < .01 level.  Contractors’ intentions to remain with their 
organizations are significantly higher than soldiers’ intentions to remain with the Army.
Path Analysis
Reliability and Correlation Statistics for Variables in Soldiers’ Path Model
Reliability estimates and correlations between the variables in the soldiers’ path 
model are presented in Table 5.11.  The correlations presented in Table 5.11 are partial 
correlations, controlling for level of confidence in finding civilian employment, age, sex, 
marital status, number of dependent children, race, education, rank, number of 
relocations, number and length of family separations in past 12 months, time in service, 
Table 5.11  Estimates of Internal Consistency and Correlations among Model Variables 
for Soldiers
Intercorrelationsa
Measure alpha† 1 2 3 4 5
1. Contact with Contractors -- 1.00
2. Social Comparisons 0.74 0.07 1.00
3. Job Satisfaction 0.93 0.11  0.47*** 1.00
4. Organizational Commitment 0.88 0.12 0.48*** 0.69*** 1.00
5. Retention Intention -- 0.13 0.24** 0.28*** 0.48*** 1.00
N = 171
a Correlation values are partial correlations; † standardized Cronbach’s alpha
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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and time remaining in service obligation.  Standardized reliability estimates for soldiers’ 
social comparison, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment scales are all strong, 
indicating the scales have good internal consistency.
The social comparison variable is significantly and positively correlated to each of 
the other model variables except level of contact with contractors.  This indicates that for 
soldiers more positive social comparisons with contractors are associated with increases 
in satisfaction, commitment, and intentions to remain in the Army.  Satisfaction, 
commitment, and retention intentions are significantly and positively correlated with each 
other; increases in one correspond to increases in the other two.  Level of contact with 
contractors was not related to any of the other model variables.
Soldiers’ Path Model
A summary of the fit statistics for the model is presented in Table 5.12.  The fit of 
the independence model, a model where the variables are completely unrelated, yielded a 
chi-square of 214.78; significant at the p < .05 level.  In contrast, the model proposed for 
this analysis produced a non-significant chi-square of 1.63.  These findings suggest that 
the proposed model does a much better job accounting for the variance in retention 
intentions than a model where the independent variables are not related.  The Bentler-
Bonett normed fit index (NFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI) surpass acceptable fit 
levels of .90, lending additional support for the strength of the model (Hoyle & Panter 
1995).  Further support for this model is provided by Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC) and Bozdogan’s consistent version of the AIC (CAIC).  The chi-square statistic for 
the independence model is greater than both the AIC and CAIC values, indicating a 
strong fit of data with the model (Bentler 1995).
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Table 5.12  Model Fit Indices for Soldiers
Model df 2 AIC CAIC NFI CFI RMSEA
Independence Model 10 214.78 194.78 153.37 -- -- --
Proposed Model 1 1.63 -0.37 -4.51 0.99 1.00 0.06
Path analysis was conducted to determine the direct and indirect effects of 
civilianization on retention intentions of Army personnel.  The control measures used in 
the path analysis include age, race, gender, rank, number of children, highest educational 
degree attained, confidence in obtaining civilian employment if they left the Army, 
number of moves made by one’s family as a result of military employment in their service 
career, number of nights spent away form duty station in last 12 months, duration of time 
away from duty station in last 12 months, and time in service and time left in service 
(both measured in years and months).
Figure 5.2 displays the retention model tested in this analysis with the 
standardized, direct path coefficients identified for each pathway.  The path coefficients 
are interpreted in the same manner as multiple regression coefficients.  Higher coefficient 
values indicate that the predictor variable is explaining a greater amount of variance in 
the outcome variable than lower coefficient values.
Consistent with the path models presented in Chapter 4, the darker arrows leading 
from contact with contractors and social comparisons indicate the direct effects of the 
outsourcing variables on retention intentions.  The lighter arrows indicate the indirect 
pathways by which the civilianization variables affect retention intentions.  The absence 
of a pathway leading from job satisfaction to retention intentions is intentional.  It was 
left out to gain the degree of freedom needed to run the model.  Results from multiple 
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regression models (not presented here) using the same control variables as the path 
analysis showed that job satisfaction did not have a significant direct impact on retention 
intentions.  Further, when the soldiers’ path analysis was rerun including the pathway 
from satisfaction to retention and omitting the pathway from contact with contractors to
social comparisons the coefficient failed to reach significance.  Regression analysis 
indicated that several model variables did not explain a significant amount of variation in 
retention intentions.  The pathway from job satisfaction to retention intentions was 
selected for omission so that all of the pathways related to the civilianization variables 
could be retained for heuristic purposes.
Results of the path analysis presented in Figure 5.2 reveal that soldiers’ level of 
contact with contractors is not significantly related to their social comparisons (.07), 
indirect effect on retention intentions
direct effect on retention intentions
(.07)
Social 
Comparisons
Job 
Satisfaction
Organizational 
Commitment
Retention 
Intentions
(.48*)
(.60*)
(.08)
(.20*)
(.01)
Contact w/ 
Contractors
(-.06)
(.46*)
(.09)
* p < .05
Figure 5.2  Soldiers’ Path Model with Estimated Path Coefficients
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suggesting that it is the mere presence of the contractors in the organization, rather than 
level of contact with them, that is driving the negative comparisons expressed by the 
soldiers.  Soldiers’ level of contact with contractors is not significantly related to 
satisfaction (.08), commitment (-.06), or retention intentions (.09).  Taken together, these 
results indicate that soldiers’ level of contact with contractors does not significantly 
impact any of the other variables in the model.  Further, the direct pathway from social 
comparisons to retention intentions is near zero and failed to reach significance (.01).
Social comparisons are observed to have a significant influence on both 
satisfaction (.46) and commitment (.20).  Satisfaction with one’s job is observed to have a 
significant effect on organizational commitment (.60), which in turn has a significant 
effect on retention intentions (.48).  All significant coefficients are positive, which is 
consistent with the conceptual model hypothesized.  The more favorably soldiers compare 
themselves to their civilian contractor co-workers, the greater their job satisfaction and 
commitment to the Army, and the more likely they are to intend to remain in service.
Table 5.13 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of the model variables on 
soldiers’ retention intentions.  Significant total effects on retention intentions are
observed for social comparisons, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment.  The 
Table 5.13  Total Effects on Soldiers' Retention Intentions
Independent 
Variable
Indirect
Effects
Direct
Effects
Total
Effects
Contact with Contractors 0.01 0.09 0.10
Social Comparisons 0.23* 0.01 0.24*
Job Satisfaction 0.29* -- 0.29*
Organizational Commitment -- 0.48* 0.48*
N = 171
* p< .05
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largest total effect is obtained from the organizational commitment variable (.48) and is 
due solely to its direct effect (.48).  The total effect for the job satisfaction variable (.29) 
is entirely indirect, operating through organizational commitment.  Again, this is an 
artifact of the decision to omit the direct pathway from satisfaction to retention intention 
in the analysis.  Were this pathway included, a non-significant direct effect of satisfaction 
on retention intentions would be observed, along with a slight increase in the already 
significant total effect.  The significant total effect (.24) of social comparisons on 
retention intentions is due primarily to its indirect effect (.23), operating through job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment.  The total effect of level of contact with 
contractors failed to reach significance.  This provides additional support that the impact 
of the civilian contractors on the soldiers’ retention intentions has more to do with social 
comparisons from their mere presence, making them a ready social comparison group, 
rather than the extent of soldiers’ knowledge or experiences gained through frequent 
personal contact with them.
Civilian Contractors’ Retention Model
Reliability estimates for the variables in the civilian contractors’ retention model 
are presented in Table 5.14.  Reliability coefficients are strong for job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment, and lower but within acceptable bounds for the social 
comparison scale.  The reliability coefficient for contractors’ social comparisons (.50) 
may be depressed due to the sample size.  The solid reliability coefficient estimates 
obtained for the other three groups provide confidence in the scale in the face of the 
reduced alpha coefficient magnitude obtained for this group.  
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Table 5.14  Civilian Contractors’ Estimates of 
Internal Consistency for Model Variables
Measure alpha†
1. Social Comparisons 0.50
2. Job Satisfaction 0.94
3. Organizational Commitment 0.89
4. Retention Intention --
N = 15
†
= standardized Cronbach’s alpha 
Table 5.15 provides the fit statistics for the civilian contractor model.  The model chi-
square is larger than the AIC and CAIC, which is one indication of a good model fit for 
the data.  However, the model chi-square is significant which is not a good indication of 
model fit.  Similarly, the NFI (.74) and CFI (.73) estimates are well below the 
recommended .90 as a strong indication of model fit.  Similarly, the RMSEA estimate 
(.77) is considerably lower than desired.  Given the poor results of these fit statistics, in 
addition to the small sample size, a path analytic model was not run for the civilian 
contractor group.  A larger sample size may aid in boosting fit indices to appropriate 
levels and would increase confidence in using a path analytic approach.
Table 5.15  Model Fit Indices for Civilian Contractors
Model df 2 AIC CAIC NFI CFI RMSEA
Independence Model 6 35.76 23.76 13.51 -- -- --
Proposed Model 1 9.91 7.19 5.48 0.74 0.73 0.77
Multiple regression analysis using the model variables to predict retention 
intentions and controlling for the same variables used in correlation analysis was 
attempted.  Collinearity tolerance limits for the model were exceeded which precluded 
computation of the test statistics.  The tolerance limit issue is also likely related to the 
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small sample size.  As a result of the limitations of the civilian contractor data, for this 
study examination of the relationship between social comparisons and retention 
intentions of contractors will be limited to correlation analysis.
As with the CIVMAR model, the retention model for the civilian contractors is 
slightly different from their military co-workers’ model.  Again, the question regarding 
level of contact with soldiers was not asked of these respondents.  Figure 5.3 presents the 
contractors’ retention model including the partial correlation coefficients among 
variables.  The double arrowed lines symbolize the correlation between model variables.
Correlation analysis was conducted using controls for age, race, education, marital 
status, number of children, number of moves made due to work, and number and duration 
of family separations in the past 12 months.  Sex was not included as a control since all 
contractors were men. In addition, race, marital status and education were included as 
Social 
Comparisons
Job 
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Figure 5.3  Civilian Contractors’ Retention Model with Correlation 
Coefficients
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dichotomous variables.  This was done because the sample size was not sufficient to 
control using the same series of dummy variables as was used for the CIVMAR sample.  
Marital status was divided into married and unmarried, race was split by white and non-
white, and education was divided among those with a high school degree (or equivalent) 
and those with higher education degrees.
Correlation analysis of the variables in the contractors’ retention model failed to 
produce any significant results. 18  Since correlation analysis is sensitive to sample size 
this finding may be related to the fact that population of civilian contractors in this case 
study was only fifteen.  Perhaps more important for current purposes is the direction and 
magnitude of the partial correlation coefficients in the contractors’ model.
The model coefficients are all positive, indicating that more positive social 
comparisons among contractors are associated with higher levels of satisfaction and 
commitment, and a greater likelihood of intending to remain with their current employers.  
Further, increases in job satisfaction are associated with increases in commitment and 
intentions to remain with one’s current employer.  Finally, greater levels of organizational 
commitment are associated with higher levels of retention intentions.  The pattern of 
correlations, in both magnitude and direction, among model variables are remarkably 
similar to those observed among soldiers, sailors, and civilian mariners.  The similarities 
observed among groups in this vein - in addition to the findings from tests of means for 
social comparisons, satisfaction, commitment, and retention - provide persuasive 
18 Zero order correlations among model variables produced significant results between all 
variables (r = .52 and above) except between social comparisons and organizational commitment, 
though their correlation was high (r = .47).  This provides evidence that the relationships 
observed in the model, though not significant, are strongly suggestive and merit consideration in 
the context of exploratory analysis.
143
evidence that similar social-psychological processes may be operating for the civilian 
contractors working with the Army squadron as for the other groups included in this 
study.
Summary of Results
Soldiers and civilian contractors agree that civilians are relatively advantaged 
compared to military personnel. Both groups are satisfied with their jobs and committed 
to their employers, and these levels of satisfaction and commitment are essentially 
equivalent in magnitude for the soldiers and contractors.  Eighty percent of the civilian 
contractors report positive intentions to remain with their current employers compared to 
just over a third of the soldiers expressing positive intentions to remain with the Army.  
In general, the retention model was supported in the Army sample.  While soldiers’ level 
of contact with civilian contractors do not have a significant effect on any of the other 
model variables, social comparisons are significantly and positively related to job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Further, social comparisons do have a 
significant negative effect on retention intentions, but this effect is only indirect through 
job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Sample size limitations precluded path 
analysis of the civilian contractor data.  Partial correlation analysis among civilian 
contractor retention model variables revealed correlations in the directions hypothesized 
and with magnitudes consistent with the soldiers, sailors, and CIVMARs in this study.
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Chapter 6.  Discussion
Since the late 1980s the federal government has been pushing for increased 
civilianization of jobs formerly performed by military personnel.  This trend is 
particularly evident in the increased pace and scope of military outsourcing.  Yet, the 
impact of bifurcating the workplace by integrating military personnel and civilians at the 
unit level is not well understood.  We are at a time in our history when we are 
simultaneously drawing down the number of personnel in our armed forces, and 
broadening and intensifying our military commitments around the globe.  The future 
appears to hold more of the same, judging by the rhetoric of the current administration, to 
include Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  This relatively new but dramatic shift in military 
organizational policy merits close examination.
This study examines effects of civilianization of the military on soldiers, sailors, 
and the civilians with whom they work.  This study differs from most examinations of 
civilianization (mostly looking at outsourcing) because its focus is on social-
psychological outcomes rather than the fiscal outcomes that are expected from this 
management decision.  This study demonstrates that organizational structure matters with 
respect to perceptions of relative advantage or deprivation on numerous highly salient job 
characteristics.  Further, these social comparisons impact retention attitudes indirectly 
through job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
Individual Variable Results
The military and civilian workers in each case study were consistent in their 
assessment that the work life of military personnel compares negatively to their civilian 
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co-workers.  The degree of consensus between military personnel and civilians with 
regard to which group is relatively advantaged or relatively deprived was striking.  These 
results may be partially explained by the observable (or perceived) difference in structural 
constraints placed on the workers from the two groups.  Differential constraints for 
military versus civilian personnel include the contractual constraints on the number of 
hours civilians are allowed to work and on the kinds of work they can be asked to 
perform, the ability to negotiate terms of employment, the level of autonomy in 
performing their job, the difference in contracts between being obliged to remain in 
military service versus being able to terminate employment at any time as a civilian, 
differential arrangements for quarters/berthing, and issues regarding the amount and 
flexibility of salary.
Issues surrounding the military as a greedy institution have been identified as 
potential negative characteristics associated with military life (Rosen & Durand 1995; 
Segal 1988).  Data presented in this study show that greedy institution characteristics of 
military employment (e.g., family separation and risk of injury or death for service 
member) appear to produce negative social comparisons among service members, and 
positive comparisons among civilians.  For example, the civilian contractors in the Army 
case study were free to have their families with them (though they may have to pay for 
their relocation) but the soldiers were structurally constrained from having their families 
with them.  Conversely, neither sailors nor CIVMARS could have their families with 
them aboard ship.  Further, most CIVMARs’ families were not even residing in or near 
their home port.  This helps explain the finding that negative impacts on family were 
significantly higher for soldiers in relation to contractors, but the difference between 
sailors and CIVMARs was not significant.  
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Another significant difference related to the military as a greedy institution was 
the level of risk of personal injury to personnel.  While the civilian contractors with the 
Army were in rear echelon positions, the soldiers were expected to be ready to engage in 
forward action if needed (and the pilots and crew frequently flew missions near hostile 
territory).  The army situation contrasts with that of the personnel on the Navy ship.  Due 
to the nature of shipboard operations the CIVMARs were literally in the same boat as the 
sailors and subject to the same degree of personal risk.  In this context, it is not surprising 
that social comparisons were not significantly different from neutral for personal risk in 
the Navy-CIVMAR sample, but a significant difference in social comparisons for 
personal risk was observed for the Army-civilian contractor sample.
Comparisons of satisfaction and commitment scores between military and civilian 
personnel were mixed.  No difference was observed in mean satisfaction and commitment 
scores between soldiers and civilian contractors.  Conversely, CIVMARs indicated 
significantly higher satisfaction and organizational commitment than those reported by 
sailors.  The observed difference between sailors and CIVMARs may be an effect of the 
structural arrangements of shipboard life and the social-demographic differences between 
the groups.
Two of the greatest challenges to shipboard living are the lack of personal space 
and privacy.  The amount of room one is allotted increases with rank for Navy personnel.  
The vast majority of sailors on the ship in this study slept in racks stacked three high in a 
space approximately six and a half feet tall.  These berths had a curtain that could be 
drawn for privacy.  Each sailor also had a narrow locker with shelves to store his/her 
personal belongings.  CIVMARs, on the other hand, were either berthed in racks stacked 
only two-high in the same six and a half foot space or provided a stateroom.  Since there 
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were a very limited number of state rooms, those CIVMARs who were “stuck” with the 
stacked berthing were paid an additional $35.00 a day for the hardship, amounting to over 
one thousand dollars in additional pay per month.  The combination of extra personal 
space and hardship pay provided to CIVMARs was well known among the sailors.  
Though some thought the difference was justified, most voiced some form of frustration 
at the perceived inequity of the situation. 
In attempting to interpret the finding that sailors and CIVMARs have significantly 
different levels of satisfaction and commitment I hypothesized that the combination of 
three social structural variables may be contributing to these observed differences: 
education level, age, and their racial backgrounds.  Approximately 54% of the CIVMARs 
have only a high school education while their mean age was 45 years.  Though 
proportionally there are more sailors with only a high school education (74%), they were 
much younger (mean = 27 years of age) and many expressed the intent to leave the Navy 
to pursue higher education or additional training. Thus, it would make sense that the 
civilian workers should be happy with their jobs and committed to MSC because limited 
prospects for doing better elsewhere.
Nearly two-thirds of the CIVMARs identified themselves as Asian, a majority of 
whom are Filipino-Americans.  Historically, Filipinos joined the U.S. Navy as a way to 
improve their life by opening up opportunities for skills training, adventure, and as a way 
to obtain American citizenship.  Working as a CIVMAR for MSC offers steady federal 
employment at a very competitive wage relative to the same kinds of work elsewhere.  
Employment with MSC also allows them the occasional opportunity to visit Asian ports 
as part of their deployment maneuvers – they visited the Philippines on their return trip 
during their most recent deployment.  It is telling that the CIVMARs were the only group 
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of the four who had a score on the organizational commitment scale item for “this is the 
best of all possible organizations to work for,” that was significantly higher than neutral.
Regression analysis was conducted to test the relationships of these social-
structural variables (i.e., age, education, and race) with retention intentions, job
satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Results of this analysis (not presented here) 
indicate that age explains a significant amount of variance in organizational commitment 
(p < .05), and the dummy variable for race = Asian was significant (p < .10).  In both 
cases, the coefficients are positive, indicating that being older and being Asian are 
associated with increased organizational commitment.  Interestingly, level of education 
did not explain a significant amount of variation in organizational commitment.  
Surprisingly, none of the three social-structural variables tested were significant in 
predicting job satisfaction among sailors or CIVMARs.
In addition, many (though certainly not all) of the civilianized jobs on the ship 
required minimal training and skills (e.g., painting, laundry, and cleaning).  It may be that 
the types of jobs performed by the sailors versus the CIVMARs are having an effect on 
satisfaction and commitment.  Due to high numbers of non-response on the job specialty 
question among respondents in both groups, I was not able to include this item in the 
regression analysis to test this hypothesized relationship.
Higher levels of commitment expressed by CIVMARs over sailors may also be 
due to the fact that some of the civilian mariners are limited to working on ships.  Several 
CIVMAR engineers indicated in their informal interviews that working aboard U.S. Navy 
ships (either USS or USNS) is considered a good job in the professional maritime 
community.  The fact that Military Sealift Command is the only organization that 
employs CIVMARs to work aboard Navy ships may be motivating higher levels of 
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commitment through reduced options.  On the other side, several sailors stated that they 
chose duty on this particular ship because she was known in the fleet as a way to serve a 
sea-tour without leaving the dock.  The fact that her crew was unexpectedly given orders 
for an extended overseas deployment caused these sailors frustration and disappointment, 
which could be affecting their satisfaction and commitment scores.
The finding that soldiers and civilian contractors have equivalent levels of job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment was also unexpected.  The lack of significant 
differences in commitment between soldiers and contractors is due to high levels of 
commitment by both groups.  The finding that contractors have satisfaction and 
commitment levels as high as soldiers might be due to the kinds of jobs that the 
contractors are performing, the fact that they are well integrated into the operational 
structure of the squadron, and that all the contractors are former military.  
Feeling well-integrated and that one’s work makes a significant contribution to the 
group’s success are likely to increase commitment through making the workers feel they 
are important to the organization.  A growing literature on the social-psychological 
concept of mattering suggests that the more individuals feel that they are integrated into 
social networks where who they are and what they do “matters” to others has implications 
for mental health, including self-esteem (Durkheim 1952; Rohall 2003; Rosenberg & 
McCullough 1981; Taylor 2001).  I argue that this also has implications for satisfaction 
and commitment.  It may be that the way the soldiers and contractors are integrated, in 
terms of the work they perform and the structure of the work place, produces a strong 
sense of both integration and mattering.  People are more likely to enjoy what they are 
doing and want to remain in an environment where they feel they are an integral, 
contributing part of the group.  All of the civilian contractors possess specialized 
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technical skills and perform critical jobs in the squadron, ensuring that the aircraft are 
flight-ready and have all the firepower, electronics, and radar functioning properly to keep 
them safe in the air.  The contractors also worked side-by-side with soldiers who were 
doing very similar (in some cases identical) jobs.  It was evident in talking with the 
soldiers that they respected the specialized technical expertise that the contractors brought 
to the unit.  Examination of a battalion that contracts out less specialized (or less mission 
essential) jobs or incorporates contractors differently may produce different results on 
these measures.
The fact that all of the contractors working with the squadron are prior military 
suggests there may be a preference for working for the Army and/or a constraint on 
finding jobs that allow them to use their technical expertise.  The majority of the civilians 
working with the squadron were mechanics and electrical and aeronautic technicians.  
While they could apply these skills to jobs in civilian aviation, if they want to make top 
dollar and continue to work on specialized aircraft, contracting for the Department of 
Defense remains the best option.
Model Results
Social Comparisons between Military and Civilian Personnel
Tests of the retention model indicate that social comparisons do have significant 
impacts on retention intentions for military personnel (Figs. 4.2 & 5.2), but only 
indirectly through job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  The results show that 
when soldiers and sailors compare themselves to the civilians with whom they work, they 
perceive themselves as relatively deprived and, as a result, are less satisfied with their 
151
jobs.  This dissatisfaction, in turn, negatively affects their organizational commitment, 
leading to decreased likelihood of remaining in the military.
This finding is an example of the irrationality of rationality.  A primary motivation 
for civilianization of the military is to make it more streamlined and effective by allowing 
the service members who are retained as permanent employees to focus on performing 
the core mission of the military.  However, the integration of the civilians with military 
personnel has resulted in negative comparisons among service members and a 
concomitant decline in their intentions to remain in service.   As a result of its 
civilianization, the military is negatively affecting the retention attitudes of the soldiers 
and sailors on whom they are counting to remain in the military to carry on its core duties 
and to achieve the efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings goals of civilianization.   As 
such, these results directly contradict the intent of OMB A-76 and President Bush’s 
management initiatives.  These results support the hypothesized effects of social 
comparisons and are consistent with literature on the effects of relative deprivation on 
satisfaction and the impacts of satisfaction on commitment and retention (Crosby 1982; 
Mueller & Price 1990; Porter, et al. 1974; Rakoff, et al. 1992; Runciman 1966 ).  Further, 
the level of agreement between military personnel and civilians with respect to which 
group is perceived to be more advantaged/deprived is striking.  It is not the case that each 
group thinks the other group is getting the better deal.  Rather, civilians and service 
members alike perceive those in uniform to be less well off compared to the civilians 
working with these military units.
The retention model for the CIVMARs failed to show significant impacts of social 
comparisons with sailors on their retention intentions (Fig. 4.3).  This unanticipated 
finding can be partially explained by the lack of variability in the dependent variable for 
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this group.  It is important to have dispersion in the variable of interest if one is trying to 
explain variability in its outcome.  The fact that nearly 70% of the CIVMARs stated they 
planned to continue working for MSC constrained the power of the model through its 
very limited variability across the five response categories.  Additional explanations for 
the lack of significance found in this model focused on several social-structural variables 
thought to be affecting CIVMARs’ responses to questions on satisfaction and 
commitment.  The regression analyses run to test these hypothesized relationships found 
that race and age were significant predictors of organizational commitment (i.e., 
commitment increased with age and if one was Asian).  Additionally, the type of job 
being performed (i.e., technical versus menial) was also seen as a potential influence on 
the model’s non-significant results.
Level of Contact between Military and Civilian Personnel
Level of contact with contractors did not significantly impact soldier job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, or retention intentions (Fig. 5.2).  This implies 
that it is the presence of the contractors in the squadron that is affecting these variables 
regardless of the frequency of interaction between contractors and soldiers.  Rather, the 
finding suggests that rumors, hearsay, and/or individual assumptions were more 
important than personal interaction and experience with civilians.19  For example, soldiers 
voiced discontent with not having the same freedoms as civilian contractors in 
negotiating employment contracts.  However, discussions with the contractors revealed 
19 One answer to this seeming contradiction is that the service members were exposed more 
frequently to the second-hand information than they were to the civilians themselves, causing 
them to have a greater attitudinal affinity toward the second-hand information.
153
that they had very little, if any, negotiation in the terms of their employment.  Several 
described their employment contract negotiations as take-it-or-leave-it “cookie cutter” 
offers.  Two contractors argued strongly that they had more power negotiating their re-
enlistment terms while they were in the Army than they did in negotiating their terms of 
employment with their private contracting firms.
Another example of how rumors and assumptions can affect satisfaction, 
commitment, and retention attitudes net of level of contact with contractors is the 
“knowledge” disseminated among service members about disparities in pay between 
contractors and military personnel.  While all service members interviewed knew that 
contractors were paid more than they were, they did not know how much more.  Further, 
the Army squadron commander stated that he often gets soldiers in his office who 
indicate they wish to leave the military and that it is not uncommon for them to express 
an interest in becoming a contractor – citing better pay among the list of expected benefits 
of contract employment with the military.  The commander said that when this happens 
he goes through an a quick and dirty calculation exercise with the soldier, accounting for 
their health benefits, leave, housing, and the retirement pay they would receive if they 
stay in the Army for 20 years.  The commander said that the results of this exercise are 
generally quite surprising to the soldiers.  Once all the benefits are calculated, the 
commander felt that his soldiers reassess their position much more favorably, if not better
than the contractors’.20
20 The commander’s argument implies a rational choice framework.  His impressions may 
or may not be correct depending on whether, and to what degree, his soldiers value the 
same work related characteristics he does.
154
Level of contact with CIVMARs was not related to satisfaction, commitment or 
retention for sailors, though it did affect their social comparisons (Fig. 4.2).  While level 
of contact with CIVMARs significantly affected social comparisons for sailors, it was in 
the opposite direction from that predicted.  Greater exposure to CIVMARs made sailors 
feel more advantaged by comparison, not more deprived.  This result may be a function of 
the way in which civilianization was done on the Navy ship as compared to the Army 
squadron in this study.  Civilianization of military jobs on the ship was done by 
transferring entire departments to Military Sealift Command.  One of the departments 
transferred to civilian (MSC) workers was the services department, which included jobs 
such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry.  Deck maintenance was also civilianized, which 
included jobs such as scraping and reapplying paint to the ships interior and exterior 
surfaces.  Additionally, watch standing was civilianized.  In general, sailors were not 
required to post at the quarterdeck to monitor who boarded and disembarked the ship –
this was the full-time job of a handful of CIVMARs.21  Most of these jobs are ones 
typically performed by sailors as temporary duties on board USS ships.  
It seems reasonable to argue that the more sailors observe CIVMARs performing 
these menial jobs, with the understanding that on most other Navy ships the sailors get 
tasked with the same jobs as extra duties, the more sailors feel advantaged by 
comparison.  Thus, by virtue of the kinds of jobs civilianized aboard ship (jobs the sailors 
21 During interviews, two sailors commented that a few times while the ship was in Asian ports, 
sailors were asked to stand watch-duty along side of CIVMARs.  Both voiced dissatisfaction in 
having to listen to CIVMARs talk about the overtime they got paid for their duty.  Sailors never 
get overtime, regardless of their job or the number of hours they work.  The sailors felt they were 
being asked to do a job that others were being paid (very well) to do, and that their presence was 
not necessary at that duty station.  This command decision was not popular with the sailors.
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do not want), the sailors appear to have engaged in downward social comparisons, which 
is to say they feel they are comparing themselves with others whom they feel are less
well-off.  This has been noted in the literature as a self-esteem enhancing type of social 
comparison (Willis 1981).  The CIVMARs may be relatively advantaged in some areas, 
but the more the sailors know about and interact with the CIVMARs, the less emphasis 
they appear to place on these advantages.  This is consistent with their responses to the 
commitment item about whether they would accept any job to remain in the Navy.  
Clearly there are jobs that the sailors do not want to do if they can be avoided – and the 
jobs that were civilianized appear to be high on the list. 
Neither contact with contractors nor social comparisons had a significant direct 
effect on retention intentions (Figures 4.2 and 5.2).  This is further support that the 
mechanism by which social comparisons affect retention is mediated through job 
satisfaction and organization commitment.  The social comparisons alone are not as 
important as how those comparisons affect one’s satisfaction and commitment.  
This finding is consistent with the theoretical distinction made in Chapter 2, that 
social comparisons and social information processing theories function jointly to produce 
effects based on differential characteristics between an individual and his/her comparison 
individual or comparison group.  Social information processing theory states that job 
characteristics are inherently neither satisfying nor dissatisfying (Salancik & Pfeffer 
1978).  Further, job characteristics are viewed as fundamentally neutral in their capacity 
to produce employee satisfaction and commitment.  Instead, positive and negative job 
related attitudes are socially learned through experience and social contexts.  They are 
constructed, reaffirmed, and renegotiated by social processes.  Relative job satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, commitment to an organization or lack of commitment, stems from 
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socially available information and can only be generated in the context of social 
comparisons.  Individuals’ positive or negative attitudes on satisfaction and commitment 
go on to affect retention attitudes (Mueller & Price 1990; Porter & Steers 1973).
The relationships among job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and 
retention intentions for the three groups tested were positive and significant, as predicted.  
These results are consistent with the large body of research on the interaction of these 
variables (Fuller, et al. 1996; Kim, et al. 1996; Mobley 1982; Mueller & Price 1990; 
Porter & Steers 1973).
The small sample size (n=15) of the civilian contractor group working with the 
Army prevented path analysis of the model for their group.  However, the partial 
correlations among the model variables suggest that the contractors’ attitudes and 
behavioral intentions have relationship patterns strikingly similar to the three other groups 
studied.  The civilian contractors’ partial correlations between variables that represent 
indirect pathways from social comparisons to retention intentions are moderate to high (r 
= .29 to .65).  These values, though not significant, compare favorably to the partial 
correlation values of the indirect pathways for soldiers (r = .28 to .69), sailors (r = .23 to 
.53) and CIVMARs (r = -.17 to .65).  The failure of the contractors’ partial correlation 
coefficients to reach significance (even at r = .65) is related to the small sample size.  
Given the similarity in the relationship of the partial correlations across groups it would 
appear that the effect of social comparisons on civilian contractors’ satisfaction, 
commitment, and retention intentions is comparable to the other groups.  However, like 
the CIVMARs, the civilian contractors have a highly, positively skewed distribution on 
retention intentions.  Both sample size and the distribution of retention attitudes are items 
that limit statistical examination of their retention intention process in the current study.
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Implications
The structure of an organization affects those who work there.  Prior research has 
documented effects of structure on workers attitudes and retention behavior (Callan 1993; 
Deavel 1998; Kennedy et al. 2002; Merton 1961; Nelson et al. 1995; Wong & McNally 
1994).  This study fits within this tradition and its findings support the notion that 
workplace context impacts individuals’ experiences which in turn shape their attitudes 
and intentions.
With the growing civilianization of the military, both civilian and military leaders 
have been expressing increased concern over the impact of military civilianization on the 
readiness of the armed forces (Avant 2004; Cha & Merle 2004; Crock et al. 2003; 
Macomber 2004; Phinney 2004; Robinson 2002; Singer 2003; Wayne 2002).  In addition 
to these more manifest outcomes of military civilianization, military leaders need to be 
aware that their personnel are making comparisons with their civilian co-workers that 
affect retention (and potentially other important outcome variables such as morale and 
readiness).
Applewhite et al. (1993) suggest that the natural state of a service member may be 
one of perceived relative deprivation.  In the context of the present study, Applewhite et 
al.’s assertion would suggest that even in the absence of civilians in their units military 
personnel will find someone else who is getting a better deal. In the present study, 
however, the (ubiquitous) feeling of relative deprivation among service members is 
corroborated by the civilians with whom they work who also feel that the military 
personnel are less well off than they are.  Regardless, military policy makers cannot 
afford simply to acknowledge that service members feel relatively deprived and go about 
their regular routine as they did in the era of conscription when a steady flow of new 
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recruits was guaranteed.  Recruits are ever harder to come by now, and the loss of 
personnel with critical skills costs the military both in expertise and money.
Military and civilian leaders need to take the negative impact of social 
comparisons with civilians into account vis-à-vis retention (and morale, cohesion, and 
readiness).  Military leadership can mitigate the negative effects of several variables 
shown to have significant impacts on social comparisons by making informed command 
decisions relating to the perception that the organization cares for its members, feeling of 
negative impacts on family, the level of organizational control over employee behavior, 
and creating efficient training and work schedules with an eye toward keeping reasonable 
work hours.
Two actions that can be taken to reduce the degree of relative deprivation (i.e., 
negative comparisons) are to provide information to contextualize the differences in 
perceived benefits between groups and work to reduce the negative impacts of the 
inaccurate information.  One example of how failing to contextualize differences between 
groups can negatively impact personnel was shared by several sailors and CIVMARs 
during informal interviews.   According to their accounts, during an all hands formation, 
including sailors and CIVMARs, a week or two prior to the ship arriving back at home 
port, the Captain of the ship recounted statistics of their deployment.  One of the statistics 
was how much money was paid to sailors and to CIVMARs.  The figure for the CIVMAR 
payroll was twice that of the sailors’ even though there were roughly equal numbers in 
each group.  This upset the sailors because they felt they were devalued.  It upset the 
CIVMARs because they felt that the way it was presented did not give proper due to their 
greater levels of experience and (perceived) higher quality of work relative to sailors, 
both of which justify their greater pay scale.  The lesson learned should be that the 
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presentation of information that involves a highly salient comparison item should be 
contextualized so that the personnel understand the rationale and justification behind the 
information.
An example of taking steps to correct misperceptions from rumors in the ranks, or 
individual assumptions, is the numbers exercise the Army squadron commander performs 
with soldiers who express an interest in separating from service to pursue jobs as 
contractors.  First, he points out that it is a buyer’s market, with too many ex-soldiers and 
not enough job slots.  Second, he estimates for his soldiers figures on their salaries, 
benefits, retirement pay, and in-kind benefits, what they would have to have already 
bankrolled, and what they would have to earn in their new job in order to compete with 
their current Army employment package.  This exercise is done to provide information so 
the soldier may make an informed decision, not as a hard sell to retain the soldier.  The 
commander’s feeling is that once the facts are known, the comparison favors military 
service.  Given the commander’s comment that this exercise produces results that surprise 
the soldiers, it would seem that a more progressive and systematic initiative would be 
helpful in reducing some of the negative social comparisons felt by the soldiers.  Good 
communication has been shown to reduce negative impacts of military life among service 
members (Segal & Harris 1993; Wong & McNally 1994).
Organizational structure, in terms of what gets civilianized, is also important.  For 
example, sailors and soldiers were significantly negative on the item that asked whether 
they would accept any job assignment in order to stay with their current employer.  
Conversely, neither civilian group had significant results one way or the other on this 
variable.  This suggests that military personnel view themselves as specialists rather than 
generalists, which is consistent with Moskos’s (1977) occupational military model.  
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Alternatively, this result could also mean that military personnel don’t value the military 
as an employer (or military service) more than the specific job they perform.  This 
alternative explanation is also consistent with Moskos’s (1977) occupational military 
model.
Given these findings, civilianizing the service and deck/maintenance departments 
aboard the Navy ship was a good command decision.  By transferring these duties to 
civilians it eliminated the 90-100 days of “crank duty” that enlisted sailors typically have 
to perform.  Crank duty is described by sailors as temporary duty assigned to most junior 
enlisted sailors who are new arrivals to a ship.  In order to keep the ship operational a 
great deal of menial work must be done, such as cleaning, cooking, and the never-ending 
job of chipping and reapplying paint.  Effectively, this means that sailors, regardless of 
specialty (e.g., IT, radar, medical, engineering), must perform these menial jobs for 
upwards of three months before they are reassigned to their “real” job on board ship.  One 
medical specialist commenting on this tradition stated, “There is nothing more 
disheartening than not being able to do my job.”  In addition to doing menial labor, the 
time spent on crank duty affects sailors’ ability to maintain their skills in their specialty, 
which can impact their evaluations and promotion rate.  Numerous sailors reported being 
very happy that the service and deck jobs aboard ship had been civilianized.  Thus, by 
structuring the work environment so that core personnel were immediately assigned 
duties that they were trained for (and expected to do) civilianization of duties on board 
the ship appears to have achieved some of its goals.
The finding that the level of contact military personnel have with civilians is not a 
significant predictor of social comparisons in one context (Army), but is a significant 
predictor of social comparisons in another context (Navy), has important implications for 
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how this management strategy can be best implemented.  The results presented in this 
study suggest that social comparisons can be positively influenced by increased contact 
between groups in the context of civilianizing entire categories of jobs that are viewed 
negatively by military personnel, especially those jobs that the service members would 
have to perform as extra duties.  When the civilianized jobs are similar to those 
performed by the service members the positive effect of group contact disappears.
Despite the feelings of relative deprivation in comparison to their civilian co-
workers, military personnel have many positive things to say about the civilians in their 
units.  Soldiers and sailors expressed a good deal of respect for the expertise, proficiency, 
and professionalism that their civilian co-workers bring to the unit.  One sailor even 
commented that having the CIVMARs on board made the ship safer because, “sailors 
aren’t as thorough… CIVMARs are more responsible and get things done right.”  Both 
soldiers and sailors also appreciated that because the civilians are outside of the formal 
hierarchical military structure they are more easy-going and speak their minds more 
freely.  These qualities of the civilians were viewed positively because they break up the 
otherwise constant, rigid military environment.  
It is interesting and important to note that military personnel at both the Army and 
Navy sites went out of their way to question why this study was being done.  They did not 
feel there was a problem with the integration of civilians in their units.  Even so, the 
soldiers and sailors studied are comparing themselves negatively to their civilian co-
workers and these comparisons are negatively impacting their attitudes about remaining 
in military service.  This is important because it demonstrates that even though the group 
of employees performing the “core duties” of the organization may not mind having the 
other group of employees in the organization, indeed they enjoy having them as part of 
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the organization, the structural difference between groups and the differential benefits and 
constraints that accompany these structural differences generate negative social 
comparisons that impact satisfaction, commitment, and ultimately retention intentions.  
The negative effects of social comparisons do not appear to impact service members’ 
feelings toward their civilian coworkers.
The service members appear to be distinguishing between their affinity for the 
civilians as co-workers and the structural differences that define the work lives of service 
members versus civilian personnel.  The contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) provides an 
explanation for the service members’ positive attitudes toward the civilians with whom 
they work.  This hypothesis states that under certain necessary conditions interaction 
between individuals of different groups will result in more positive attitudes with regard 
to members of the “other” group (Pettigrew 1998).  Even so, the perceived differences on 
highly salient job characteristics between civilians and service members produce negative 
comparisons among military personnel.  This effect of social-structural variables, net of 
personal attitudes toward comparison others, is consistent with prior research on the 
fundamental impact of social comparisons on individuals’ attitudes based on highly
salient items (Hodson 1985; Merton & Kitt 1950; Milkie 1999).
Limitations of the Study
This study provides strong evidence to support the conclusion that civilianization 
of the military has negative effects on the retention intentions of military personnel.  Yet, 
as with any study, there are limitations in the data and research method that constrain the 
generalizability of these findings and preclude the strongest declaration of certainty in 
these results.
163
First, the data presented were obtained from two case studies, one Army and one 
Navy.  This, in itself, limits the generalizability of the findings beyond the populations in 
the two units surveyed.  The two units included in this study are important because they 
manifest variation in the key variables of civilians’ job specialties (technical vs. menial) 
and the way in which the civilians are integrated into their respective military units.  
While there are limitations on generalizability associated with any case study design, this 
design was nonetheless critical for capturing the effects of the structural variation in the 
units (i.e., the work the civilians were performing and the way in which they were 
integrated) on the retention model.  The results of this study validate the appropriateness 
of using a case study method to examine the effects of civilianization in the military on 
retention intentions.
The Army unit studied was a combat aviation squadron, which is itself an atypical 
unit.  A minority of Army units are combat arms, and only a fraction of those are aviation 
units.  This unit was also surveyed overseas, which may have introduced some unknown 
bias into the soldiers’ responses.  The Navy and CIVMAR personnel studied were from a 
command and control ship.  This ship is relatively small by Navy standards, and there are 
not many ships that perform this function for the Navy.  Many more sailors serve aboard 
USS ships (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, amphibious support, and 
surveillance/intelligence) which do not have CIVMARs on board.  Further, aside from the 
very small minority of sailors who serve on USNS ships, the average sailor is most likely 
to encounter civilians working for the Navy on their shore rotations.  The civilians 
included in this study from both sites are also not representative of their respective 
populations.  They included only a fraction of the jobs performed by their respective 
peers, and in the Navy example, included only those civilians who have self-selected a 
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career at sea.  Given the characteristics of the two military units studied, it is clear that 
additional research is needed to test the effect of civilianization on other types of units.  
This will be addressed in the following section on recommendations for future research.
Second, for all but the soldier sample, sample size limited both the statistical 
power of the tests and the generalizability of the results – even within their respective 
case study populations.22  Third, the samples analyzed for this study did not have 
sufficient numbers of women and minorities to allow for analyses by race and gender.  A 
fourth limitation is that there were no officers captured in the Navy sample, and too few 
in the Army sample to run a separate model by rank (officer vs. enlisted).  Ideally NCOs 
should be broken out as a separate group for analysis as well, but these data did not allow 
for this either.
A final limitation of this study is that the path models used to examine the impact 
of civilianization on retention intentions are based on cross sectional data.  Therefore, the 
results are probabilistic, and though highly suggestive, they fall short of establishing 
causality.
Future Research
Given the results presented in this paper and the limitations of the current study, 
several areas of future research would expand upon the foundation built by this study.  
First, additional military-civilian integrated units should be analyzed to test whether the 
relationships identified in this study generalize beyond the two units examined.  A wider 
22 Generalizability to the case study population was not an issue for the civilian contractors 
working for the Army since there was a 100% response rate.
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range of military unit types would provide greater confidence in the validity of the 
findings beyond the two cases in this analysis.  In particular, units that should be 
examined include: support and logistics units, maintenance depots, shore-side Navy units, 
CONUS Army units.
A second, but related issue is the need to tease apart the effects of civilian job 
specialty (i.e., technical versus menial) and the way in which civilians are integrated (i.e., 
departmental versus individual level).  These two variables were linked in the current 
study so their independent effects could not be determined.
Two additional variables that should also be examined as potentially impacting 
the relationship between civilianization variables and retention intentions include service 
members’ military occupational specialties (or their service-specific equivalent) and 
whether or not they have been deployed to a war zone, and if so whether they had contact 
with DoD civilians and/or DoD civilian contractors while deployed.  It may be that 
service members in some military occupational specialties experience stronger effects 
from civilianization of the military (e.g., IT specialists) whereas the effects on others may 
be more muted (e.g., clerical).  Deployment to a war zone may also have an impact on the 
effect of civilianization in the military, since the differences between military personnel 
and civilians are likely to be most pronounced in this setting - unless the civilians are 
incurring equal risk.
Race and gender have both been shown to have impacts on satisfaction, 
commitment, and retention (Bourg & Segal 1999; Firestone & Stewart 1998; Harrington, 
et al. 2001; Leiter, et al. 1994; Moore 2002; Pittman & Orthner 1989; Waite & Berryman 
1986).  Future studies should examine the effects of civilianization of the military by 
race, gender, and other important social-structural characteristics.
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The various service branches are employing civilians differently within their 
organization, have different organizational cultures, and different ratios of civilians to 
military personnel.  One would expect to see differences by service branch with respect to 
which job characteristics are having the most influence on social comparisons, though not 
necessarily on the overall effect of social comparisons on satisfaction, commitment, and 
retention. The Reserve components should be included in this analysis.  The Reserves 
constitute 40% of the troops currently on the ground in Iraq and their social-structural 
position as Citizen Soldiers places them in a position to have a unique perspective on the 
civilianization of the military.  Research is needed on all the service branches of the 
military to extend our understanding of the broader contextual effects of military 
civilianization.  
Future research should examine the effect of civilianization of the military on 
other outcome variables.  Readiness, morale, and cohesion are three obvious variables 
that should be examined.  For example, research by Mowday, et al. (1982) has
documented that reduced job satisfaction negatively impacts workers’ attendance and 
productivity.  
Finally, the model used in this research is probabilistic.  Longitudinal data are 
needed to demonstrate more rigorous support for the causal relationships hypothesized in 
this study.
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Appendix I.  Soldier Survey Protocol23
Work-Related Attitudes
University of Maryland
Center for Research on Military Organization
Mr. Ryan D. Kelty
Dr. David R. Segal
Participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous.  Do not place your name on this 
survey.  Data will be presented at a level of abstraction such that individual respondents 
cannot be identified.
23 This protocol was adjusted for sailors by substituting “civilian mariner” for “civilian 
contractor” and “Navy” for “Army.”
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Please complete the following survey.  It should take about 20 minutes. Thank you.
The first group of questions focuses on attitudes related to your experiences as a member of 
the U.S. Army.
1.  During your later high school years, what were your aspirations for the period immediately 
     following high school?  Please circle ONE.
a.  join the military
b.  attend a military academy
c.  attend college, then join the military (officer or enlisted)
d.  attend college, then join the civilian labor force
e.  attend trade school, then join the civilian labor force
f.  find non-military employment
g.  no plans
2.  Thinking back to when you were making your decision to enter the Army, which of the 
     following best represents your intentions at that time?  Please circle ONE.
I intended to…
a.  stay in the Army for a career
b.  stay for one term and then get out
c.  wait and see
3.  Right now I am…         (Please circle ONE.)
a.  planning to remain in the Army,    (skip to question 6, next page)
b.  leaning toward remaining in the Army,   (skip to question 6, next page)
c.  undecided,   (skip to question 6, next page)
d.  leaning toward leaving the Army for a civilian job, (go to questions 4 & 5)
e.  planning to leave the Army for a civilian job.  (go to question 4 & 5)
4. If you are currently leaning toward or planning to leave the Army, do 
you wish to have a civilian job in the same line of work as the one you 
currently perform?  Please circle ONE.
a.  Yes
b.  No
c.  Not applicable – I plan to stay in the Army
5. If you are currently leaning toward or planning to leave the Army, which  
of the following best reflects your situation?  Please circle ONE.
a.  I have a job waiting for me
b.  I have job leads but no firm offer at this time
c.  I do not have any job leads at this time
d.  I will be attending college or trade school
e.  not yet sure.
f.  not applicable – I plan to stay in the Army
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6.  Which of the following best reflects your current attitude about the possibility of working 
     as a civilian contractor after you separate/retire from the Army? Please circle ONE.
a.  It is a very attractive option
b.  It is an attractive option
c.  It is neither an attractive nor unattractive option
d.  It is an unattractive option
e.  It is a very unattractive option
7.  Using the 7-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of your
     opinion for each statement.
(1)                   (2)                  (3) (4) (5)           (6)        (7)
    Disagree       Disagree           Disagree            Neither             Agree         Agree    Agree
    Strongly                Somewhat            Agree             Somewhat Strongly
   Nor Disagree
a. ____  I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help the Army be successful.
b. ____  I talk up the Army to my civilian friends as a great organization to work for.
c. ____  I feel very little loyalty to the Army.
d. ____  I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for 
the Army.
e. ____  I find that my values and those of the Army are very similar.
f. ____  I am proud to tell others that I am part of the Army.
g. ____  I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type 
of work was similar.
h. ____  The Army really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance.
i. ____  It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to 
leave the Army.
j. ____  I am extremely glad that I chose to work for the Army over other 
organizations I was considering at the time I joined.
k. ____  There’s not too much to be gained by sticking with the Army for a career.
l. ____  Often, I find it difficult to agree with the Army’s policies on important 
matters relating to its personnel.
m. ____  I really care about the fate of the Army.
n. ____  For me the Army is the best of all possible organizations to work for.
o. ____  Deciding to work for the Army was a definite mistake on my part.
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8. Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of your 
opinion for each statement.
          (1)     (2)           (3)      (4) (5)
        Very              Dissatisfied              Neither Satisfied            Very
    Dissatisfied   Satisfied nor                                 Satisfied
     Dissatisfied
On my present assignment, this is how I feel about:
a.  _____ being able to keep busy all the time
b.  _____ the chance to work alone on the job
c.  _____ the chance to do different things from time to time
d.  _____ the chance to be “somebody” in the community
e.  _____ the way my supervisor handles his/her men and women
f.  _____ the competence of my supervisor in making decisions
g.  _____ being able to do things that don’t go against my conscience
h.  _____ the way my job provides for steady employment
i.  _____ the chance to do things for other people
j. _____ the chance to tell people what to do
k. _____ the chance to do something that makes use of my abilities
l. _____ the way the Army’s policies are put into practice
m. _____ my pay
n.   _____  the amount of work I do
o.   _____  the kind of work I do
p. _____  the chances for advancement on this job
q. _____ the freedom to use my own judgment
r. _____ the chance to try my own methods of doing the job
s. _____ the working conditions
t. _____ the way my co-workers get along with each other
u. _____ the praise I get for doing a good job
v. _____ the feeling of accomplishment I get from doing my job
     w. _____  the support I get from my coworkers
 x. _____  the support I get from my supervisors
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9.  Which of the following were important in your decision to join the Army? 
       Check ALL that apply.
a.  ____  desire to serve county
b.  ____  patriotism
c.  ____  adventure/challenge
d.  ____  desire to be soldier (for a few years)
e. ____  desired a long career as a soldier
f.  ____  money for college
g.  ____  repay student loans
h.  ____  entry bonus
i.  ____  need to support family (spouse and/or kids)
j.  ____  crisis (divorce, loss of job, financial problems, etc.)
k.  ____  influenced to join by parents
l.  ____  influenced to join by spouse or significant other
m. ____  influenced to join by friends
n.  ____  lack of better options
o.  ____  best employment available
10.  Using the list below, please rank order the five (5) aspects of yourself that best capture who 
you are?   Identify the most important aspect as 1, second most important as 2, and so on.
a. ____  I am a father
b. ____  I am a mother
c.  ____  I am a husband
d. ____  I am a wife
e.  ____  I am single
f.  ____  I am a son
g. ____  I am a daughter
h. ____  I am a sibling
i.  ____  I am a soldier, NCO, officer, or other military related role
j.  ____  I am a Christian, Jew, Muslim or member of another religion
k.  ____  I am an athlete
l.  ____  I am a hunter, fisherman/woman, outdoorsman/woman
m. ____  I am a(an) _____________________ (enter job specialty – e.g., mechanic,       
        security specialist, air traffic controller, etc.)
n. ____  I am a student
o. ____  I am American or some other nationality
p. ____  Other:  ________________________________________
q. ____  Other:  ________________________________________
11.  Which of the following best describes how you view yourself?   Check ONE (A or B).
____  A.   I am a U.S. soldier who specializes in __________________ (enter your job specialty).
OR
____  B.  I am a(n) ________________ (enter your job specialty) who works for the U.S. Army.
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The next group of questions focuses on your experiences with civilian contractors in the Army.
12.   For each of the following statements, use the 6-point scale below to indicate your opinion.  
Enter the number that corresponds to your opinion on each statement in the blank provided.  
          (1)           (2)         (3) (4)   (5)   (6)
      Disagree      Disagree          Disagree              Agree            Agree Agree
     Strongly     Somewhat       Somewhat           Strongly
a. ____  As a soldier/officer in the U.S. Army I am uncomfortable working with civilian 
contractors.
b. ____  Civilian contractors allow the Army to operate more effectively.
c. ____  Civilian contractors are important because they free-up Army personnel to 
train for and perform the real war-fighting duties.
d. ____  Civilian contractors increase the efficiency of the Army.
e. ____  I would prefer not to work with civilian contractors. 
f. ____  Civilian contractors decrease morale among Army personnel.
g. ____  By having Army personnel work along-side of civilian contractors performing 
essentially similar duties, it encourages Army personnel to leave the service.
h. ____  Civilian contractors are less expensive to employ than Army personnel.
i. ____  The Army should not use its personnel to perform duties that the civilian work 
force can do just as well as military personnel.
j. ____  The use of civilian contractors increases the flexibility of the Army in striving 
to achieve its core missions.
k. ____  Civilian contractors work just as long as Army personnel.
l. ____  Civilian contractors work just as hard as Army personnel.
m. ____  Civilian contractors are less committed to their work than Army personnel.
If you work with civilian contractors in your current job, please answer the three items below 
using the same 6-point scale above.
n.  ____  The civilian contractors I work with perform at the same level of expertise 
that I do.
o.  ____  The civilian contractors that I work with are less motivated than I am to do a 
good job.
p. ____  I am impressed by the abilities of the civilian contractors that I work with. 
13.  In your current assignment, how often do you work directly with civilian contractors?  Please 
circle ONE.
a.  Daily
b.  Several times a week
c.  About once a week
d.  About once every couple of weeks
e   About once a month
f   Less than once a month
g.  Never 
173
14.   If you have been stationed at multiple bases, would you say that in your current assignment 
that your level of contact with civilian contractors is greater than average, average, or less 
than average?     Please check ONE.
____  a.  Greater than average
____  b.  Average
____  c.  Less than average
____  d.  Not applicable – I have not been stationed at multiple bases
15.  Do you have friends who have left the Army and now work for DoD as civilian 
 contractors?  Please check ONE.
 ____  a.  Yes   (go to question 16)
 ____  b.  No   (skip to question 17)
If yes on question 15, 
16.  To your knowledge how many of your colleagues, formerly with the Army, 
are now civilian contractors with DoD?  ________
17.  Since you have been employed by the Army have you ever been contacted about a job by 
someone working for a civilian contracting firm?  Please check ONE.
 ____  a.  Yes  (go to questions 18 & 19)
 ____  b.  No   (skip to question 20)
If yes on question 17, 
18.    How often would you say this has happened?  
Please check ONE.
____  a.  Once
____  b.  A few times
____  c.  Fairly frequently
____  d.  With great frequency
If yes on question 17, 
19.   Where were you when you were contacted? 
  Check ALL that apply.
____  a.  At work
____  b.  At home
____  c.  In uniform but not at my place of work
____  d.  Other (please specify)  ______________________
20.  If you left the Army today, how confident are you that you could find a job in the civilian 
labor force?  Please check ONE.
____  a.  very confident
____  b . confident
____  c.  not very confident
____  d.  not at all confident
21.  If you wanted to apply for a job at a civilian contracting firm, would you know where to go? 
 Please circle ONE:      Yes         No
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22. Do you and your fellow soldiers discuss issues surrounding civilian contractors and 
the Army?   Please check ONE.
____  a.  Yes    (go to question 23)
____  b.  No     (skip to question 24)
If yes on question 22, 
23.  What issues do you discuss?    
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
24.   Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement (Please check ONE):  
I consider civilian contractors to be members of the U.S. military’s total force.
a. ____  strongly disagree
b. ____  disagree 
c. ____  disagree somewhat
d. ____  agree somewhat
e. ____  agree
f. ____  strongly agree
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The next two questions are similar, but are asking you to make comparisons in two different 
ways.  Question 25 asks you to rate how you feel you, yourself, compare with civilian 
contractors on a number of factors.  Question 26 asks you to make the same types of 
comparisons but between Army personnel in general and civilian contractors in general.
25. If you were to compare yourself with civilian contractors (assuming comparable duties), how 
would you rate the following factors using the 5-point scale below? 
 (1)                           (2)            (3)                          (4) (5)
Much Greater            Greater for           About Greater for    Much Greater
  for Myself  Myself  Equal for           Civilian for Civilian
Both                 Contractors         Contractors
a. ____  pay
b. ____  benefits
c. ____  level of risk of personal injury
d. ____  freedom to make decision about how a job is done
e. ____  task variety within one’s job
f. ____  promotion opportunities based on merit
g. ____  quality leadership in the organization
h. ____  organizational control over employee behavior (i.e., what employees 
                can/cannot do)
i.  ____  negative impacts on family members’ happiness
j.  ____  satisfying relations with co-workers
k. ____  freedom to negotiate employment contract
l.  ____  degree to which the organization takes care of its employees
m. ____  requires one to spend time away from their family
n.  ____  gaining a feeling of accomplishment from one’s work
o.  ____  feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society
p.  ____  feeling of leadership support in facilitating completion of job tasks
q.  ____  time spent working per day
176
The next question is similar to the last one, but now we would like you to compare Army 
personnel in general to civilian contractors in general.
26.  On the whole, comparing Army personnel to civilian contractors (assuming comparable 
duties) how would you rate the following factors using the 5-point scale below?
        (1)                           (2)            (3)                         (4) (5)
Much Greater            Greater for          About Greater for    Much Greater
   for Army                Army  Equal for              Civilian              for Civilian
   Personnel  Personnel                  Both                  Contractors          Contractors
a. ____  pay
b. ____  benefits
c. ____  level of risk of personal injury
d. ____  freedom to make decision about how a job is done
e. ____  task variety within one’s job
f. ____  promotion opportunities based on merit
g. ____  quality leadership in the organization
h. ____  organizational control over employee behavior (i.e., what employees 
                can/cannot do)
i.  ____  negative impacts on family members’ happiness
j.  ____  satisfying relations with co-workers
k. ____  freedom to negotiate employment contract
l.  ____  degree to which the organization takes care of its employees
m. ____  requires one to spend time away from their family
n.  ____  gaining a feeling of accomplishment from one’s work
o.  ____  feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society
p.  ____  feeling of leadership support in facilitating completion of job tasks
q.  ____  time spent working per day
These next two questions focus on your health and well-being.
27.  In general, would you say at the present time your health is . . .   (Please circle ONE)
       Excellent        Very Good          Good            Fair           Poor
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Please use the five-point scale below when answering the items in question 28.
        (1)                         (2)                 (3)                         (4) (5)
   All the time     Most of the time  Some of the time     A little of the time       None of the time
28.  During the past 30 days, how much of the time did you feel…  (enter number in space provided)
a.  ____  so sad nothing could cheer you up? g. ____ lonely?
b.  ____  nervous? h. ____ you worried too much about things?
c.  ____  restless or fidgety? i. ____ fearful?
d.  ____  hopeless? j. ____ that something bad would happen to you?
e.  ____  that everything was an effort? k. ____ blue?
f.  ____  worthless?            l.  ____ tense or keyed up?
The next few questions ask about social and demographic characteristics highly relevant to 
this research study.
29.  What is your age?   _______ years
30.  What is your sex?   ____ male   ____ female
31.  Are you currently: married, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been married?   
Please check ONE.
a.  ____  never been married
b.  ____  married
c.  ____  divorced
d.  ____  separated
e.  ____  widowed
32.  How many children do you have as legal dependents, whether they reside with you or 
not?  Please circle ONE.
0           1           2           3            4            5           6 or more
33.  Do you consider yourself Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino/Latina?  Please check ONE.
a.  ______  Yes b.  ______  No
34.  What is your race?  Please check ONE.
______   a. White
______   b. Black or African American
______   c. Asian (e.g., Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese)
______   d. American Indian or Alaska Native
______   e.  Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
______   f.  Multi-racial: please specify  ___________________________________
______   g. Other: please specify  __________________________________
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35.  What is your military rank?  ______________________
36.  What is your MOS?  __________________________
37.  During your active duty career, how many times did your family members move to a new 
       location because of your permanent change of station?  Please check ONE.
a.   ____  0 e.  ____  4 i.   ____  8
b.   ____  1 f.  ____  5 j.   ____  9
c. ____  2 g.  ____  6 k.  ____  10 or more
d. ____  3 h.  ____  7 l.  ____  Not applicable, no family yet
In answering Questions 38 and 39, “military duties” is defined as deployments, TADs/TDYs, 
training, military education, time at sea, and field exercises/alerts.
38.  During the last 12 months, how many separate times were you away from your permanent 
duty 
station for at least one night because of your military duties?  Please check ONE.
e. ____  0 e.  ____  3 g.  ____  6 or more
f. ____  1 f.  ____  4
g. ____  2 g.  ____  5
39.  During the past 12 months, how long were you away from your permanent duty station due 
to your military duties?  Please check ONE.
a. ____  < 1 month d.  ____  5 to < 7 months
b. ____  1 to < 3 months e.  ____  7 to < 10 months
c. ____  3 to < 5 months f.  ____  10 to 12 months
40.  How long have you served in the Army?  _____ years,   ______ months
41.  How much longer are you obliged to serve? _____ years,   ______ months
42.  How much longer do you expect to remain in the Army? _____ years,   ______ months 
43.  What is the highest degree you have attained?  Please check ONE.
____  a.  less than high school or equivalent
____  b.  high school or equivalent
____  c.  associates degree
____  d.  bachelors degree
____  e.  masters or professional degree
____  f.  doctoral degree
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Please use this page to tell us any additional information on issues related to your work.
Thank you for completing this survey.
Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.
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Appendix II.  Civilian Survey Protocol
Work-Related Attitudes
University of Maryland
Center for Research on Military Organization
Dr. David R. Segal
Mr. Ryan D. Kelty
Participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous.  Do not place your name on this 
survey.  Data will be presented at a level of abstraction such that individual respondents 
cannot be identified.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Please complete the following survey.  It should take about 20 minutes.  ALL respondents 
should complete questions 1 through 25.  If you have had prior active duty U.S. military service, 
continue answering questions 26 through 39.  Thank you.
The first group of questions focuses on aspects of your job and attitudes you have about your 
job.
1.  Using the 7-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of your 
opinion 
     for each statement.  “Organization” refers to your contracting firm.
(1)                   (2)                   (3) (4) (5)           (6) (7)
Disagree       Disagree           Disagree            Neither             Agree         Agree    Agree
  Strongly        Somewhat            Agree             Somewhat Strongly
   Nor Disagree
a. ____  I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected 
in order to help this organization be successful.
b. ____  I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.
c. ____  I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
d. ____  I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working 
for this organization.
e. ____  I find that my values and this organization’s values are very similar.
f. ____  I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.
g. ____  I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the 
type of work was similar.
h. ____  This organization really inspires the very best in me in the way of job
performance.
i. ____  It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to 
leave this organization.
j. ____  I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over others I 
was considering at the time I joined.
k. ____  There’s not too much to be gained by sticking with this organization 
indefinitely.
l. ____  Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization’s policies on 
important matters relating to its employees.
m. ____  I really care about the fate of this organization.
n. ____  For me this is the best of all possible organizations to work for.
o. ____  Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part.
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2.  Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength 
     of your opinion for each statement.
          (1)     (2)           (3)    (4) (5)
        Very              Dissatisfied                  Neither Satisfied            Very
    Dissatisfied    Satisfied nor                                     Satisfied
      Dissatisfied
 On my present assignment, this is how I feel about:
a. ____  being able to keep busy all the time
b. ____  the chance to work alone on the job
c. ____  the chance to do different things from time to time
d. ____  the chance to be “somebody” in the community
e. ____  the way my boss handles his/her men and women
f. ____  the competence of my supervisor in making decisions
g. ____  being able to do things that don’t go against my conscience
h. ____  the way my job provides for steady employment
i. ____  the chance to do things for other people
j. ____  the chance to tell people what to do
k. ____  the chance to do something that makes use of my abilities
l. ____  the way company policies are put into practice
m. ____  my pay
n.   ____  the amount of work I do
o.   ____  the kind of work I do
p. ____  the chances for advancement on this job
q. ____  the freedom to use my own judgment
r. ____  the chance to try my own methods of doing the job
s. ____  the working conditions
t. ____  the way my co-workers get along with each other
u. ____  the praise I get for doing a good job
v. ____  the feeling of accomplishment I get from doing my job
w. ____  the support I get from my coworkers
x. ____  the support I get from my supervisors
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3.  Which of the following best describes how you view yourself?   
Please fill in the blanks, then check ONE (A or B).
____ A.  I am an employee of _____________________ (your company) who specializes 
   in _______________________(enter your job specialty).
OR
____ B.  I am a(n) _______________(enter your job specialty) who performs contractual 
  work for the U.S. Army.
4.  For each of the following statements, use the 6-point scale below to indicate your opinion.   
     Enter the number that corresponds to your opinion in the blank next to each statement.
          (1)            (2)                  (3)            (4) (5) (6)
      Disagree  Disagree            Disagree               Agree            Agree            Agree
      Strongly     Somewhat      Somewhat          Strongly
a.   ____  The soldiers I work with perform the same level/expertise of work that I do.
b.   ____  The soldiers that I work with are not as motivated as I am to do a good job.
c.   ____  I am impressed by the abilities of the soldiers that I work with. 
d.   ____  I do not like working with military personnel.
e.   ____  Civilian contractors allow the military to operate more effectively.
f.   ____  Civilian contractors are important because they free-up military personnel to 
train for and perform the real war-fighting duties.
g.  ____  Civilian contractors increase the efficiency of the military.
h.   ____  I would prefer not to work with military personnel.
i.    ____  Civilian contractors decrease morale among military personnel.
j.    ____  By having soldiers work along side of civilian contractors performing essentially 
similar duties, it encourages soldiers to leave the service.
k.   ____  Civilian contractors are less expensive to employ than Army personnel.
l.    ____  The Army should not use its personnel to perform duties that the civilian work 
force can do just as well as military personnel.
m.  ____  The use of civilian contractors increases the flexibility of the Army in striving 
to achieve its core missions.
n.   ____  Civilian contractors work just as long as Army personnel.
o.   ____  Civilian contractors work just as hard as Army personnel.
p.   ____  Civilian contractors are less committed to the work they perform than Army 
personnel.
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5.  Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement.  Please check ONE.
My work as a civilian contractor is consistent with the expectations I had for the job prior to 
starting.
a. ____  strongly agree
b. ____  agree 
c. ____  agree somewhat
d. ____  disagree somewhat
e. ____  disagree
f.    ____  strongly disagree
6.  Right now I am …  (Please check ONE.)
a.  ____  planning to remain with my current employer
b.  ____  leaning toward remaining with my current employer
c.  ____  undecided
d.  ____  leaning toward leaving my current employer to work for another organization
e.  ____  planning on leaving my current employer to work for another organization 
7.  Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement.
I consider civilian contractors to be members of the U.S. military’s total force.
Please check ONE.  
g. ____  strongly disagree
h. ____  disagree 
i. ____  disagree somewhat
j. ____  agree somewhat
k. ____  agree
f. ____  strongly agree
8.  Which of the following best reflects your thoughts on joining (or rejoin) the military?  
     Please check ONE.
a. ____  I plan to join (or rejoin) the military.
b. ____  I am considering joining (or rejoining) the military.
c. ____  I am undecided at this time..
d. ____  I doubt that I would join (or rejoin) the military.
e. ____  I have absolutely no desire to join (or rejoin) the military.
9.  During your career as a civilian contractor, how many times did your family members 
     move to a new location because of your job?
a.   ____  0 e.  ____  4 i.   ____  8
b.   ____  1 f.  ____  5 j.   ____  9
h. ____  2 g.  ____  6 k.  ____  10 or more
i. ____  3 h.  ____  7 l.   ____  not applicable, no family yet
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10.  During the last 12 months, how many separate times were you away from your 
       family for at least one night because of your job?  Please check ONE.
j. ____  0 e.  ____  3 g.  ____  6 or more
k. ____  1 f.  ____  4
l. ____  2 g.  ____  5
11.  During the past 12 months, how long were you away from your family due to your 
       job?  Please check ONE.
d. ____  < 1 month d.  ____  5 to < 7 months
e. ____  1 to < 3 months e.  ____  7 to < 10 months
f. ____  3 to < 5 months f.  ____  10 to 12 months
The next two questions are similar, but are asking you to make comparisons in two different 
ways. Question 12 asks you to rate how you feel you, yourself, compare with Army personnel on 
a number of factors.  Question 13 asks for the same types of comparisons but between Army 
personnel in general and civilian contractors in general.
12. If you were to compare yourself to Army personnel (assuming comparable duties), how 
would 
      you rate the following factors using the 5-point scale below?
   (1)                              (2)            (3)          (4)            (5)
Much Greater            Greater for           About   Greater for    Much Greater
    for Army                Army Equal for            Myself       for Myself 
    Personnel                 Personnel                   Both 
a. ____  pay
b. ____  benefits
c. ____  level of risk of personal injury
d. ____  freedom to make decision about how a job is done
e. ____  task variety within one’s job
f. ____  promotion opportunities based on merit
g. ____  quality leadership in the organization
h. ____  organizational control over employee behavior (i.e., what employees 
can/cannot do)
i.  ____  negative impacts on family members’ happiness
j.  ____  satisfying relations with co-workers
k. ____  freedom to negotiate employment contract
l.  ____  degree to which the organization takes care of its employees
m. ____  requires one to spend time away from their family
n.  ____  gaining a feeling of accomplishment in one’s work
o.  ____  feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society
p.  ____  feeling of leadership support in facilitating completion of job tasks
q.  ____  time spent working per day
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The next question is similar to the last one, but now we would like you to compare Army
personnel in general to civilian contractors in general.
13.  On the whole, comparing Army personnel to civilian contractors (assuming comparable 
duties), 
        how would you rate the following factors using the 5-point scale below? 
         (1)                              (2)            (3)          (4)            (5)
Much Greater            Greater for           About   Greater for    Much Greater
    for Army                Army Equal for                Myself       for Myself 
    Personnel                  Personnel Both 
a. ____  pay
b. ____  benefits
c. ____  level of risk of personal injury
d. ____  freedom to make decision about how a job is done
e. ____  task variety within one’s job
f. ____  promotion opportunities based on merit
g. ____  quality leadership in the organization
h. ____  organizational control over employee behavior (i.e., what employees 
can/cannot do)
i.  ____  negative impacts on family members’ happiness
j.  ____  satisfying relations with co-workers
k. ____  freedom to negotiate employment contract
l.  ____  degree to which the organization takes care of its employees
m. ____  requires one to spend time away from their family
n.  ____  gaining a feeling of accomplishment in one’s work
o.  ____  feeling that one’s work makes a contribution to society
p.  ____  feeling of leadership support in facilitating completion of job tasks
q.  ____  time spent working per day
The next two questions focus on your health and well-being.
14.  In general, would you say at the present time your health is . . .   (Please circle ONE)
      Excellent      Very Good       Good         Fair          Poor
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Please use the five-point scale below when answering the items in Question 15.
     (1)           (2)     (3) (4)                     (5)
All the time      Most of the time     Some of the time       A little of the time        None of the 
time
15.  During the past 30 days, how much of the time did you feel…  
a.  ____  so sad nothing could cheer you up? g. ____ lonely?
b.  ____  nervous? h. ____ you worried too much about things?
c.  ____  restless or fidgety? i. ____ fearful?
d.  ____  hopeless? j. ____ that something bad would happen to you?
e.  ____  that everything was an effort? k. ____ blue?
f.  ____  worthless? l.  ____ tense or keyed up?
The next few questions ask about social and demographic characteristics highly relevant to 
this research study.
16.  What is your age?    _______ years
17.  What is your sex?   ____ male   ____ female
18.  What is your current marital status?   Please check ONE.
a.  ____  never married
b.  ____  married
c.  ____  divorced
d.  ____  separated
e.  ____  widowed
19.  How many children do you have as legal dependents, whether they reside with you or not?
       Please circle ONE.
0           1           2           3           4            5           6 or more
20.  Are you currently a member of the National Guard or Reserves?  Please check ONE.
a.  ____ Yes, I am a current member of the National Guard.
b.  ____ Yes, I am a current member of the Reserves.
c.  ____  No, I am not a current member of the National Guard or Reserves.
21.  What is your occupational specialty?  _______________________________________
22.  Are you a U.S. citizen?
a.  ____  Yes
b.  ____  No:  if no, please specify: __________________________
23. Do you consider yourself Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino/Latina?  Please check ONE. 
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a.  ______ Yes     b.  ______ No
24. What is your race?  Please check ONE.
a.  _____  White
b.  _____  Black or African American
c.  _____  Asian (e.g. Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese)
d.  _____  American Indian or Alaska Native
e.  _____  Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
f.  _____  multi-racial: please specify _______________________________
g.  _____  other: please specify  ___________________________________
25.  What is the highest degree you have attained?   Please check ONE.
a.  _____  less than high school or equivalent
b.  _____  high school or equivalent
c.  _____  associates degree
d.  _____  bachelors degree
e.  _____  masters or professional degree
f.  _____  doctoral degree
STOP here IF you have never been an active duty member of the U.S. military.
If you are prior active duty U.S. military, continue answering questions 26-39, which focus on 
your experience of prior service.
26.  How important is it to you that you continue to contribute to the mission of the U.S. military 
       through working as a civilian contractor?  Please check ONE.
a. ____  not at all important
b. ____  somewhat important
c. ____  moderately important
d. ____  very important
27.  During your later high school years, what were your aspirations for the period immediately 
following high school?  Please check ONE.
a. ____  join the military
b. ____  attend a military academy
c. ____  attend college, then join the military (officer or enlisted)
d. ____  attend college, then join civilian labor force
e. ____  join the civilian labor force
f. ____  no plans
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28. Thinking back to when you were making your decision to enter the military, which of the    
      following best represents your intentions at that time?  Please circle ONE.
a.  stay in the military for a career
b.  stay for one term and then get out
c.  wait and see
29.  Which of the following were important in your decision to join the military?  
    Circle ALL that apply.
a.  desire to serve my county
b.  patriotism
c.  adventure/challenge
d.  desired to be a soldier, airman, Sailor, or Marine (for a few years)
e. desired a long career as a soldier, airman, Sailor, or Marine
f.  money for college
g.  repay student loans
h.  entry bonus
i.  need to support family (spouse and/or kids)
j.  crisis (divorce, loss of job, financial problems, etc.)
k.  influenced to join by parents
l.  influenced to join by spouse or significant other
m. influenced to join by friends
n.  lack of better options
o.  best employment available
p.   I was drafted
30.  While you were still in the military, did you have colleagues who left the military to 
        work for DoD as civilian contractors?  Please check ONE:
a. ____ Yes (Go to question 31)   
b. ____ No  (Skip to question 32)
31.  If yes on Question 30, approximately how many?  __________
32. While you were on active duty, where you ever contacted about a job by someone 
       working for a civilian contracting firm?  Please check ONE.
a. ____  Yes (Go to questions 33 and 34)
b. ____  No  (Skip to question 35)
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33.  If yes on question 32, how often would you say this happened?  
       Please check ONE.
a.  ____  once
b.  ____  a few times
c.  ____  fairly frequently
d.  ____  with great frequency
34.   If yes on question 32, where were you when you were contacted? 
        Check ALL that apply.
a.  ____  at work
b.  ____  in uniform but not at my place of work
c.  ____  at home
d.  ____  other (please specify)  _______________________
35. What was your rank when you separated/retired from the military?  ________________
36. What was your military specialty?  __________________    
37.  What was your MOS code? _________
38.  Which service were you in?  _____________
39.  How long did you serve in the military?  _____ years _____ months.
Please use this space to tell us any additional information on issues related to your work.
(continue on back if necessary)
Thank you for completing this survey.
Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.
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Appendix III.  Informed Consent Form
Informed Consent Form
Work-Related Attitudes
I state that I am over 18 years of age and wish to participate in a program of research being 
conducted by David R. Segal and Ryan Kelty in the Department of Sociology at the University of 
Maryland, College Park.
The purpose of this research is to examine issues related to civilian contractors working with 
military personnel.
Procedure:  The procedure for this study involves completion of a short paper and pencil 
questionnaire and/or an informal interview focusing on experiences and attitudes related to 
working in an environment that includes both military and civilian contractor personnel.  
Completion time for this questionnaire is approximately 15-20 minutes.  Informal interviews will 
be held at the request of the research volunteer and may last as long as the research subject 
maintains interest and has time available.
Examples of questions asked in the survey include: 
A.  On a 6-point scale (1. strongly disagree 2. disagree, 3. somewhat disagree, 4. 
somewhat agree, 5. agree, 6. strongly agree) enter the number that corresponds to 
your level of agreement with the following statement:  
STATEMENT: __ I consider civilian contractors to be members of the U.S. 
military’s total force.
B.  If you were to compare military personnel and civilian contractors who perform the 
same (or roughly equivalent) duties, how would you rate the following factors using the 5-
point scale below? (1. much greater in the military, 2. greater in the military, 3. about equal 
in both, 4. greater in private contracting firms, 5. much greater in private contracting firms) 
FACTORS: __ pay;  __ benefits; __ hours spend working per day; __ quality of leadership 
in the organization; __ level of risk of personal injury, etc.
C.  Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate in the blanks provided the strength of 
your opinion for each statement. (1. very dissatisfied, 2 dissatisfied, 3. neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, 4. satisfied, 5. very satisfied)
STATEMENTS: __ Being able to keep busy all the time; __ The chance to work alone on 
the job: __ The chance to do different things from time to time; __ The chance to be 
“somebody” in the community; __ The way my supervisor handles his/her men and 
women; etc.
All information collected in this study is confidential to the extent permitted by law.  I 
understand that the data I provide will be grouped with data provided by others for reporting and 
presentation and that my name will not be used at any time.
There are no foreseeable physical or psychological risks to research subjects as a result of 
participation in this study.
Initials ______   Date __________ Page 1 of 2
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I understand that while this experiment is not designed to help me personally, my participation 
will help the investigators learn more about the social-psychological effects of military 
outsourcing.  This knowledge will be used to make recommendations that facilitate improvement 
in military efficiency and soldiers’ quality of life.  I am free to ask questions, withdraw from 
participation, or decline to answer any of the questions in the survey without being penalized in 
any way.
Principal Investigator Student Investigator
Dr. David R. Segal Ryan D. Kelty
Department of Sociology Department of Sociology
4145 Art/Sociology Bldg. 2112 Art/Sociology Bldg.
University of Maryland University of Maryland
College Park, MD  20412 College Park, MD  20412 
dsegal@socy.umd.edu rkelty@socy.umd.edu
301-405-6439 301-405-6013
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related 
injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College 
Park, Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-4212.
Name of Research Subject (please print):  __________________________________
Signature of Research Subject:  ____________________________________
Date: ___________________
Page 2 of 2
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